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ABSTRACT 
 
The main focus of this thesis is an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of subsidies paid by 
electricity consumers to support the uptake of household photovoltaic (PV) in Australia, 
modelled over the period 2006 to 2014. This modelling is a component of a larger 20 year model, 
of small and large-scale renewable energy, developed to enable sensitivity analyses and policy 
scenarios to be undertaken of the effectiveness of renewable energy subsidies. In Australia 
subsidies are funded mostly by electricity consumers although there are some state and 
Commonwealth grants. Costs and revenues have been determined for each type of renewable 
energy over the period from 2000 to 2020 and converted to payback periods. For household PV, 
annual payback periods are regressed against the uptake of PV over the years 2006 to 2014 with 
sensitivity analyses run on input variables. The extent to which renewable energy has replaced 
coal and gas-fired energy is assessed to estimate the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. The 
relationship of subsidies to emission reductions appears to be the first analysis of this kind in 
Australia.  
Household PV sensitivity analysis revealed that the declining cost of PV panels had most impact 
on PV uptake followed by feed-in tariffs (FITs), renewable energy credits and increasing 
household electricity tariffs. Modelling suggests that FITs were higher than necessary to achieve 
the resultant levels of household PV uptake and that the low cost of PV panels and comparatively 
high electricity tariffs are likely to result in a continuing strong uptake of household PV in 
Australia.  
Household PV subsidies peaked in 2011 and 2012, with payback periods falling to three to four 
years, having since increased to five to six years. Emission reduction costs are expected to reduce 
from AU$118 per t CO2e in 2014 to AU$110 per t CO2e in 2020, having peaked at AU$212 per t 
CO2e in 2010. Household PV reduced Australia’s emissions by 3.7 million t CO2e in 2014 and 
are expected to reach 6.9 million t CO2e (1.3 % of Australia’s total emissions) by 2020. 
Large-scale energy, not having the same level of subsidies as household PV, had payback periods 
upwards of 10 years prior to 2015 but have since fallen as a result of increasing large-scale 
generation certificate (LGC) prices increasing to over AU$70/LGC. Emission reduction costs for 
large-scale renewable energy averaged AU$47 per t CO2e in 2014 and are forecast to reach 
AU$80 per t CO2e by 2020. The trend difference is because household PV FITs expire over time 
whereas LGC prices have been increasing. 
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Sensitivity analyses suggest that household PV subsidies could have been AU$1 billion to AU$2 
billion lower with minimal impact on the uptake of household PV. The outcome without 
subsidies produced an almost 50% uptake of actual household PV uptake, but little growth in 
large-scale renewable energy. Subsidies totalling AU$19 billion could have been saved over the 
period 2000 to 2020 but Australia would not have met its target of 20% of generation being from 
renewable energy sources by 2020.  
Modelling suggested that in 2014 retail electricity prices would have been 12 % lower without 
subsidy payments and a further 14 % lower if network costs had increased at the same rate as 
other electricity cost components. The latter highlights the substantial increase in network 
charges which were argued were necessary “to keep the lights on”, which assisted in reducing 
emissions through reduced electricity consumption. 
The model was extended to analyse the responsiveness of consumers to increasingly higher 
electricity prices, producing a price elasticity of demand for electricity in Australia over the 
period FY 2008 to FY 2015 of -0.4, being in line with other research.  This means that consumer 
subsidies not only stimulated renewable energy output but, through higher retail electricity prices 
have also contributed towards emission reductions through reducing electricity consumption. 
The analysis was extended to include the economics of battery storage associated with household 
PV, considered appropriate because of the decline in battery costs, and the forthcoming 
termination of high FITs. Together they are expected to make battery storage a viable option for 
many households in Australia in the near future. Battery payback periods are expected to fall 
from 25 to 12 years for smaller PV households and to decline to four years for larger (more than 
4 kW) PV households. 
In summary, renewable energy subsidies in Australia will total nearly AU$20 billion over the 
period 2001 to 2020, a cost born by electricity consumers. The outcome is that Australia will very 
likely meet its 2020 target of 20% of generation being from renewable energy but whether the 5% 
reduction in emissions will also be achieved is also dependent on emission reductions in other 
areas, including the success of the government’s Direct Action Plan. Household PV subsidies 
could have been restructured to achieve more cost effective outcomes, with AU$1 billion to 
AU$2 billion savings having been possible with little uptake impact.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Summary 
The Introduction explains, in an Australian context, (1) the importance of the renewable energy 
sector in reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, (2) subsidy-related renewable energy 
sector issues, (3) the research questions answered in this thesis, (4) the significance of the 
research, (5) methodology used, (6) the author’s professional experience in the energy sector as 
far as it relates to this research, and (7) the structure of this thesis. 
1.1 Background 
 
This thesis is predicated on the assumption that climate change is a major global problem and that 
the primary driver of climate change is GHG emissions. The importance of taking corrective 
action to address climate change is summed up by Orszag (2008) in his testimony to the US 
House of Representatives: 
Global climate change is one of the nation’s most significant long-term policy challenges.  
Human activities are producing increasingly large quantities of greenhouse gases, 
particularly CO2. The accumulation of those gases in the atmosphere is expected to have 
potentially serious and costly effects on regional climates throughout the world. Although 
the magnitude of such damage remains highly uncertain, there is growing recognition that 
some degree of risk exists for the damage to be large and perhaps even catastrophic. 
The risk of potentially catastrophic damage from climate change can justify taking action 
to reduce that risk in much the same way that the hazards we all face as individuals 
motivate us to buy insurance.  Some of society’s resources may best be devoted to 
addressing climate change even if the most severe damage ultimately does not materialize. 
Reducing greenhouse-gas emissions would be beneficial in limiting the degree of risk 
associated with climate change, especially the risk of significant damage.  However, 
decreasing those emissions would also impose costs on the economy – in the case of CO2, 
because much economic activity is based on fossil fuels, which release carbon in the form 
of that gas when they are burned.  Much of those costs will be passed along to consumers 
in the form of higher prices for energy and energy-intensive goods (Orszag, 2008, p 1). 
The focus of this thesis is on the contribution that the electricity sector, and in particular the 
renewable energy sector, can make in helping to reduce GHG emissions in Australia. GHG 
emissions from the electricity sector increased from 40 to 45% of total Australian GHG emissions 
over the last 20 years (Australian Government Department of Climate Change and Energy 
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Efficiency, (2012a). Countering fossil fuel generation growth is the growth in renewable energy 
from 8% of total electricity output in 2000 to 15% in 2015 (BREE, 2013; Clean Energy Council, 
2015). Recent renewable energy growth is mostly due to household PV having increased from 23 
MW in 2008 to 4,000 MW in 2015 (AEMO, 2012; Clean Energy Council, 2015), being 2.4% of 
total energy output (Clean Energy Council, 2015).  
The analysis presented in this thesis covers the period from 2000 to 2020, being the period during 
which the Australian Government committed, in 2011 as part of the Clean Energy Futures Plan, 
to reduce GHG emissions by 5% compared with 2000 levels as well as seeking to have at least 
20% of electricity generation from renewable energy sources (Clean Energy Regulator, 2012a). 
Although the analysis does not extend beyond 2020 the ongoing subsidy-related renewable 
energy incentives will ensure ongoing emission reductions, being a necessary part of future 
emission reduction targets, the most relevant being reduction of GHG emissions by 80% by 2050 
(Climate Change Authority, 2014). 
Australia’s approach to reducing GHG emissions has been wide-ranging including energy 
conservation measures, land clearing incentives and state government schemes such as the 
Queensland’s 13% gas scheme and the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement scheme. This thesis 
however examines only subsidy-related renewable energy schemes applying nationally that by 
impacting on electricity generation or electricity consumption reduce GHG emissions. The first 
such scheme took effect in 2001 through the establishment of a mandatory renewable energy 
target (MRET) scheme, followed by having a price on carbon on 1 July 2012, terminating in June 
2014, and more recently, following a change in government, introducing what is known as the 
Emissions Reduction Fund and Direct Action Plan (DAP). In addition states introduced feed-in 
tariffs (FITs) for household PV, the first commencing 1 July 2008. Renewable energy scheme 
costs and FITs are passed on directly by retailers to electricity consumers. The price on carbon is 
initially borne by electricity generators who, to the extent competition allows, pass this on in 
higher wholesale electricity prices to retailers who pass on to electricity consumers. The DAP is 
funded directly by government. 
The MRET was restructured in 2009, to become the renewable energy target (RET), providing 
separate targets and separate penalties to electricity retailers for not securing minimum renewable 
energy credits from small-scale, mostly household photovoltaic (PV), and large-scale renewable 
energy projects. The history of MRET and RET schemes is discussed in more detail in Section 
4.2. Large-scale renewable energy schemes initially had the most impact on reducing GHG 
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emissions but increasingly attractive household PV incentives resulted in substantial growth in 
household PV with emission reductions exceeding the most optimistic expectations.  
1.2 Research problem 
 
Emission reduction policies have been implemented in many countries and regions around the 
world (Honghang et al, 2014a; Dusonchet and Telaretti, 2015; REN, 2016) most often, based on a 
literature search, without an evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of these schemes. This was also 
observed in Australia’s case by Oliva and MacGill (2013) who commented “There has been a 
lack of a long term economic assessment of these (referring to PV policy support) in Australia, 
from both a social and a private perspective, which has ended up in unsustainable and 
economically inefficient programs” (Oliva and MacGill, 2013, p 1). In Australia, policy decisions 
are made at both the Commonwealth and state levels, generally with the parties acting 
independently of each other so that funding allocated towards emission reduction policies is not 
being effectively used to meet national emission reduction and renewable energy targets. The 
influence of governments at different levels and the possibility of changes in the parties in power, 
who may change existing policies, has resulted in some investment uncertainty jeopardising the 
effectiveness of renewable energy policies. At the Commonwealth level the only real bipartisan 
stability has occurred in the unwritten agreement to support a renewable energy scheme, but this 
may change as renewable energy targets beyond 2020 have yet to be finalised. 
The research challenge is the need to provide more reliable information on the cost-effectiveness 
of Australian government’s renewable and emission reduction policies. Research by 
organisations such as the Productivity Commission, Treasury, ACIL Tasman, ROAM Consulting, 
SKMMMA and Frontier Economics, provide valuable information but they cannot overcome 
political uncertainty and are generally not in the same level of detail as in this thesis.  
1.3 Research questions 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide information that assists Australian policy makers in 
developing long-term electricity sector emission reduction policies by answering the following 
questions: 
1. How do renewable energy schemes compare with the efficiency of other emission reduction 
schemes? 
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2. How cost-effective have household roof top PV1 subsidies been in reducing GHG emissions 
in Australia? 
 
3. What lessons can be learnt from household PV incentive schemes, particularly regarding 
how incentive schemes could have been better structured?  
 
4. How would the level of output and emission reductions have changed if subsidies for small 
and large-scale renewable energy had been at lower levels? 
 
5. What is the likelihood that Australia will meet its renewable energy and emission reduction 
targets in 2020? 
This thesis utilises a model developed for the purpose of answering these questions. The model 
enables quantification of the cost of subsidies, both in absolute terms and in cost per tonne of 
reduced GHG emissions from renewable energy in Australia, to show which schemes have been 
relatively cost effective. 
1.4 Justification for this research 
 
The spending of substantial amounts of money, being either directly by government or through 
levies imposed on electricity consumers, is a contentious matter, not always showing clear 
benefits. This thesis attempts to reduce the level of contention through objective analysis to 
measure costs and benefits, such that an assessment can be made as to whether such money or 
levies are “well spent” or appropriately imposed. The level of contention can be reduced if 
renewable energy output and GHG emissions from reduced subsidy levels were better 
understood, and meaningful alternatives suggested, being important information for policy 
makers. 
The model developed enables examination to be made of the level of subsidies associated with 
each type of renewable energy, associated emission reductions and their unit costs. It is 
sufficiently generic that it could be applied in other countries where renewable energy subsidies 
have been introduced2.   
A 20 year model has been developed that produces payback periods for household PV and large-
scale energy types: solar; wind; hydro, bagasse and biomass energy generation, enabling 
1 Availability of data has meant that the analysis also includes small-scale commercial (less than 100 kW) PV.  
 
2 This comment was made by one of the reviewers of the author’s paper published in the journal Applied Energy. 
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sensitivity analyses to be undertaken, an approach that does not appear to have occurred in 
Australian or overseas. Neither does the household demand-side management component, 
defined as electricity demand response to higher retail electricity prices, producing price-demand 
elasticities, appear to have been modelled in Australia, although overseas research is common. A 
particularly novel aspect of the research is the in-depth analysis of the financial aspects faced by 
households in deciding whether or not to install PV, developing payback periods, and then using 
regression analysis to relate payback periods to the actual uptake of PV. A further novel aspect is 
the use of half-hourly PV output data, for a full year, to determine the types of generation 
displaced so that reductions in GHG emissions can be measured and matched against the level of 
subsidies involved. Outcomes with and without subsidies were used to determine the impact of 
subsidies on levels of emission reductions and the extent to which 2020 targets might or might 
not be met. 
1.5 Overview of methodology approach 
 
A 20 year model has been developed that captures costs, subsidies and revenues associated with 
renewable energy projects on an annual basis. Five categories of renewable energy types are 
examined: household rooftop PV; large-scale solar; hydro, wind, bagasse and biomass, although 
for data availability reasons biomass is viewed in less detail than the others. Household PV is 
examined in most detail because it involves a range of incentives and has been an effective 
emissions reduction scheme. A regression model relates payback periods to the actual uptake of 
household PV over the period FY 2006 to FY 2014.   
Non-renewable energy is viewed according to the switch from coal-fired to gas-fired generation 
particularly over the carbon price years of FY 2013 and FY 2014. Energy conservation, in effect 
energy reduction, is viewed according to the reduction in demand associated with increases in 
real electricity prices, creating a price elasticity of demand. Sensitivity analyses are undertaken of 
input costs and subsidies, wherever possible. Household PV regression analysis covers nine years 
whereas the full analysis is from FY 2000 to FY 2020 encompassing the period the Australia 
Government has committed to reducing GHG emissions by 5% as well as seeking to have at least 
20% of electricity generation from renewable energy sources (Clean Energy Regulator, 2012a). A 
more complete explanation of the methodology used is contained in Chapter 5, with additional 
detail in Appendix A.   
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1.6 Structure of this thesis 
 
This thesis has been structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This chapter includes objectives of this thesis, originality of research and methodology adopted.  
Chapter 2 Review of Renewable Energy-Related Literature 
This chapter discusses published research on household PV and large-scale renewable energy, 
with emphasis on variations in subsidies worldwide. It also examines renewable energy in the 
context of energy storage, relationship with other emission reduction schemes and the future of 
renewable energy world-wide. 
Chapter 3 Climate Change Reality and World-wide Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction 
Schemes  
This chapter discusses whether there is in fact a climate change issue, and if so what are the 
options available to address it. A broad view is first taken of the difference between “price” and 
“quantity” emission reduction schemes, in the context of carbon pricing, cap and trade and 
renewable energy schemes. World-wide GHG emission reduction schemes are examined with a 
focus on emission reduction schemes in the European Union, including analysis of baseline 
issues. 
Chapter 4 Australia’s Approach to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions   
This chapter discusses the history and current situation concerning electricity-related emission 
reduction schemes in Australia, including reference to the rapid growth in household PV and 
opportunities for households to reduce emissions. 
Chapter 5 Methodology 
This chapter begins with the approach taken that lead to modelling the various emission reduction 
schemes proposed and adopted in Australia, leading to the four part modelling approach adopted. 
Each of these four model components is discussed in some detail. Comments are also included on 
aspects not modelled, such as network and back-up generation issues associated with renewable 
energy. 
Chapter 6 Model Results 
22 
 
This chapter discusses household PV model outcomes including costs per tonne of CO2e emitted 
and examines the sensitivity of outcomes to changes in input data such as subsidy levels and PV 
panel costs. The subsidy costs of large-scale renewable energy output, being large-scale solar, 
hydro, wind and bagasse, are examined with comments on the likelihood of Australia achieving 
its emission reduction and renewable targets in 2020. These costs are compared with emission 
reduction costs in other countries. 
Chapter 7 Sensitivity of Model Results to Reduced Subsidy Levels 
The sensitivity of renewable energy output to reduced subsidy levels is viewed for each of 
household PV and large-scale renewable energy, including the extreme example of no subsidies. 
The outcomes are used to evaluate whether Australia’s emission targets could be met at lower 
subsidy levels.  
Chapter 8 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This chapter discusses policy implications for household PV including FIT policy options and the 
future of renewable energy in Australia. Opportunities for households to more actively contribute 
to reducing emissions are discussed. 
Appendix A Model Explanation 
This appendix contains five sections being parts of this thesis explained in more detail, being: 
how the household PV model was developed, how generation data was used retail electricity 
prices developed, how the large-scale renewable energy model was developed, reconciliation of 
renewable energy output with data contained in the REC Registry and a list of references 
containing data used only in the models developed. 
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Chapter 2 Literature review of subsidies and viability of renewable energy 
 
Summary 
Chapter 2 is a literature review mainly covering subsidies that support renewable energy world-
wide and the overall economics of renewable energy. It does not relate to Australian 
developments, which are covered in later chapters. There is particular emphasis on research that 
relates to the model that has been developed, and associated policy implications. 
The initial focus is on feed-in tariffs (FITs) which are a key form of small-scale renewable energy 
subsidy. Large-scale renewable energy subsidies are also examined particularly because of their 
current and expected future importance in helping ensure Australia meets its renewable energy 
targets.  
The improving economics of energy storage, household PV and large-scale renewable energy are 
examined to determine whether viability is still possible at lower subsidy levels and even 
possibility without subsidies at some stage. 
The literature review ends with the relationship between renewable energy schemes and other 
electricity-related schemes designed to reduce GHG emissions, and also discusses how renewable 
energy, non-renewable energy and energy storage might best be integrated.  
The chapter that follows takes a global view of climate change to help provide a perspective of 
the importance of renewable energy schemes, including a world-wide analysis of renewable 
energy schemes. Carbon trading schemes are also examined but only in the context of how they 
relate to renewable energy schemes. 
The review, in effect, examines different types of incentives or subsidies designed to support 
renewable energy, and the extent to which, as relative costs change over time, these incentives or 
subsidies are less likely to be needed.  
2.1 Subsidies stimulating household PV 
 
The literature review for solar energy has been separated into world-wide subsidies, variations in 
FITs, being the most common type of household PV subsidy, and the possibility of household PV 
reaching grid parity, reflecting continually declining PV costs, so that subsidies would no longer 
be required. 
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2.1.1 World-wide subsidy support for household PV 
 
An increasing number of countries has introduced renewable energy subsidies with a particular 
focus on household PV, supported by FITs, which were first introduced by Germany (Bakhtyar et 
al, 2014), and less commonly supported by RECs. Honghang et al (2014a) determined that in 
2014 there were 75 jurisdictions world-wide having solar energy FITs and 14 having renewable 
energy credit policies, having increased from 50 and ten respectively in 2010 (Schmalensee, 
2012). A comprehensive review of FITs in EU countries is provided by Dusonchet and Telaretti 
(2015).  
Australia’s household PV subsidy structure differs from those in other parts of the world in that 
there is both a nation-wide subsidy and state subsidies. The nation-wide subsidy is in the form of 
small-scale technology certificates (STCs), earlier known as RECs, being a capital cost subsidy. 
An STC represented each MWh of PV output, which for PV systems in excess of 1.5 kW were 
deemed to total two STCs per annum, totally a maximum of 30 STCs over a 15 year period. State 
subsidies are FITs, varying by state, having differing terms with some FITs being on a gross (that 
is all PV output) basis and some on a net (that is exports only) basis. The relative merits of  REC 
and FIT schemes are discussed in Sun et al (2015) concluding that it is difficult to show which is 
more effective while Tamas et al (2010) concluded that the schemes would have identical 
effectiveness in perfectly competitive markets. Authorities in Australia, as in most countries, 
underestimated the uptake of PV which was driven mainly by the unexpected rapid decline in the 
price of PV panels (Australian PV Association, 2011). This has resulted in many countries 
reviewing the ongoing nature of household PV subsidies, particularly FITs.   
2.1.2 Variations in types of feed-in-tariffs 
 
The provision of comparatively high fixed FITs in some Australian states, continuing for five to 
20 years, and the ongoing high cost, begs the question of whether a different type of FIT could 
have been adopted (Parliament of Australia, 2011).The level and ongoing nature of FITs is also a 
concern in many other countries, including the United Kingdom (Cherrington et al, 2013), Spain 
(de la Hoz, 2014), Italy (Antonelli et al, 2014) and Greece (Danchev et al, 2010), and recognised 
by Hsu (2012) in providing FIT policy suggestions for Taiwan. The Australian case of three years 
of high FITs is similar to the experience in the United Kingdom, where attractive FITs resulted in 
strong PV growth. Cheerington et al (2013) noted that the UK government was considering 
reducing the FIT by 50% concluding, from case studies, that “a healthy return on investment can 
still be made” (Cheerington et al, 2013, p 421). 
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Japan introduced installation-cost subsidies for residential PV in 1994 followed by a FIT scheme 
in 2009 of EUR34 per kWh (Muhammad-Sukki et al, 2014). In August 2011, following the 
Fukushima disaster, this was expanded to include wind, geothermal, hydro and biomass, with a 
target of 20% to 35% of energy from renewable sources by 2013. Since July 2012 the FIT rate for 
small scale solar has been EUR30 per kWh with payback periods varying between 7 and 9 years. 
Their analysis suggests that Japan has had a carefully constructed FIT regime, stimulating PV 
without the highs and lows experienced by many other developed countries.  
Ouyang and Lin (2014) determined that, in China, the current FIT of 5 percent capital costs is 
inadequate to support renewable energy growth needed to meet emission reduction targets (of 40 
to 45% reduction on 2005 levels by 2020) with increased FITs being the most desirable means of 
achieving this target. In Ireland the economics of household PV has not been attractive (li et al, 
2011).  Ayompe and Duffy (2013) evaluated PV viability in Ireland under three FIT scenarios for 
three user type categories, resulting in substantial savings compared with a single FIT, for a 
similar uptake level. 
Some of the many suggestions on FIT improvements include comments by Couture and Gagnon 
(2010) who suggested two types of FITs, those having a fixed price, with variations such as CPI 
adjustment and front loading, and those linked to market electricity prices. Lesser and Su (2008) 
suggested including a market component by having a “two part tariff, consisting of both a 
capacity payment and a market-based energy payment” (Lesser and Su, 2008, p 981) while 
Jenner et al (2013) commented on seven different FITs, most of which are currently in place in 
European countries. Of relevance in an Australian context are comments made by Leepa and 
Unfried (2013) to allow “FIT adjustments related to the changes of photovoltaic panel prices” 
(Leepa and Unfried, 2013, p 536). Also relevant is the suggestion made by Byrnes et al (2013) 
that FITs be “reviewed regularly to ensure that market distortions are not excessive” and that 
“FITs are reduced “once technology maturity and integration increases” (Byrnes et al, 2013, p 
717). Danchev et al (2010) expressed similar views in relation to Greece which changed in 2009 
from a fixed to a de-escalating FIT.  
A market-related FIT policy has been deployed in Germany (Grau, 2014) but there are critics 
(Fais et al, 2014) who suggest that the FIT and REC regimes in Germany could be better 
structured taking closer account of policy objectives. Zhou et al (2011) and Ringel (2006) have 
similar views in stressing the importance of distinguishing between renewable energy subsidy 
schemes which are effective, in being capable of achieving goals, and those which are efficient, in 
minimising costs in achieving goals. Several commentators, including Reuter et al (2012) argue 
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that the uncertain future of FIT regimes in some countries has been limiting renewable energy 
growth.   
A reverse auction process of determining FITs has been suggested by several authors. Mayr et al 
(2014) modelled a reverse auction for household PV in Austria concluding that savings of 20% to 
41% could be achieved compared with the current first-come first-served policy. In Australia a 
reverse auction FIT was suggested by Buckman et al (2014) in regard to a 40 MW solar energy 
plant in the Australian Capital Territory. Although this is substantially larger than household PV 
capacities it is a similar concept, utilising both market prices and a competitive process to 
determine a FIT level. These policy suggestions are not too late for some counties, such as 
Mexico, where FITs in other countries are being examined to determine best FIT policy options 
(Mundo-Hernandez, 2014). 
There is a further issue of whether any form of FIT should apply when existing FIT contracts 
terminate, so that renewable energy projects can continue to be competitive. Uran and Krajcar 
(2013) suggest that a new FIT could apply which included a component in the form of the 
wholesale electricity price, a concept likely to have application in Australia in the near future as 
FITs expire on a state by state basis. As well as the type of feed-in tariff being important to be 
effective in the case of developing countries the comment has been made that there is also the 
need to address technical, regulatory issues and financial barriers (Rickerson et al, 2013).     
2.1.3 World-wide trend in the improving economics of household PV 
  
Household PV in Australia has become increasingly attractive with payback periods having fallen 
to between three and four years (Burtt and Dagusch, 2015), although the time period has since 
risen to over five years as a result of the reduction in subsidies. This begs two questions: how 
does this compare with other countries and what is the likely trend for the future?  
O’Flaherty et al (2014) examined payback periods between 2007 and 2009 on 23 buildings in 
South Yorkshire. REC benefits were first available but they were subsequently replaced by FITs 
so that both types of benefits were not available at the same time. With RECs, payback periods 
were at least 60 years and with FITs they were as low as 14 years. Muhammad-Sukki et al (2014) 
calculated household PV payback periods in the order of 8 years in Japan follow introduction of 
FITs on 1 July 2012, concluding that a strong uptake will continue. Muhammad-Sukki et al 
(2014) undertook similar analyses for Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom resulting in 
payback periods of 15, 9 and 9 years respectively. They added that although solar only 
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contributed to less than 1% of electricity generated in Japan prior to the Fukushima event the new 
FIT generates “an acceptable payback period” (Muhammad-Sukki et al, 2014, p. 642).  
These results support the growth in household PV in Italy and the United Kingdom but with the 
strong growth of household PV in Germany it would appear there might be some additional 
German incentives not included. Plante (2014) undertook a similar exercise in a USA context 
arriving at a payback period of 15 to 17 years but with the inclusion of federal and tax credits this 
reduces to 9 to 10 years. It is worth noting that none of these payback periods is as low as those 
applying in the peak of subsidies provided in Australia in 2011 and 2012. 
2.2 Subsidies stimulating large-scale renewable energy 
 
The main focus in this thesis is household PV and the extent to which different types of subsidies 
have provided the greatest growth stimulus. For large-scale renewable energy the prime stimulus 
in Australia has been renewable credits in the form of large-scale generation certificates (LGCs), 
for output in excess of average 1994, 1995 and 1996 levels (Appendix A-4). In countries other 
than Australia there are often specific FITs designed to encourage renewable energy from a wider 
range of renewable energy sources, in effect substituting for Australia’s LGC concept. 
The extent to which different types of renewable energy incentives, for example grants, tax 
exemptions, green certificates and FITs, are most likely to be effective was examined by Burer et 
al (2009), through a survey of 60 investment professionals in Europe and North America. Of 12 
possible “market pull” policies, FITs rated 4.2 out of a maximum 5.0, no others being above 3.6 
and renewable certificates being one of the lowest rated at 3.2. The likelihood of least possible 
government intervention in the case of FITs was seen as a key factor in these results. 
2.3 The improving economics of energy storage 
 
There is the potential for household PV to obtain increased benefits through the storing of excess 
electricity at times when it is not needed, for later use (Bahadori, 2013). In an Australian 
household context Speidel and Braunl (2016) examined the improving economics of battery 
storage, aided by declining PV costs and the expected continuing reduction in battery costs. 
The use of battery storage reduces the need for peaking electricity generation, giving rise to 
possible long-term benefits to consumers. Unfortunately the outcome provides real challenges for 
network companies, particularly if households become energy independent and therefore off grid 
(Agnew et al, 2015). Utilities are seeing this as a real threat, requiring a review of their business 
models (Rocky Mountain Institute, 2014).  
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The three main limitations to households achieving energy storage benefits are one-part 
household tariffs, not showing variations reflective of wholesale electricity prices, cost and 
availability of time-of-use meters (Burtt, 2009) and the cost of storage (Schleicher-Tappeser, 
2012; Mayr et al, 2014). Edis (2014) summarised results from seven authors showing the cost of 
battery storage had declined by an average 40% between 2011 and 2014, with a further reduction 
of 35% expected between 2014 and 2020. In a Japanese context Komiyama and Fujii (2014) 
concluded that better use of LNG combined cycle plant and lower battery costs were necessary to 
secure the full potential of PV. 
Chiang et al (1998) examined the most efficient relationship between household PV output, 
household consumption and battery storage system to determine how to most cost-effectively 
satisfy a utility’s power requirements. An experimental 600 watt system was used concluding that 
although set-up costs made the proposal uneconomic this could change in the future. Zahedi 
(2011) provided similar comments particularly in regard to the value of energy storage in 
improving overall PV reliability.   
On a larger scale, in the wholesale market there are benefits through storage occurring when 
wholesale electricity prices are low for later exporting to the grid at times of high (peak) prices. 
This was recognised by  Dominguez et al (2012) noted, in a Spanish context, who noted that 
molten salt storage has the potential  to improve the economics of a large-scale concentrating 
power plant. The economics of large-scale hydro has similarly benefitted through pump storage, 
whereby water is pumped uphill to a catchment area to be later released, to flow through hydro-
turbines at times of high electricity prices (PIN, 2013; IEA, 2014a). Australian examples include 
the Wivenhoe power station, Southern Hydro and Snowy Hydro.  
The increasing focus on energy storage has prompted research into the most efficient types of 
battery systems. Yang et al (2011) examined the technical efficiency of a wide range of 
electrochemical battery types concluding that “the applications in terms of capacity, siting, 
performance parameters, etc. need to be further refined” (Yang et al, 2011, p. 3605). Xiaosong et 
al (2014) examined three energy storage systems a Li-ion battery, a supercapacitor pack and a 
combination of the two to determine which was most cost effective in powering a hybrid 
powertrain, concluding that in general the hybrid option was most cost effective but the outcome 
could vary depending on battery and diesel costs. Utilisation of used electric vehicle batteries is 
seen by Heymans et al (2014) as a valuable energy storage option particularly for peak load 
shifting. The outcome however was not seen to be economic without government incentives, but 
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with the possibility of a greater uptake of electric vehicles in future this could eventually become 
a viable option.  
Although not modelled in detail in this thesis the subject of energy storage and the associated 
economics for household PV has been analysed in Section 6.1.10 by considering possible 
outcomes when household FITs expire. 
2.4 Future viability of household PV 
 
The continuing decline in the cost of solar panels (Ghosh, 2014; Trancik, 2014) has caused 
speculation as to whether, at some time in the future, it is possible that PV may be economic 
without subsidies (Frankel, 2012; Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012). The concept of being “economic” 
is generally viewed in the context of being similar to household electricity tariffs (known as “grid 
parity”) rather than being similar to wholesale market electricity prices (Bazilian et al, 2013, p 
334). The concept of “grid parity” should, according to Elliston et al (2010) and Bazilian et al 
(2013), be treated with some caution as electricity tariffs are not always representative of 
underlying energy and network costs, and this could change in future making the concept of grid 
parity, especially in the case of multi-part tariffs, more problematic. Brazilian et al. (2013) also 
noted that because household tariffs are set differently around the world, inter-country 
comparisons should be treated with caution. Nevertheless there is widespread view that “solar PV 
grid parity has already been achieved in a number of countries/regions” (Bazilian et al, 2013, p 
335), even up to four years ago in parts of the USA (Branker et al, 2011), imminently in Italy 
(IEA, 2012) and parts of China (Rigter and Vidican, 2010 and Honghang et al, 2014b). Fokaides 
and Kylili (2014), in a Cyprus context, noted that, because of the rapid reduction in PV costs, 
predictions of grid parity in the 2016 to 2020 era need to be brought forward such that grid parity 
may have already occurred in some locations. There is not however a consensus view with 
Holdermann et al (2104) concluding, in the context of each of Brazil’s 63 distribution networks, 
that PV is not viable in either the commercial or residential sectors. 
2.5 Future viability of large-scale renewable energy 
  
Jakob (2012) analysed the extent to which subsidies are required to enable renewable energy 
projects viable. His analysis showed that levelised costs of solar energy were much greater than 
for other types of renewable energy, with wind being only about 25% that of solar energy. These 
figures suggest that it would be some time before large-scale solar would be viable without 
subsidies. However his figures are at 2005 and there have been substantial solar cost reductions 
since then, highlighting how far solar has progressed. Reichelstein and Yorston (2013) reached 
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similar conclusions in a USA context noting that utility-scale PV installations are not yet cost 
competitive with fossil fuel power plants and that in contrast, commercial-scale installations have 
already attained cost parity, being comparable with retail electricity prices. Wind generation is 
also close to not requiring a subsidy, according to Frankl (2012). 
Delucchi and Jacobson (2011) viewed the extreme situation of world energy being supplied 
100% by renewable energy, with various means of addressing output volatility including storage. 
They concluded that the cost would be similar to the cost today and that the barriers are 
“primarily social and political, not technological or even economic” (Delucchi and Jacobson, 
2011, p 1170). 
Various authors have examined the likely future of large-scale renewable energy in Australia. 
Some attempted to view the outcome if there was a substantial increase in renewable energy, 
possibly in anticipation of larger GHG emission targets in the future. Elliston, MacGill and 
Diesendorf (2013) undertook modelling in an Australian context concluding that if emissions 
were to be dramatically cut, 100% renewables would be cheaper than any mix of fossil fuel and 
gas generation scenarios. Simshauser and Docwra (2004) came to a similar conclusion in using a 
range of modelling assumptions to conclude that no mix of coal and gas generation can cause 
GHG emissions to reduce sufficiently to enable Kyoto targets to be met as did Buckman and 
Diesendorf (2010a), through modelling, but only in relation to Australia attempting to meet its 
MRET target. They concluded that feed-in tariffs, a carbon price from an emissions trading 
scheme and renewable energy certificate prices will not be sufficient for the MRET target to be 
met. In a more recent paper Buckman and Diesendorf (2010b) concluded that low LGC prices 
will only support wind projects and that other forms of renewable energy will need their own 
incentives (Buckman and Diesendorf, 2010b). It should be noted that these comments are made 
prior to the upsurge in LGC prices in early 2015. 
AEMO (2013) concluded that a 100% renewable energy scenario was possible in Australia but 
wholesale electricity prices would need to be a little over double current levels. The principal 
underlying factor was additional capacity required, in excess of peak demand to ensure reliability 
of supply. Currently the excess is in the order of 15% to 25% but under a 100% renewables 
scenario this would need to be 100% to 150%, reflecting in particular the unreliability of wind 
generation. This conclusion is at odds with Simshauser (2011) who commented that the back-up 
or “hidden costs” associated with wind generation are trivial. His comments were based on a case 
study of wind energy in South Australia where, in 2010 wind output exceeded 17 per cent of total 
generation. This percentage would now be substantially higher which could alter his conclusion.  
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2.6 Externalities associated with renewable energy 
 
The viability of renewable energy projects, particularly household PV, reflects costs and benefits 
experienced by project developers, but does not include many related generation and network 
issues which developers currently do not experience (Simshauser, 2011; Lilley et al 2012). Hence 
they have not been modelled but they do have an economic impact that should not be overlooked, 
particularly when looking forward. 
In the short-term these issues reflect related non-renewable energy costs of transitioning to a 
more carbon friendly environment but the pain is not evenly spread. For example coal-fired 
generation is likely to still have a place in the generation mix but its importance will be reduced. 
Non-renewable generation expansion will be curtailed and there will be short-term costs through 
capacity being less well utilised, resulting in capital costs not being fully recovered. 
Issues associated with network costs in Australia, being distribution and transmission costs, are 
more complex. Distribution costs, associated with the carriage of electricity to households, will 
with increased household PV, be less well utilised with the owners being restricted in the extent 
to which cost recovery is possible. This reflects the fact that, in Australia, where there is a mix of 
privately and government owned distribution companies, the AER sets increases in network 
charges based on a range of factors (AER, 2015). As with generation, total cost recovery is not 
expected to be possible for several years when capacity becomes more closely aligned with 
demand. Households moving off grid, an increased likelihood given the decreasing cost of energy 
storage, will increase the concern of network companies being able to achieve full cost recovery. 
Transmission costs in Australia will be impacted but to a lesser extent. As with distribution costs 
the AER sets increases in transmission charges which are paid for by two consumer groups; 
households through being on-charged by distribution companies, and large consumers who may 
also be on-charged by distribution companies or have a direct relationship with transmission 
companies, thereby making direct payments. With the ongoing development of large-scale 
renewable energy, transmission companies in Australia will become involved in a wider range of 
transmission projects that may provide a better portfolio mix. For example household PV will 
need greater support from backup generation, new large-scale solar and wind generation will 
require new transmission lines and the overall integration of renewable and non-renewable 
energy and storage requirement will require additional transmission support.   
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2.7 Relationship between renewable energy and carbon pricing schemes 
 
The relationship between carbon pricing schemes, cap and trade schemes and renewable energy 
schemes is a key environmental and policy issue for several reasons. There is a need to ensure 
funding is well targetted, subsidies paid by consumers are as low as possible to achieve desired 
outcomes, schemes are compatible with each other, there is a clear relationship between emission 
targets and carbon price signals, and there is a clear understanding of the impact of changes in 
one type of scheme on other schemes. When making these comparisons, there are also less 
obvious benefits, particularly with renewable energy schemes such as energy security, local jobs 
and investment, but these are not examined in this thesis. 
Authors that have examined the relationship between carbon pricing and renewable energy 
schemes include Lehmann and Gawal (2013) who, in a European context, disagreed with many 
scholars who suggested abolishing renewable energy schemes because they, the scholars, 
believed they did nothing for emission reductions and undermined the cost-effectiveness of the 
EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). Lehmann and Gawal (2013) believe their conclusions were 
based on narrow and unrealistic assumptions, valid only in a perfect world. It is Lehmann and 
Gawal (2013)’s view that where there were multiple policy objectives, such as a minimum 
percentage of renewable energy generation and a targeted level of GHG emission reductions, 
being common in many countries, then “a policy mix of the EU ETS and RES-E support schemes 
may be justified for a variety of reasons” (Lehmann and Gawal, 2013, p 604). In a follow-up 
paper Gawal et al (2014) concluded that “support for renewable energies (1) contributes to a 
more effective ETS-design and (2) may even increase the overall efficiency of climate and energy 
if other externalities and policy objectives besides climate protection are considered” (Gawal et 
al, 2014, p 175). Kalkull et al (2013) developed a model, with a German focus, to determine the 
best mix of carbon pricing and renewable energy policies, to avoid duplicating incentives. 
Rio et al (2005) noted that in the EU it could be less costly to achieve emission reductions 
through Kyoto Protocol (CDM/JI) projects than by supporting new renewable energy projects. 
However this was noted as being less likely if the renewable energy project were undertaken 
overseas under the umbrella of a CDM/JI project as project costs are likely to be lower, while 
CDM/JI credits of CERs and ERUs would still be achieved. In this case domestic emission 
reduction benefits are reduced at the expense of overseas beneficiaries. Rio et al (2005) added 
that if there was instead a mandatory percentage of electricity that needed to be sourced from 
renewable energy then carbon-related projects would become a secondary consideration, in effect 
adding to the pool of renewables once the renewable energy percentage had been achieved.  
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A further variation was offered by Richstein et al (2015) who suggested that if renewable energy 
schemes became overly effective (“overshooting”) then the emission cap in an ETS could be 
reduced. That is instead of altering the renewable energy target, thereby affecting investment 
certainty, the emission cap is lowered so that other carbon reduction methods, such as cap and 
trade, become the residual emissions reduction activity. Reducing the emissions cap reduces the 
carbon market price and hence reduces the viability of renewable energy projects helping to 
correct “overshooting”.  
The key connection between carbon pricing and renewable energy schemes is that they have a 
common objective of reducing GHG emissions but carbon pricing schemes may be ineffective if 
liable parties have little prospect of reducing emissions. Furthermore, if carbon pricing schemes 
are in a form of an emissions trading scheme there may be market price impacts of the like that 
recently occurred in the European Union. Luta (2014) commented on the oversupply of 
renewable allowances in the EU ETS noting that although the excess supply is continuously 
being wound back this has yet to arrest the dramatic price fall from EUR30/t CO2e in 2008, to 
EUR15/t CO2e from 2009 to 2011 and EUR$5/t CO2e to EUR8/t CO2e over the last two years, 
impacting the schemes effectiveness. Where renewable energy schemes run in parallel, there is 
the prospect that they could pick up the emissions target shortfall. KPMG (2014a)’s review of 
renewable energy schemes world-wide concluded that 117 of 138 countries had renewable energy 
targets and that 70 of the 138 countries had FITs or a similar premium payment. Most of the low 
income countries had renewable energy targets but few had FITs. The overall result highlights the 
substantial advancements that have been made world-wide in the field of renewable energy.  
There is value in extending the analysis to try to determine whether Australia has an ideal mix of 
emission reduction schemes. Wilkins (2008) undertook research at a time when it appeared likely 
Australia would continue with an emissions trading scheme, commenting “If there were a broad-
based perfectly functioning emissions trading scheme in Australia, there would be no need for 
any complementary policies. The trading scheme would deliver the most efficient outcome for 
Australia.” (Wilkins, 2008, p 1). Wilkins added that there is a “rather disorganised set of 
programs” that should be transitioned from 62 to eight that, inter alia, should be more strategic 
and better aligned with the emissions trading scheme. 
Australian Government Climate Change Authority. (2014) commented “It is likely a range of 
complimentary policies will continue to be necessary in Australia, and elsewhere, to deliver 
effective global action on climate change in the most cost-effective manner.” (Australian 
Government Climate Change Authority, 2014, p 78). 
34 
 
2.8 Optimal integration of renewable energy, non-renewable energy and energy 
storage 
 
The increasingly cost-competitive aspect of renewable energy begs the question of what, in 
future, will be the best mix of types of renewable energy, energy storage and conventional  coal 
and gas-fired energy that will meet the objectives of supply reliability, emission reduction targets 
and least costs. This can be viewed at both the macro, national level or at the micro, household 
level which are both now discussed. The increasing number of articles written on this subject is 
useful but only in a generic sense as each country or individual household has its own particular 
features. For example relative costs are changing over time, reflecting in particular solar energy 
technology developments since 2008 and more recent energy storage developments having a 
large-scale production focus. Individuals are likely to be seeking solutions that differ from large-
scale solutions, including seeking to be off-grid whereas large-scale solutions will reflect many 
factors such as carbon pricing, network pricing and the gradual reduction in network capacity and 
conventional power stations. In the case of individuals, consumption patterns can differ 
materially and price signals are not always readily available, often because technology associated 
with energy types is developing at different speeds. The initial discussion is at the broad, national 
level followed by emphasis on households, being more relevant to this thesis. 
How renewable energy schemes and non-renewable schemes might work together, rather than let 
different types of schemes compete in the open market, has been attempted through regulation in 
the UK. The rationale is that the outcome may produce a more efficient market outcome because 
of the manner in which different schemes impact on the need for back up generation and the 
differing impacts on network costs. Gurkan and Langestraat (2014) viewed in a UK context, the 
requirement for generators to provide part of their output from renewable generation sources, 
receiving valuable certificates for doing so. They concluded that the scheme “cannot guarantee 
that the original obligation target is met, hence potentially resulting in more pollution” (Gurkan 
and Langestraat, 2014, p 85).   
In a New Zealand context, of substantial hydro storage Mason et al (2013) concluded that 
security of supply over a six year period could be achieved with 100% renewables being “49% 
hydro, 23% wind, 13% geothermal, 14% pumped hydro storage peaking plant, 1% wood thermal 
plus biogas generation” (Mason et al, 2013, p 332). They suggested that peak demand could 
initially be met through 10%  gas turbines to be eventually be replaced by pump hydro energy 
storage. 
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At the household level there has been much research recently relating to the development of 
models to find the optimal mix of solar/wind, and battery storage for given load profiles. 
Examples include Zheng et al (2014) who related electricity usage options to levels of battery 
storage and Stenzel et al (2015) who determined optimal generation designs for various mixes of 
load profiles and battery storage systems. A model using levelised cost of energy storage 
(LCOES) was developed by Parra et al (2015), in a UK case study, to show that the LCOES was 
much lower when determined on a 100-home community basis rather than for a single home. 
This result may be important when options are considered at the time battery storage becomes 
economic. 
Ekren and Ekren (2010) developed a model to optimize the size of a PV/wind integrated hybrid 
energy system with battery storage. They noted this was ideal in remote locations “where the grid 
cannot penetrate and there is no other source of energy” (Ekren and Ekren, 2010, p 592). The 
model used historically derived distributions of solar radiation, wind speed and electricity 
consumption that converged at the 127th iteration to produce the optimum size of a PV/wind 
hybrid energy conversion system with battery storage. 
Taha et al (2014) proposed the concept of renewable energy producers receiving a Quasi-Feed-in-
Tariff (QFIT) which reflected market circumstances of grid, demand and energy price 
fluctuations. In simple terms the QFIT was designed to encourage renewable energy to produce 
when electricity prices were high, thereby reducing the need for peaking generation. This concept 
is great in theory but has the practical limitation in that substantial data and systems will be 
required as well as access to wholesale market prices such that the costs may outweigh the 
benefits. Fast developing technologies and greater economies of scale in the future suggest that 
eventually such “integration” models may be economic for use by households, world-wide. This 
may occur in the very near future given the comment by Naumann et al (2015): 
Using this model, we derive a clear picture of system profitability with dependence to all 
major influencing parameters. Applying the baseline aging characteristic and given the 
German market price trends, system profitability is expected to be in the very near future 
(Naumann et al, 2015, p 37) 
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Chapter 3 Climate change mitigation issues 
 
Summary 
Chapter 3 provides a perspective of the focus of this thesis by examining the reality of climate 
change as a major global problem, followed by a discussion of the different types of policy 
initiatives used world-wide to reduce GHG emissions. The focus of the chapter then narrows to 
an analysis of renewable energy schemes world-wide. The analysis is not in-depth and is only 
meant to provide an indication of developments world-wide to help put schemes adopted in 
Australia into some perspective. As with the thesis as a whole the focus is on schemes with 
financial incentives directly targeting emission reductions, rather than schemes relating to, for 
example, energy efficiency and energy conservation.  
3.1 Climate Change Reality and the need for government involvement 
 
Environmental issues affect society as a whole. It follows that everyone should pay for receiving 
the benefits of climate change action, but not everyone believes there is a climate change issue 
and so not everyone is willing to pay for action to be taken. Given that subsidies or incentives are 
paid either by government or electricity consumers, in effect everyone does pay so that such 
concerns have no practical way of being addressed. It is not surprising that there is no natural 
market-related economic outcome that addresses this issue and hence there are some “free 
riders”, or “partial free riders” but it is most likely free riders will eventuate whatever approach is 
adopted, otherwise no action will be taken and everyone is worse off, a typical moral hazard 
situation. Hence there is a need for government action in the form of subsidies or incentives to 
support reducing GHG emissions, reflected in the views of IEA (2012) who stated “incentives are 
justified to compensate for market failures” (IEA, 2012, p 11). The approach, world-wide, has 
been to focus on two types of schemes, being schemes  that directly target emitters and those that 
have as an outcome emission reductions, such as renewable energy schemes (Ciarreta et al, 
2014), the latter being the prime focus of this thesis. 
3.2 Drivers of climate change action 
 
The drivers of climate action stem initially from the realization that GHG emissions are harming 
the climate, followed by emission reduction targets (set either under international agreements, on 
a country by country basis or regions within countries) and consequent policy instruments 
considered necessary to achieve emission reduction targets. This gives rise to two challenges 
being the appropriate level of emission reductions and how best to achieve these reductions.  
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Increasing progress is continually being made world-wide to achieve emission reductions with 
Roelfsema et al (2014) concluding: 
Domestic policies of India, China and Russia are projected to lead to lower emission levels 
than the pledged levels.  Australia’s and the EU’s nationally legally binding policy 
framework is likely to deliver their unconditional pledges, but not the conditional ones.  The 
situation is rather unclear for Japan, South Korea, Brazil and Indonesia.  We project that 
policies of Canada and the USA will reduce 2020 emission levels, but additional policies are 
probably needed to deliver their pledges in full. (Roelfsema et al, 2014, p 781) 
3.3 Means of reducing GHG emissions – quantity and price schemes 
 
The focus of this thesis is on renewable energy schemes and their cost-effectiveness in reducing 
GHG emissions but these schemes cannot be viewed in isolation from other emission reduction 
schemes for a number of reasons. These include the possibility of synergies, whereby renewable 
energy schemes and other schemes become more effective because of the existence of the others’ 
scheme. Alternatively there is the possibility of duplication or conflicting impacts, such that other 
schemes become less effective, or even redundant. It would be ideal to find some combination of 
different types of schemes that result in an overall improvement in the cost efficiency of 
achieving emission reduction targets. As discussed in Section 2.7 this is a substantial task for 
various reasons but particularly because different schemes have different objectives and 
circumstances differ between countries. 
In broad terms there are two types of emission reduction schemes, being “quantity” schemes 
having volume targets, such as renewable energy schemes where price is an outcome, and “price” 
schemes where prices are set, such as a carbon price, and volumes (of reduced emissions) are 
outcomes (Kesicki, 2011). Australia’s recent Emissions Reduction Fund and Direct Action Plan 
(DAP) is a mix of these, but closer to a “price” scheme. A confidential benchmark price is set and 
bids (quantity and price) are accepted up to this price, a form of “closed” auction.  
Although renewable energy schemes are “quantity” schemes they have a “price” scheme 
component as noted by Mananteau et al (2003):  
…it becomes crucial to take a look at the relative efficiency of the different schemes used.   
Such schemes may focus on quantities-defining national targets and setting up bidding 
systems, or quota systems providing for green certificate trading –, or they may focus on 
prices – feed-in tariffs. (Mananteau et al, 2003, p 799) 
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Part of the scheme distinction also involves whether schemes require funding or whether they are 
revenue generators. This distinction was noted at least as early as 1960 when Coase (1960) 
questioned how pricing should be applied in the case of “harmful externalities”, asking should the 
creator be taxed or harmed parties instead compensated?  
There are also schemes that have both price and quantity objectives such as “cap and trade” 
(CAT) schemes, also known as emissions trading schemes (ETS) having quantity targets with 
permits provided at prices either set by government or through an auction process. CAT schemes 
are treated as a hybrid or third option. Even schemes which appear to be price or quantity 
schemes have an element of the other. For example in Australia FITs, which are basically price 
schemes, often have state-determined quantity limits, and quantity schemes such as renewable 
energy schemes have price limits. Small-scale renewable energy schemes create STCs and large-
scale renewable energy schemes create LGCs, each of these having a price cap reflective of the 
penalty price paid by electricity retailers in not being able to secure legislated minimum 
quantities, being (tax-adjusted (AU$57.14/STC and AU$92.86/LGC).   
3.4 Baseline issues associated with emission reduction schemes 
 
Quantity based schemes have challenges of establishing appropriate baselines, either in terms of 
emission levels or renewable energy output levels, and being able to effectively measure progress 
against these baselines. This is less of an issue with renewable energy schemes as new projects 
are easily identified, although there can be issues associated with determining the extent to which 
additional output from existing renewable energy schemes is subsidy driven.  
An emissions benchmark level is set (or agreed to) having the effect that there is no penalty if 
emissions are reduced to the base level. A negative aspect of such schemes is that no extra 
penalty applies if emissions exceed the “business as usual” emissions level. If emissions are 
reduced below the benchmark level there is the likelihood, depending on the scheme, that 
emission credits can be created and on-sold, being important in ensuring emission reduction 
incentives are not limited. This could create an emissions “band” only within which incentives or 
penalties have meaningful effect, which ideally should be avoided. It is the setting of emissions 
baselines which is the most contentious issue associated with schemes having a price on carbon. 
The problem is that this requires detailed, and often subjective, analysis to determine realistic 
emission reduction levels. Chomitz (1998) commented:  
Baseline determination unavoidably has a judgmental component. This means that baseline   
determination depends not just on methodology, but on a set of institutions that keep the 
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methodology’s application reasonable and honest. Overly lax baselines will threaten the 
system’s credibility and usefulness, and shift rents from high quality providers to low 
quality providers of offsets. Overly stringent baselines will discourage valid projects and 
drive up project costs. (Chomitz, 1998, p i) 
 
Baseline concerns were also expressed by MacGill et al (2006), and Fischer (2005) in regard to 
the United Nation’s Clean Development Mechanism, noting that use of any of the three choices 
of (1) historical emissions, (2) expected emissions and (3) an industry average could either 
encourage or discourage project participation if participants expected outcomes different from 
those forecast (Fischer, 2005, p 1821). This gives rise to the need to contemplate a pricing 
scheme that penalises all emissions, thereby reducing the need for subjective analysis. As all 
emissions would be affected there would remain an incentive for all emission producers to reduce 
emissions. The downside is that parties having the greatest potential to reduce emissions would 
have much lower incentive levels and may not feel sufficiently rewarded to take significant 
reduction level action. This could be overcome by having a two-step incentive regime whereby 
incentives were higher for the first, say 5 percent of emission reductions. 
It would appear that Jones (2010) had baseline concerns in mind when suggesting that there 
should be an international price on all emissions thereby eliminating the need for determining 
emission benchmarks. Jones (2010) concluded: 
An international carbon fee would place an equal burden (in terms of dollars per tonne of 
emitted carbon dioxide) based on easily- measured fuel quantities on all nations. It would 
embrace the great spirit of simplicity. The fee scheme would not require estimates of 
baseline emissions in countries where the data to determine such baselines are hard to find; 
nor would it require speculation on future business-as-usual emission scenarios. Nor would 
a uniform fee necessitate classifying nations according to income level, human 
development indices, or other measures. (Jones, 2010, p 249) 
Jones did however recognise that some issues would still need to be resolved including the fee 
level, the emission sources to be included, possible perverse incentives and concessions needed to 
ensure the scheme is acceptable to all nations. It is possible for these reasons, particularly the loss 
of sovereignty, that this idea has not had great appeal.  
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3.5 Cap and trade schemes 
 
This section examines cap and trade (CAT) schemes to better understand their effectiveness and 
limitations. The general concept is that GHG emitting companies are incentivised to reduce their 
emissions by a given amount, normally to reach a baseline amount, which is reduced each year, 
being related to the overall level of national emissions reduction targets. Companies may be 
assigned a level of permits that can be acquitted as compensation for emissions and these may be 
provided freely or at a price which could possibly be set at auction Ideally the incentives and 
penalties involved should ensure national emission reduction targets are met and permits are 
traded in a transparent manner such that there is a traded price thereby providing a market price 
on carbon. 
CAT schemes have similarities with renewable energy schemes in that a baseline is created but 
with renewable energy schemes the baseline only has the purpose of rewarding parties which 
increase production above this baseline. GHG emissions are then reduced either by directly 
targeting levels of emissions, as with CAT schemes, or through encouraging renewable energy, 
designed to replace more carbon intensive types of generation (Brohe et al, 2009). 
Realistic benchmarks are important because a party which is easily able to meet its emission 
reduction target could further reduce its emissions but may not have an incentive to do so. 
Permits are generally only allocated to emitters making it difficult for other parties to be actively 
involved in permit trading. This could be partly overcome through the inclusion of an auction 
system allowing permits to be purchased by any party. The benefit of allowing non-emitters to 
also access permits is to provide increased trading opportunities and hence greater choices for 
emitters to manage their permit shortfall positions.  
The volume of permits made available is typically set below emitters’ forecast emission levels, at 
a level considered the “benchmark”, to provide the incentive for emitters to reduce their emission 
levels to that of the benchmark thereby avoiding penalties associated with a permit shortfall. This 
is a fundamental principle of CAT schemes (Bushnell and Chen, 2009; Judson, Matthew and 
Robert, 2009). 
The extent to which permits should be provided freely, auctioned or only a portion being 
provided free was examined by Liu et al (2012) and Goulder et al (2010), the latter, in a USA 
context suggesting that no more than 15% of permits should be freely allocated being sufficient 
to “prevent profit losses in the most vulnerable U.S. industries” (Goulder et al, 2010, p161).  
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McKibbin et al (2014) noted that with CAT schemes it  is the level of GHG emission reductions 
that are targeted with the carbon price set by market forces, whereas with a carbon price (or tax) 
the level of GHG emission reductions is determined by market forces but the carbon price is 
known, being set in advance. They argue that there are enormous risks associated with an 
emissions only target scheme and that there should also be carbon price collars, providing 
benefits of easing countries into emission reduction schemes and providing price transparency 
being useful for inter-country comparisons. Wood and Jotxo (2011) added that price floors could 
be created through “government commitments to buy back permits, a reserve price at auction, or 
an extra fee or tax on acquittal of emission permits” (Wood and Jotxo, 2011, p 1746) which could 
be complemented with price caps. They thought the fee idea was likely to be most favoured as it 
provided government revenue. 
Repetto (2013) argued, in a USA context, that a CAT scheme is preferable to a carbon tax as it is 
more consistent with existing and overseas policies and provides more assurance that greenhouse 
gas emissions would decline sufficiently to avoid catastrophic damages from climate change.  His 
preference was for government to issue permits to the current pollution levels and to then reduce 
the allocation by 3 percent each year. Firms that had low abatement costs could sell unneeded 
permits to firms whose abatement options are more expensive’ who benefit by acquitting permits 
costing them less than the penalty for non-acquittal. Firms with low abatement costs would then 
continue to reduce levels of emissions. Avi-Yonah and Uhlmann (2009) instead argued that 
climate change action is an urgent issue, supporting the speed of implementing a carbon tax, 
rather than a CAT scheme taking years to develop and implement and having enforcement 
imposing difficulties.  
One of the most comprehensive evaluations of CAT and carbon tax policies was undertaken by 
He et al (2012) using seven criteria (emissions price, emissions levels, renewable energy 
portfolios, total generation, generation and grid owner profits, economic welfare and emissions-
adjusted economic welfare) highlighting the fact that CAT and carbon tax policies impact a wide 
range of participants and environmental issues, which is often overlooked. 
Feijoo and Das (2014) developed a model that helps determine the optimal mix of generation to 
achieve a particular level of emission reductions. They also discuss the key CAT aspects of 
whether permits should be free or auctioned, how the limit should be reduced over time, the 
possibility of banking and penalties for permit shortfalls. 
Cheng and Lai (2011) expressed concern that the financial burden on high polluters could cause 
them to exert political pressure to reduce pollution restrictions thereby causing even higher 
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pollution. This appears to be an extreme comment but it does have similarities with the extent to 
which many Australian industries (Emissions-Intensive Trade-Exposed Activities, discussed in 
Section 7.4) which are exempt payment of renewable energy charges. 
Bode and Michaelowa (2001) referred to “investment additionality” whereby incentives might be 
provided to projects that were going to be undertaken in any event. In a modelled example they 
note that “investors can have the incentive to invest at unfavourable sites, since the disadvantages 
from the reduced yield of energy can be more than offset by the revenues from the sale of the 
additional reduction units” (Bode and Michaelowa, 2001, p 29).  This has similarities with 
Australia’s renewable energy scheme whereby companies are rewarded for growth in renewable 
energy output. Where plant is already in existence, and therefore a sunk cost, increased output 
incurs only the marginal cost of production, so that output growth may occur without the need for 
subsidies such as LGCs.  
Many other papers focus on how GHG reduction schemes could be structured for optimal results. 
Fischer and Newell (2005, p 142), in an American context, commented that optimal policy in 
achieving reductions has a ranking of (1) emissions price, (2) emissions performance standard, 
(3) fossil power tax, (4) renewable share requirement, (5) renewable subsidy and (6) R & D 
subsidy. 
3.6 Price-based schemes 
 
This section summarises world-wide GHG reduction schemes where a price is put on carbon 
either directly or through a market mechanism. The schemes examined do not target particular 
types of projects, thereby assisting in making international comparisons, and providing the 
possibility of linking schemes on an international basis.  
Emission reduction schemes have been in existence since the mid 1990s with the situation in 
early 2014 being: 
About 40 national and over 20 sub-national jurisdictions are putting a price on carbon. 
Together these carbon pricing instruments cover almost 6 giga t CO2e or about 12% of the 
annual global GHG emission. (World Bank Group, 2014, p 14). 
As commented by World Bank Group (2014) it is a matter of two steps forward and one step 
back. Eight new carbon markets, California, Quebec, Kazakstan, and five Chinese regions 
commenced in 2013, but Australia repealed its carbon price and Japan, New Zealand and Russia 
pulled out of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Regarding the first three 
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countries, Senator the Hon Chris Evans, then Australia’s acting Minister for Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency announced on 1 January 2013 that new emissions trading schemes had 
commenced in California, Quebec, and Kazakhstan as well as Croatia through its entry to the 
European Union. He added they join 33 countries covering a population of more than 540 million 
people pricing carbon via national emissions trading schemes. Countries included the 27 member 
nations of the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand. Later this year 
China – Australia’s largest trading partner – was expected to roll out pilot emissions trading 
schemes in a number of its provinces and major cities. 
Senator Evans commented further on schemes in the first four countries: 
The state of California has commenced a cap and trade program. An inaugural auction was 
held in November 2012, with over 28 million carbon units purchased. From 2013-14, the 
scheme will cover emissions from the electricity generation and industry sectors, 
representing around 35 per cent of the state's greenhouse gas emissions (approximately 160 
million metric tons, or MMT). From 2015onwards, around 85 per cent (approximately 395 
MMT) of the state's emissions will be covered and distributors of transportation fuel and 
natural gas will become liable (Evans, 2013, p 20). 
 
Senator Evans added that Quebec, Kazakhastan and Croatia had introduced Emissions Trading 
Schemes and that Croatia had become “the 31st country to join the world’s biggest carbon market 
after the 27 EU member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway”. (Evans, 2013) 
3.6.1 United Nations emission reduction commitments 
 
On an international basis, targets have been proposed and agreed to by United Nations members. 
The first major, but not binding agreement, was the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) opened for signature in 1992 having been signed by 157 nations as 
at December 1992 (Edmonds et al, 1995). Co-ordinated action first occurred in 1998 when 55 
nations signed up to the UNFCCC (“Annex B” parties) with 37 agreeing to reduce their GHG 
emissions by an average of at least 5% on 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, with Australia’s 
target being not to exceed an increase of 8% which it subsequently met. Countries, not being the 
same as those in the original group, subsequently agreed to a second non-binding commitment 
reduction over the period to 2020. The two main means by which Annex B parties can meet their 
emission reduction commitments are the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) whereby parties 
can purchase certified emission reduction (CER) units, relating to emission reduction projects, 
from less developed countries, and the Joint Implementations (JIs) whereby emission reduction 
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units (ERUs) are created by an Annex B party undertaking a carbon emission activity, which can 
be sold to another Annex B party (Rio et al, 2005; Lazarowicz, 2009). 
The different means by which EU parties can meet their emission reduction obligations has 
resulted in some concerns, relating to, for example, effectiveness and evidential credibility. For 
example Woerdman (2000) concluded that, for many reasons JIs and CDMs are preferable as 
international emission trading (IET) could possibly involve “fake” emissions. 
 Since the 1997 Kyoto meeting there have been 21 annual meetings of the Conference of Parties 
(COP), the most recent being in Paris in 2015, resulting in mixed progress. Part of the problem is 
that to reach agreement requires nations to have a common view on the level and timing of 
emission reductions so that although most nations agree in principle they do not agree on the 
detail proposed. However many nations, because they agree in principle, have taken action of 
their own, often on a regional basis to limit GHG emissions.  
3.6.2  European Union emission reduction schemes 
 
The most active emission trading takes place in the European Union (EU), where carbon trading 
began in January 2005 (Austin, 2007) through the European Climate Exchange (ECX) where 
futures contracts are cleared through the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) (Ellerman, Convery 
and Perthius, 2010). The market based reference price, for settling derivative contracts involves a 
mix of European Union Allowances (EUAs), being permits allocated to EU ETS participants and 
Certified Emissions Allowances (CERs), being credits issued to participants without binding 
targets so that they can trade with participants with binding targets (Austin, 2007). Austin (2007) 
mentioned the two market phases of 2005 to 2008 and 2008 to 2012, with the former period being 
when the market was oversupplied with prices dropping and the second when supply was to be 
reduced to correct this. Since then however prices have remained comparatively low, being an 
issue to the extent that carbon trading schemes are internationally linked. 
There are various papers written questioning the scheme, for example in regard to “leakages” 
(Bushnell and Chen, 2009) and also Marshinski et al (2012) who concluded that linking the 
European Emissions Trading System to other schemes, without full emissions caps, could 
increase total global emissions. On the positive side, the scheme has some deliberate “leakages” 
in the form of the creation of CERs providing assistance to less developed countries as mentioned 
above.  
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3.6.3 Emission reduction schemes world-wide 
 
Differences in political leaders’ environmental views have impacted on the introduction of 
emission trading schemes both at the national and regional level in many countries. In addition 
the views of the people may not be the same as their leaders as has occurred in Greece. 
Tsantopoulos et al (2014) commented that more than 50% of the Greek public supported PV, for 
environmental, financial and social considerations whereas the government was promoting 
legislation that would disallow new applications for household PV. 
Many non-European countries have GHG emission reduction schemes either applying nationally 
or on a regional basis (Talberg and Swoboda, 2013). World Bank President Jim Yong Kim 
summed up the situation in September 2014 by commenting: 
Today we are announcing that 73 national and 11 regional governments and over one 
thousand companies and investors support putting a price on carbon. Together, these 
government supporters represent 52 percent of global GDP, 54 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, and almost half the world’s population. The supporters include 
emitters like China, Russia and the European Union, and growing economies like 
Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa. Many already have carbon pricing in place or are 
preparing to implement it. Others, including the Philippines and many small island 
developing states support carbon pricing because they know that without such action, 
climate change will have devastating impacts on their populations and on their economies. 
Companies such as LG Electronics, National Grid and Westpac have already integrated a 
“shadow” price on carbon into their business strategies to improve decision-making for the 
future.  They know that this will help avoid risks and find opportunities that can increase 
energy and resource efficiency, reduce CO2 emissions, and give them a competitive edge. 
(World Bank, 2014, p 1) 
In New Zealand, an Emissions Trading Scheme was enacted in 2008 requiring emitters to 
surrender one emission unit, provided free by the government, for every two tonnes of carbon 
dioxide reported, or buy New Zealand units from the government for NZ$25 per unit. The 
number of free units issued is set at a level to encourage emission reductions but is not seen as a 
CAT scheme (Bertram and Terry, 2010). 
Regional schemes exist in many countries, including USA, with a California focus (C2ES, 2012) 
and China, currently with 18% coverage (Lo, 2012) of regions with schemes in place to reduce 
GHG emissions (Grubb, 2012; Lo, 2013). Canada has regional reduction schemes in Quebec and 
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British Columbia (Core, 2011). Aldy and Stavins (2012) commented that “Greenhouse gas cap-
and-trade systems are in place or under development in the European Union, Australia, Japan, 
Korea, New Zealand, California (USA), and several Canadian provinces” (Aldy and Stavis, 2012, 
P 1044). In broad terms there is an increase in the number of schemes in place or about to be 
introduced. 
The USA extended trading in established exchange traded contracts, such as oil and corn, to include 
Carbon Financial Instruments (CFIs) traded on the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCE), being 
financial contracts with the right to emit 100 tonnes of CO2e. This is a voluntary system but by 
joining firms legally commit to reducing their emissions. The CFIs allow firms to emit to levels no 
greater than 6% below their 2010 baseline levels. Firms achieving better than 6% reductions can 
sell their excess CFIs to firms that have not achieved this minimum reduction level. CFIs can also 
be generated by offsetters (forestry, renewable energy, landfill methane for example). As at 2011 
500 firms had joined (Sabbaghi and Sabbaghi, 2011). Shortly thereafter the CCE lasted was 
purchased by Europe’s Intercontinental Exchange and then closed through lack of activity. 
(www.CO2offsetresearch.org/policy/ccx.html) 
3.7 Bi-lateral and multi-lateral emission reduction agreements 
 
Countries (and regions) have, over time, taken closer notice of the development of schemes in 
other, particularly neighbouring, countries, for various reasons, including fairness, so that some 
countries are not providing harsher measures than their trading partners, which could negatively 
impact on trade outcomes.  In the USA these issues became a prime focus in Peter Orszag’s 
testimony to the US House of Representatives in 2008, in which he suggested, to retain 
competitiveness, American export and import industries could be rewarded or penalised 
depending on the comparative impact of carbon reduction mechanisms in the USA and overseas 
trading countries (Orszag, 2008). He added that lessons could be learnt of the sorts of incentives 
that are effective in other countries and the possibility that domestic credits could be used in other 
countries to reduce their GHG emission obligations. This helps to ensures parties to successful 
schemes continue to take action to reduce emissions following their targets being met. This is not 
dissimilar to the UK JI scheme mentioned in Section 3.6.1. 
Burniaux, Chateau et al (2009) suggested an integrated approach in determining action necessary 
to reduce GHG emissions, including phasing out fossil fuels, linking regional carbon schemes 
and, in particular, addressing deforestation. Ackerman, Stanton and Bueno (2010) concluded that 
to achieve optimal GHG reductions it would be necessary for a substantial, but possibly 
politically unacceptable, flow of capital from rich to poor nations to occur. Chichilnisky and 
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Block (2000) expressed similar views, questioning why rich countries should financially 
contribute if they are not big emitters. Houser, Bradley, et al (2008) questioned how strict internal 
emissions restrictions should be, and by industry, when other countries have a wide range of less 
restrictive policies. Vob (2007) had a similar concern, cautioning that consideration needed to be 
given to the possible negative impact of an emissions trading scheme on domestic policies and 
goals. In New Zealand these issues seem to be less of an issue with MFE (2010) noting that the 
New Zealand government is not overly concerned with leakage, recognising and accepting that 
industries overseas could benefit from New Zealand’s emission regulations. 
There is however not uniform agreement on the benefits of linking schemes. Marshinki et al 
(2012) noted the importance of all participating countries in cross-border trading having CAT 
schemes in place and developed a model suggesting that if this is not the case the overall outcome 
could be no effective benefit with overall emissions levels possibly being higher. Cian and 
Tavoni (2012) through development of a model, argued that restrictions on international trading 
of emission permits could limit technology advancements.  
 The fundamental problem with most of these questions is that these views could be used to argue 
for no action when even the authors involved do not question the need for some action. A more 
positive comment was made by Jaffe, Ranson and Stavins (2009) who suggested that when 
linkable trading permits are traded between countries, some prices will increase and some will 
decline, but the overall effect will be a reduction in emissions. 
In Australia the intention had been to enable credits to be used by another country to help meet 
emission commitments, on 1 July 2015 (Clean Energy Regulator, 2012b). The current Coalition 
government does not, however appear enthused by such ideas. 
3.8 Global renewable energy schemes 
 
Renewable energy schemes around the world are driven by incentives such as credits for units of 
renewable energy production, normally above a baseline, FITs for renewable electricity exported 
to the country’s grid, and grants to establish projects, all of which exist in Australia and are 
discussed in Chapter 2. This section takes a more global view examining world-wide renewable 
energy developments. 
The wide range of world-wide renewable energy schemes and their rapid growth is discussed in 
Dusonchet and Telaretti (2015) and REN21 (2016). IEA (2016), which views world-wide trends 
in PV, noting that 2015 PV capacity increased by 50.7 GW, a 26.5% increase over 2014, with 
most of the growth occurring in China, Japan and USA.   
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An indication of increased funding for renewable energy projects world-wide, can be seen by 
comments made by Bloomberg (2014) that world-wide clean energy investment in the September 
2014 quarter was US$55 billion, up 12% from the US$48.9 billion in the September 2013 
quarter, Chinese solar investment rose to a new record of US$12.2 billion, with solar installations 
expected to “total 13-14GW in 2014, nearly a third of the world total” (Bloomberg, 2014, p 1) 
and that solar growth was also strong in Japan, with investment bounces also in Canada, France 
and India. 
This growth continued in 2015 with average quarterly new investment reaching US$87 billion, 
although this dropped to an average US$58 billion in the first two quarters of 2016, due mainly to 
small-scale solar investment being down US$9 billion over the same period a year earlier 
(Bloomberg, 2016). As well as the simple economics of renewable energy there are also other 
benefits not often recognised. IRENA (2016) comments that “doubling the share of renewables in 
the energy mix by 2020 would increase global GDP by up to 1.1 percent, improve welfare by up 
to 3.7 percent and support over 24 million jobs in the sector” (IRENA, 2016, p 77). The 
International Energy Agency has provided forecasts to 2020 with the renewable energy share of 
generation expected to rise “from 22% in 2013 to over 26% in 2020” representing “more than 
today’s total combined demand of China, India and Brazil” (IEA, 2015, p 3) 
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Chapter 4 Australia’s approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Summary 
Chapter 4 focuses on Australia’s approach to reducing GHG emissions covering Australia’s 
international obligations, the rapid growth in household PV in Australia and the underlying 
reasons. Finally, continuing with a household focus, demand-side management is examined 
noting how electricity consumption has declined coincident with the rise in real household 
electricity prices. These schemes are viewed in the context of relevance to the model developed 
and in Australia meeting its targeted emission reduction levels. 
Key milestones have been 1998, when Australia signed the UNFCCC “Kyoto” protocol (to 
reduce GHG emissions) (section 3.6.1), followed by ratification in 2007, 2001 when the MRET 
scheme was introduced (Section 4.2), 2008 onwards when states introduced FITs (Section 5.6.2), 
2011 when the MRET scheme was split into two schemes targeting small and large-scale 
renewable energy, 2011 when the Clean Energy Futures Plan was introduced which covered a 
range of issues but particularly the carbon price, and 2013 when the Direct Action Plan was 
introduced (Section 4.2). These are covered in the sections mentioned, to the level of detail 
considered appropriate to the focus of the thesis. 
Australia’s initial KYOTO commitment was to achieve emission levels not exceeding 108% of 
1990 levels over the period 2008 to 2012, which it met and received credits for over-
achievement. This was followed by a non-binding commitment to reduce emissions by at least 
5% by 2020 compared with 2000 emission levels (Combet, 2012; United Nations, 1998). Neither 
of Australia’s first (unconditional) 108% target not its subsequent (conditional) 95% target was 
seen as particularly onerous relative to those of other countries (Fraser, 2015). 
At the most recent UNFCCC annual 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) meeting, in Paris in 
November 2015, Australia formally advised, in its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(INDC) to a new Climate Change Agreement that it will “implement an economy-wide target to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 26 to 28 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030” 
(www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC). On 5 October 2016 it was announced that the 
participating parties’ agreement threshold had been reached resulting in the undertakings given 
by each participant taking effect 4 November 2016. 
The thesis does not focus in any detail on schemes and incentives beyond those clearly 
identifiable with the focus of the thesis. Nevertheless there are a range of measures that have also 
been very effective in reducing emissions, including those included in the 2011 Clean Energy 
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Futures Plan such as assisting businesses in using more energy efficient technologies, improved 
housing design and construction, mandatory emission reduction standards for new light vehicles 
and farming related initiatives to reduce emissions and store carbon (Australian Government 
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2012b). In addition there are many 
examples contained in www.energyefficient.com.au/reports-papers relating to Australia’s 
standards, labelling, smart appliances, insulation and energy efficient appliances. 
4.1 Australia’s targeted emission reductions  
 
Australia committed to reducing its overall emissions to at least 5% below 2000 levels by 2020 as 
part of the suite of announcements in 2011. This target equates to reducing emissions from 565 
million tonnes CO2e (m t CO2e) in 2000 to 537 m t CO2e in 2020 (Australian Government 
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2012a). Australia’s GHG emissions in FY 
2013 totalled 562.8 m t CO2e (electricity contributing 193.1 m t CO2e, or 34%). Australia’s 
emissions reduction target for 2020 equates to 537 m t CO2e, with 191 m t CO2e  targeted from 
electricity generation (Australian Government Department of Climate Change and Energy 
Efficiency, 2012a; Australian Government, Department of Environment, 2013). These figures 
show that electricity sector GHG emissions are targeted to decrease only marginally to 2020, 
partly due to the impact renewable energy has already had on GHG emission levels.  
Australian Government, Department of Environment (2015a)3 suggested the overall target to be 
achieved, as at March 2015, is a further reduction of 126 m t CO2e by 2020 compared with 
current projections that would otherwise result in 656 m t CO2e. These figures indicate rapidly 
increasing levels of GHG emissions on a business-as-usual basis, resulting in the need for 
substantial emission reductions. The business-as-usual assumptions however appear overly 
pessimistic, but the comment was added that the outcome of the DAP had not been included 
which was expected to have a substantial impact.  
DAP auctions in 2015 contracted 93 m t CO2e abatement, some of which is likely to be from the 
electricity sector, and is expected to achieve 431 m t CO2e reductions between 2015 and 2020 
(KPMG, 2014a). The DAP verification process, to be undertaken in 2016, will be very important 
in substantiating the accuracy of these figures. Even if substantiated there is the further issue of 
actual additionality, that is the extent to which some of the lowest cost bids may represent 
3 There is a small difference between Australian Government Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency 
(2012) figures showing the 20 year target decreasing  from 565 to 537 m t CO2 and Australian Government, Department 
of Environment (2015a) showing the target decreasing from 559  to 530 m t CO2. 
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projects that would have taken place in any event (Burke, 2016). These figures highlight their 
importance of the DAP in Australia meeting its emission reduction target. 
Australian Government, Department of Environment (2015a) show electricity sector emissions 
having increased by 5 m t CO2e between FY 2000 and FY 2014, to reach 180 m t CO2e, with an 
extra 21 m t CO2e expected to FY 2020, reaching 201 m t CO2e, exclusive of any abatement from 
the DAP. The figure of 201 m t CO2e, as with total levels of missions, appears overly pessimistic.  
If these figures are realistic they suggest that the electricity sector needs to ensure that emissions 
do not increase by more than 11 m t CO2e to achieve the target level of 191 m t CO2e, or put 
another way electricity sector emissions need to be 10 m t CO2e lower than those forecast. 
Australia’s emissions projections are being updated on a very frequent basis with Australian 
Government, Department of Environment (2015d) being the most recent update (December 2015) 
showing forecasts for total emissions at FY 2020 of 593 m t CO2e, being 59 m t CO2e (9%) 
below previous projection of 656 m t CO2e. This is 12% above the required target level (of 530 m 
t CO2e) but it is argued that the target will be met when additional DAP auction results are 
included. These figures show how quickly emission reduction progress is being made. Reasons 
for the latest forecast emissions reduction to 593 m t CO2e are described as relating to adjustment 
to the LRET target, as well as “closures of high emitting coal-fired power stations and as a result 
of gas generation largely maintaining its share of generation after 30 June 2014” (Australian 
Government, Department of Environment, 2015d, p 4) all of which are included in thesis 
modelling. Electricity sector emissions are now forecast to reach 187 m t CO2e by 2020, 4 m t 
CO2e lower than previous projections because “abatement from the Emissions Reduction Fund 
(being the DAP) have been incorporated in projections for the first time” (Australian 
Government, Department of Environment, 2015d, p 4), being below the 191 m t CO2e target, 
again highlighting the importance of the DAP scheme..  
The emissions projections in this thesis relate only to electricity-related generation emissions and 
do not include DAP emissions. Hence they are marginally higher than published electricity 
emission reduction forecasts. In summary Australia appears to be on target to meet its emissions 
reduction target if the DAP scheme to FY 2020 is as effective as forecast. Modelling in this thesis 
suggests that the electricity sector will reduce emissions by 23.9 m t CO2e between 2000 and 
2020 (Table 7.7), providing a key contribution towards achieving this target. 
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4.2 Emission reduction schemes in Australia 
 
In Australia there has been electricity-related action on two key fronts to reduce GHG emissions, 
having a price on carbon and having incentives to encourage renewable energy schemes. The 
former was the result of a compromise between the newly elected minority Gillard Labor 
government and the Green Party in 2010 to put a price on carbon, as preferred by the Green 
Party, prior to introducing an ETS (The Australian, 1 December 2010). Eventually, in FY 2013 
and 2014 the Labor government imposed a price on carbon emissions by large emitters, including 
electricity generators, whose GHG emissions exceeded 25,000 tonnes pa. of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (AG, 2011). The price was set at AU$23/t CO2e in the first year, and was intended to 
be increased at 2.5% pa in real terms over the next three years but this was terminated a year 
early when the Labor government was replaced by the Coalition government in 2013. Over the 
two years when the carbon price was in place, revenue of AU$13.5 billion was received by the 
government (Heath, 2014).  
It had been intended, for a three year period from FY 2016 to FY 2018, that an ETS, also known 
as a CAT, scheme was to apply with a ceiling price set at AU$20/t CO2e above the international 
price, increasing at 5% pa in real terms4. Acceptable for compliance were to be carbon permits, 
Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs) and International units for up to 50% of a company’s 
obligation (Westpac, 2012). In addition free permits were to be provided for a portion of these 
emissions (Carbon Market Institute, 2013). After 2018 the only variation was to be that 
Australian companies could sell (that is as well as buy) carbon permits overseas (Ashurst, 2012).   
The Coalition government, on coming to office in 2013, terminated the carbon price scheme 
effective 1 July 2014 and introduced a Direct Action Plan (DAP) under the umbrella of the 
Emissions Reduction Fund (Australian Government, 2014). The scheme provided for parties to 
offer, in an auction system, the level of emission reductions they would target for a certain 
financial inducement with the lowest bids being accepted up to a total level of emission 
reductions. In this way reductions occur at the least cost (Montgomerey, 1972; Judson et al, 
2009). Compared with the carbon price scheme which generated government revenue, the DAP 
scheme is budgeted to cost the government a maximum of AU$2.55 billion over a three year 
period commencing late 2015 (KPMG, 2014b, Australian Government, 2014). 
Two DAP auction rounds have been held to date, the first in April 2015 resulting in 47.3 million 
tonnes of CO2e abatement contracts being awarded at an average price of AU$13.95/tonne CO2; 
and the second in November 2015 resulting in 45.5 million tonnes of CO2 abatement contracts 
4 A floor price was earlier legislated but this was announced to be withdrawn on 28 August 2012 
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being awarded at an average price of AU$12.25/tonne CO2e 
(www.CleanEnergyRegulator.gov.au). The next auction is to be held in April 2016. The average 
abatement cost of AU$13/tonne CO2e compares favourably with other abatement cost 
experienced to date in Australia. The DAP has cost the government AU$1.2 billion to date in 
comparison with the earlier carbon pricing scheme that generated revenue of AU$13.5 billion 
over two years. The DAP could be an effective emissions reduction scheme but this will only be 
known following the DAP audits in 2016 when actual emission reductions are compared with 
contracted levels of abatement. 
The Labor party’s proposed ETS scheme would have required large emitters to purchase 
emission permits, providing the right to generate GHG emissions up to a specified “benchmark” 
level. Where emitters were able to achieve additional emission reductions they could sell any 
excess permits to parties who are unable to achieve emission reductions. This is the “trade” 
aspect of an ETS. The setting of the “benchmark” creates the “cap” giving rise to an ETS also 
being known as a CAT scheme.  
The second type of schemes are “quantity” schemes, being schemes with a targeted level of 
renewable energy generation, such as renewable energy schemes, where the market sets the 
carbon price, or equivalent subsidy price. The two main political parties are generally close to 
agreement on “quantity” schemes. As background Australia implemented the world’s first 
national Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) in 2001 (Kirsebom-Aronsen, 2013; 
Cludius et al, 2014) which encouraged renewable energy schemes by crediting each megawatt 
hour of renewable energy output  above a base level of an average of 1994, 1995 and 1996 levels 
(Clean Energy Regulator, 2012a; MacGill et al, 2006) with a REC, later re-classified as either a 
large-scale generation certificate (LGC) or a small-scale technology certificate (STC). (Clean 
Energy Regulator, 2012a). The demand for RECs is created through electricity retailers having a 
legal obligation to purchase a proportion of their sales in the form of RECs. The MRET target 
was initially set at 9,500 GWh by 2010, then in 2009 increased to 45,000 GWh by 2020 (then 
constant to 2030). At the same time the MRET was renamed the renewable energy target (RET).  
At both the Commonwealth and state levels it was considered desirable to provide further support 
for small-scale renewable energy, in particular household PV and household solar hot water 
systems. To achieve this, a REC multiplier was introduced (the “Solar Credits Program”) 
providing for extra “deemed” RECs to be created (Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment 
Act 2010). The 45,000 GWh target was calculated to deliver approximately 20% of total 
electricity generated from renewable energy sources. On 1 January 2011 the 45,000 GWh target 
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was split into the large-scale renewable energy target of 41,000 GWh and an implied small-scale 
renewable energy scheme target of 4,000 GWh (AEMC, 2013). The reason for this was: 
Higher than expected uptake of small-scale systems – provided with extra encouragement 
through the Solar Credits multiplier and state/territory feed-in tariffs – had created a large 
number of certificates, depressing prices and discouraging investment in large-scale 
projects. The division of the RET was designed to address this issue by creating separate 
incentives for large-scale energy projects (such as wind farms) and small-scale 
technologies (such as solar PV and solar water heaters), which no longer directly competed 
with one another under the RET scheme. (Australian Government Climate Change 
Authority, 2012, p 14) 
If retailers are unable to purchase their annual liability levels of LGCs there is a shortfall penalty 
of AU$65/LGC and in the case of STCs there is a shortfall penalty of AU$40/STC. If shortfalls 
did occur retailers could not use the penalty charges as a cost to their businesses so in effect the 
costs of these shortfalls, in tax adjusted terms, at a 30% tax rate, was  AU$92.86/LGC and 
AU$57.14/STC, which was recognised as the market price cap. There has continued to be 
bipartisan support for the scheme so it is likely the scheme will continue in some form 
(Kirsebom-Aronsen, 2013).  
In 2014 there was an RET review resulting in the concept of the scheme being retained but in 
2015, following the Coalition government being elected to power, it was argued that the 
reduction in overall energy demand meant that a 41,000 GWh LRET target would result in much 
more than a 20% level of renewable energy. Agreement was reached to reduce the LRET target 
to 33,000 GWh effective March 2016 (Australian Government, Department of Environment, 
2015b). No changes were made to the SRES scheme which does not have a limit, although it 
earlier had an implied 4,000 GWh limit. The market viewed the outcome as still being a 
challenge, resulting in the LGC price quickly increasing from a little under AU$40/LGC to nearly 
AU$70/LGC between March 2015 and September 2015. (www.mercari.com.au). Unfortunately 
there was much uncertainty in 2014 and early 2015 about what the target could have been 
creating an environment not conducive to investors with the outcome being that renewable 
energy investors took some time to come back into the market (ShahNazari, 2014). 
4.2.1 Benefits and disadvantages of schemes used in Australia 
 
The two types of schemes have a range of favourable and less favourable aspects that are 
important to appreciate in considering emission reduction schemes in Australia in future. A price 
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on carbon provides the clearest carbon price signal, being important in encouraging market 
participants to take action to reduce GHG emissions. Having a market carbon price is also useful 
in encouraging other schemes, such as carbon offset schemes, whereby approved parties are 
rewarded for achieving emission reductions through, for example, reducing landfill emissions or 
planting trees. The carbon offsets produced are then available for purchase by carbon liable 
parties (Australian Government, Department of Environment, 2010).   
Renewable energy schemes instead involve long-term decision making with vastly different 
emission reduction results. An example is in the case of bagasse-fuelled renewable energy, a by-
product of sugar refining, which receives the same incentives as solar systems although some 
emissions would have been created because the bagasse needs to be burnt to fire a boiler (to 
create steam to go through a turbine to create electricity). The emissions from a bagasse-fired 
plant are however very low according to Basu et al (2011) and have therefore been ignored.. 
Another view, promoted by Millis (2016) is that bagasse-fired generation has little harmful 
emissions because all the carbon emitted has been withdrawn from the air by the growing  of 
cane giving zero net emissions. The validity of this view is dependent on whether sugar cane is 
only economic to harvest if supplementary revenue is generated from the electricity producing 
process. This is unlikely to be the case, although it could be valid in an additionality sense. 
Not surprisingly different implications and consequences have resulted in no one particular 
scheme being favoured world-wide. Similarly there is no consensus view in Australia. In fact 
there is an opinion that Australia may need a mix of policies, with Climate Change Authority 
(2014) stating “It is likely a range of complimentary policies will continue to be necessary in 
Australia, and elsewhere, to deliver effective global action on climate change in the most cost-
effective manner”.  (Climate Change Authority, 2014, p 78) 
In examining the choice of schemes a key issues is whether a particular scheme operates “in 
total” or “at the margin”, that is whether a scheme operates to benefit or penalise (a) some or all 
participants and (b) at all levels of activity or only activities “at the margin”.. In effect there is a 
trade-off between the simplicity of a scheme capturing all participants and all activities, and 
therefore not having to determine a benchmark level, having an element of subjectivity, and a 
scheme that targets activities that could be affected by a price on carbon. The former is effective 
but not efficient whereas the latter is possibly efficient and effective but only to the extent that 
meaningful benchmarks have been set. 
In an Australian an example of (a) is the “in total” approach that occurred in FY 2013 and FY 
2014 with a carbon pricing scheme introduced which targeted large emitters (of over 25,000 
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tonnes t CO2e pa) including electricity generators, who were required to pay a price for all 
emissions, even though in many cases there was little capability of reducing levels of emissions. 
In the case of electricity generators the result was some (emission beneficial) switching between 
black and brown coal-fired generation and between coal and gas-fired generation. In the case of 
large emitters, many incurred an unavoidable cost impost but there were some benefits in a price 
signal being created that could have encouraged new entrants, but uncertainty of this policy’s 
future is likely to have discouraged any material action. 
In the case of renewable energy projects, schemes are efficient because an “at the margin” 
approach is applied. That is only new projects or additional output to existing projects above a 
1999 output level are able to access renewable energy credits. Nevertheless there are baseline 
issues to be considered which, in Australia’s case, are well documented in MacGill et al (2006) in 
regard to the various Commonwealth and state emission reduction schemes adopted in Australia.  
There are also second order effects that connect these schemes. A price on carbon if passed on to 
consumers in higher electricity prices, improves the revenue potential, and therefore viability, of 
renewable energy projects. By reducing carbon emissions, renewable energy schemes contribute 
to the overall level of emission reductions that may be sought nationally. Hence the more the 
success of renewable energy schemes, the less punitive do carbon reduction schemes have to be 
to ensure the overall level of targeted emissions is achieved. A good example of this is occurring 
in Australia at present where renewable energy schemes have been very successful in reducing 
GHG emissions to the extent that the DAP scheme may need only to be partially successful for 
Australia to meet its 2020 electricity-related emission reduction targets. 
4.3 Features of rapid growth in Australian household PV 
 
The key features of the rapid growth in Australia’s household PV have been the substantial 
decline in solar panel costs, attractive FITs and the multiplier applied to STCs. PV panel costs 
decreased by over 50% between 2008 and 2012 and have remained stable since then despite the 
much weaker Australian dollar. FITs for new installations rose to a peak of AU57c/kWh in 2012 
and now represent only the exported value to retailers, of about AU8c/kWh, but it is new panel 
costs that have resulted in the demand for PV not declining to the extent expected (Clean Energy 
Council, 2013). Nevertheless at some stage a saturation level will be reached whereby the non-
PV household group will take an increasing level of enticement to be attracted to PV. In late 2013 
the Australian states of Queensland and South Australia penetration rates had increased to 22% 
and 25% respectively with a nation-wide average of 14% (Parkinson, 2013), increasing to 29% 
and 30% respectively with a nation-wide average of 20% in 2016 (APVI, 2016).  
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The rapid growth in PV was also caused by additional “deemed” STCs that could be created, 
having a multiple of five for FY 2010, intended to be reduced by one each year to reach unity by 
FY 2014. Recognition of the rapid PV growth caused the scheme to be terminated six months 
early on 1 January 2013 (Watt et al, 2012; NSW Government, 2011). The unexpectedly high 
growth in household PV prompted speculation on how attractive FITs could be altered including 
the breaking of FIT contracts. This was attempted on a retrospective basis by the NSW 
government in May 2011 but then withdrawn due to public backlash (Sydney Morning Herald, 
2011). The only other means for this to happen is when households with PV shift house, causing 
FITs to terminate, with the later impact estimated to be in the 3% to 4% pa range (Parkinson, 
2013). 
4.4 Demand-side management 
 
Australia has a range of energy efficiency schemes that have preceded the price-related GHG 
emission schemes that are the focus of this thesis. These schemes are not examined in detail and 
are not modelled except for the impact of high retail electricity prices on electricity demand. 
These schemes include mandatory labelling of appliances introduced in 1992, estimated to have 
reduced emissions by an average 600 thousand t CO2 over the period 1992 to 2000 (Holt and 
Harringtong, 2003), minimum mandatory energy efficiency performance standards (MEPS), also 
introduced in 1992 initially for refrigerators and freezers (Saddle, 2014), and a range of measures 
as part of the 2011 Clean Energy Futures plan, also discussed in Summary to Chapter 4. Saddler 
(2014) estimated that between 2006 and 2013 building, appliance and equipment measures had 
reduced electricity demand by 10.5 TWh, or 28% of total estimated electricity demand. 
Energy conservation took a sharper focus in Australia from 2008 onwards due largely to 
sustained increases in retail electricity prices. Australian Government, Department of Industry 
and Science (2015b) commented that Australians have enjoyed historically low electricity prices, 
but over the period from 2008 - 2014 prices increased by over 80 percent, and this is significantly 
more than inflation. Expenditure on energy was 5 per cent of average gross weekly household 
income in 2012, ranging from “almost ten per cent for low income households to as little as three 
per cent for high income households” (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013) and likely to be 
higher since then due to real price increases. As mentioned in previous chapters households have 
sought new opportunities to reduce these costs, including installing PV for electricity, solar water 
heating and more efficient energy appliances. This is in addition to the increasing realisation and 
appreciation that by pursuing energy conservation not only were households achieving cost 
savings but there were also environmental benefits. The largest impact on retail electricity prices 
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over the 2008 to 2014 period was the two year (FY2013 and FY 2014) price on carbon causing 
households to further conserve their use of electricity.  
On a broader scale further gains could be made if households were able to aggregate contracted 
electricity reductions and be paid for this either in the form of carbon offsets or through bidding 
reductions into an auction such as Australia’s DAP or bidding into the National Electricity 
Market (NEM) as a form of generation.  Advances in areas such as use of Time of Use Meters, 
and appropriate price signals, and purchasing of energy efficiency are now explored in further 
detail. 
4.4.1 Factors that influence household electricity consumption behaviour 
 
As a general rule, electricity is viewed as an essential commodity with consumers using 
electricity when it is needed regardless of price, creating a very low price-demand elasticity. The 
approach, leading to quantitative analysis, has been to examine changes that have occurred or 
could occur to enable Australian households to become increasingly demand responsive to 
electricity price rises, to analyse international price elasticities of demand and to determine price 
elasticities of demand that have recently occurred in Australia. Developments that would be of 
assistance in encouraging demand-side management in Australia are now examined.  
Public Attitudes 
The public attitude towards environmental conservation has, in the last five to ten years, become 
more noticeable in line with increasing belief in the reality of climate warming. Households are 
more likely to take action, from a price signal, to reduce electricity consumption when such 
action is seen to provide benefits beyond those affecting their personal financial positions. The 
outcome is likely to have increased the sensitivity of electricity consumption to price changes in 
more recent years. 
Information that assists in electricity demand conservation 
Provision of easily understandable information on the electricity usage of appliances assists 
households in taking short-term action in how they use appliances as well as long-term action in 
their decision-making to purchase new appliances. In the past such information was general not 
available . Selling competitive pressures have helped cause this change but only in the knowledge 
that the public had such an interest. 
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Technology that assists in electricity demand conservation 
Meters, commonly known as “smart” meters, that provide real time information on electricity 
usage of different appliances is information that was not readily available in the past. However 
“smart” meters come at a cost, varying from AU$100 to AU$1,000 so households need to be 
aware of the associated costs and benefits.  
The cheapest form of smart meter is a “time of use” (TOU) meter that measures electricity 
consumption on a half-hour basis. Many states in Australia have or are contemplating rolling out 
smart meters, the costs of which may either be charged directly to such households or be spread 
over all electricity consumers in that region, through networks passing these costs onto retailers. 
Choice of electricity tariff 
Retailers continue to explore types of electricity tariffs that will give them a competitive edge 
while not affecting revenue quality with two or three part tariffs often providing an optimal 
outcome (Burtt, 1998). The ongoing introduction of TOU meters in Australian states provides a 
wider range of options, particularly in enabling households to have access to pricing that reflects 
electricity costs in the wholesale market. To this extent households can then react to the same 
high prices retailers experience enabling retailers to pass on the costs savings, being a cost pass-
through. Prices on a half-hour basis do not provide retailers with a convenient means to include a 
profit margin (for risk) resulting in either two or three part tariffs becoming more common. The 
market benefits of providing consumers with access to forecast day ahead prices was evaluated 
by Valenzueal (2012) noting the value of load shifting on the market’s peak energy needs. 
Retailers having flat tariffs, thereby not providing useful price signals, are described by Oliva and 
MacGill (2012), as providing a “schedule of fees intended more for cost recovery than efficient 
resource allocation” (Oliva and MacGill, 2012, p 7). 
Somewhat ironically the reactions already by households to conserve electricity, including 
purchasing PV, has reduced the peakiness of wholesale electricity prices thereby reducing the 
effectiveness and need for two or three part pricing.  
Wholesale market changes designed to encourage demand-side management 
The reactions of households in reducing electricity demand provides both a short and long-term 
benefit to households and a long-term benefit to the market through reducing the need for 
additional network investment to accommodate peak demand and through reducing the need for 
expensive peaking generation. Market rules allow large users, such as smelters, to bid in demand 
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reduction capacities. In late 2014 a demand side rule change was proposed to allow demand 
aggregators to bid in capacity, opening the door for households to become participants in the 
wholesale market, an important household conservation development.  
For the reasons mentioned above it could be expected that electricity demand is more sensitive to 
price increases than may have been the case five to ten years ago, and is likely to be the case into 
the future. 
4.4.2 Household electricity consumption behaviour 
 
The potential of household demand-side management (DSM) was quantified by Saddler (2007) 
who examined the potential in 2007, noting that residential electricity demand was 62,000 GWh 
in FY 2005, being approximately 25% of national electricity demand. By focussing on water 
heating, being smaller and with 5-star rating, lagging of water pipes, installing ceiling installation 
in all houses, improved lighting efficiency and a range of other measures Saddler concluded that 
demand-side actions could reduce national system demand by 145,000 GWh by 2050. BREE 
(2015) forecasts total electricity generation to be 332,000 GWh pa by FY 2050 indicating that 
there is DSM potential to reduce demand by 44% by 2050. What is not known is the extent which 
such DSM assumptions are already included in these forecasts. If they were fully included then 
total electricity demand would otherwise have been 477,000 GWh, with the DSM impact then 
being a 30 percent reduction. Either way these figures highlight the enormous potential for DSM 
to reduce electricity demand. This is not a key focus of this paper but should be included in any 
full-scale analysis of how GHG emissions can most cost effectively be reduced in future. 
The increasing level of interest shown by in households in seeking to be involved in activities to 
reduce GHG emissions has increased in pace. Sadler (2014) noted that the reduction in NEM 
demand in FY 2013, by 8 terawatt hours (TWh), was a result of a mixture of factors including 
industry restructure, including the partial or complete close down of the Port Kembla steelworks, 
the Kurri Kurri aluminium smelter and the Clyde oil refinery (contributing 3.6 TWh) and 
photovoltaics (2.7 TWh). Sadler added: 
Research we have recently completed concludes that the three largest factors contributing to 
the recent dramatic changes in demand for electricity are: 
• the impact of (mainly regulatory) energy efficiency programs 
• structure change in the economy away from electricity intensive industries  
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• since 2010, the response of electricity consumers, especially residential consumers, to 
higher electricity prices. (Saddler, 2014, p 3)  
Similar comments were made by AEMO (2016) that: 
Residential consumption represents about 30% of total annual consumption in each region. 
It has been declining in recent years, due to: 
• Increased penetration of rooftop PV panels. 
• Appliance and building energy efficiency savings attributed to Federal and State energy 
efficiency programs. 
• Increased residential process (energy bill stress) also put downward pressure on 
household electricity consumption. (AEMO, 2016, p 21) 
These measures represent the most cost effective means of reducing GHG emissions but are most 
likely to initially require households to pay higher costs as noted by Orszag (2008) who 
commented: 
… price increases would be essential to the success of a cap-and-trade program because 
they would be the most important mechanism through which businesses and households 
would be encouraged to make investments and behavioural changes that reduced CO2 
emissions (Orszag, 2008, p 5) 
The potential for demand-side management is also emphasised in Burtt (2009) and Wagner, 
Froome and Foster (2010). Both stress the need for time of use meters. Part of the challenge will 
be to ensure energy efficiency achievements are measured and integrated into whatever carbon 
reduction schemes are in place, a point made by Bertoldi et al (2005) who also discussed how 
green certificates, for renewable energy, white certificates, for energy efficiency, and brown 
certificates, from cap-and-trade schemes, could be integrated, a point also discussed by Meran 
and Wittman (2012). Oikonomou et al (2012), noted that energy efficiency was the cheapest form 
of GHG emission reduction. This potential is also recognised by IEA (2014) who commented 
“Energy efficiency has been referred to as the ‘hidden fuel’, one that extends energy supplies, 
increases energy security, lowers carbon emissions and generally supports sustainable economic 
growth. Yet it is hiding in plain sight: the global energy efficiency market is worth at least 
US$310 billion a year and growing” (IEA, 2014b, p 2).  
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
 
Summary 
Chapter 5 discusses the approach taken to the build-up of the model, commencing with 
examining financial flows in the Australian electricity sector and then relating these financial 
flows to the different types of subsidies and electricity sector activities that give rise to GHG 
emissions.  The outcome was a four part modelling approach covering household PV, large-scale 
renewable energy, the changing mix of renewable and non-renewable energy and demand-side 
management. 
The household PV model incorporates the various financial factors that households consider 
when deciding to install PV, being the PV cost and the benefits that arise, from PV output 
reducing electricity imports and receiving credits from output exported to the grid. These 
financial factors are converted into payback periods, and compared with the actual uptake of PV 
and levels of reduced emissions. The analysis is over the period FY 2008 to FY 2014. 
The large-scale renewable energy model is similar to the household PV model in determining 
payback periods but the analysis is over a longer FY 2000 to FY2020 period. Levels of emission 
reductions are determined in a similar way by noting the higher emission type generation the 
renewable energy replaces.. Both models are used for sensitivity purpose to assess likely 
outcomes if any of the input variables are changed. The period FY 2000 to FY 2020 encompasses 
the period the Australia Commonwealth Government has committed to reducing GHG emissions 
by 5% as well as capturing the year 2020 when Australia is seeking to have at least 20% of 
electricity generation from renewable energy sources (Clean Energy Regulator, 2012a).  
The changing mix of generation types is viewed to determine the extent to which emissions are 
reduced when moving from brown coal to black coal to gas to renewable energy. 
Demand-side management covers the types of actions households undertake to conserve energy 
with a model established to measure the extent to which households have, since 2010, reduced 
electricity consumption in response to higher retail electricity prices. 
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5.1 Electricity sector financial flows 
 
A wide range of electricity sector financial flows was first examined (Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5-1 Financial flows affecting the electricity sector 
The purpose of Figure 5.1, reflecting the situation in Australia in early 2012, is to show that 
electricity prices are determined through generation, from non-renewable and renewable sources, 
being dispatched to meet total electricity demand, from household and non-household sources. 
This process is the responsibility of the Australian Electricity Market Operator (AEMO) who 
dispatches least cost generator bids (price and quantity) first, which may differ from their actual 
operating costs, followed by increasingly expensive generator bids up to the level of the cheapest 
generation that ensures supply matches demand, being the marginal generator. In so doing 
AEMO uses the marginal generator’s bid price to determine the wholesale market price, initially 
on a five minute basis, which is then averaged to produce half-hourly “spot” prices. 
Figure 5.1 also serves the purpose of highlighting, in green, the four non-market inputs which 
have the effect of lowering GHG emissions. These cover carbon pricing (supporting renewable 
over non-renewable generation and gas-fired over coal-fired generation), STC prices and feed-in 
tariffs designed to encourage household PV, and LGCs designed to encourage large-scale 
renewable energy. The non-market inputs show the cost of subsidies to electricity consumers. 
Carbon pricing increases wholesale electricity prices, being a cost component to electricity 
retailers who are also required to make STC, LGC, and FIT payments, the latter passed on by 
network companies, all of which are contained in consumer electricity prices. 
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5.2 Linkages of subsidies with electricity sector GHG emissions 
 
The focus of this thesis is on the costs of GHG emission reductions. Hence it is necessary to 
relate the electricity-related financial links in Figure 5.1 to activities associated with GHG 
emission reductions (Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Sources of electricity sector emission reduction  
Each of the four non-market inputs can be seen to link to GHG emission reduction activities. The 
six links to GHG emission reductions shown are: firstly demand-side management  whereby 
consumers, in response to increasingly higher electricity prices, reduce electricity consumption 
either through conservation, possibly by using more efficient electrical appliances, or using PV to 
displace their need for electricity imported from the grid; secondly increased uptake of PV 
displacing other more GHG emission intensive generation; thirdly other (large) renewable energy 
generation displacing more emission intensive generation; fourthly less emission intensive 
generation, such as increased gas-fired generation and replacing brown with black coal-fired 
generation, driven by carbon pricing; fifthly  other large emitters, such as transport and coal 
mining companies, becoming more GHG emission efficient in their business activities, and lastly 
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a range of activities that provide GHG reduction benefits arising from a price being placed on 
carbon. These include Carbon Farming Initiatives (CFIs) created in the agriculture sector, for 
example through tree planting, carbon offsets created by reducing GHG emissions such as 
utilising land-fill emissions for electricity creation or flaring and sequestration, whereby carbon 
dioxide emissions from coal-fired generation are stored underground, also known as carbon 
capture and storage (CCS). 
Of these six GHG emission reduction processes, this thesis addresses  the first four although there 
is the prospect that households could be involved in carbon offsets in future and hence this could 
be included as part of demand-side management. In effect the modelling relates to electricity 
sector activities affected by non-market inputs giving rise to GHG emissions. The purpose of the 
modelling is to allow changes in a non-market variable, as shown in green in Figure 5.2, to flow 
through to changes in other variables and ultimately to changes in GHG emissions. 
There are some electricity-related activities that could be included but instead have been omitted 
as the beneficial emissions impact arises not through a process that directly reduces GHG 
emissions but instead through compensating activities.  For example CFIs assist in absorbing 
GHG emissions but only after GHG emissions have been created. In addition CCS is a process 
designed to ensure GHG emissions are not released into the atmosphere. This is an attempt to 
address a problem after it has occurred, and in any event is still to be proven to be economic on a 
large-scale. Wagner and Foster (2011) noted that in Australia a substantially higher carbon price 
was needed before CCS was viable. Spath (2004) noted that CCS costs could easily be under 
stated and that a total life cycle approach was needed to reflect the fact that additional energy was 
needed to compress and transport the gas to underground deposit areas.  
5.3 Carbon pricing, emission trading schemes and direct action plan 
 
Carbon pricing, which directly targets carbon emissions, also had a material impact in the 
electricity sector, when in FY 2013 and FY 2014, through the resultant increase in retail 
electricity prices, the economics of household PV improved and energy conservation became 
more apparent. These effects have been modelled. Carbon pricing also resulted in a marked 
movement from coal-fired generation to gas-fired generation and to renewable energy, with 
associated emission reductions. Although not modelled the effect has been noted in the model 
results on an annual basis. This issue is comprehensively analysed in studies by AEMO (2012) 
and ROAM Consulting (2014). An ETS was proposed but not enacted by the Labor Party by the 
time it went out of office in 2013. The Coalition’s Direct Action Plan took effect in early 2015, 
having provision to allow aggregation of small-scale demand reductions which, if coupled with 
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price transparency, could be a valuable market contribution in allowing households to become 
more active DSM participants and in providing important market price signals. 
The various features previously referred to suggested the need for a four part modelling exercise, 
covering: household PV; large-scale renewable energy; non-renewable energy switching from 
coal-fired to gas-fired and to renewable energy; and demand-side management by households, 
relating to energy conservation, PV displacing electricity imported from the grid and, although 
not modelled, the potential for involvement in demand-side aggregation or carbon offset creation 
5.4 Non-modelled aspects of renewable energy 
 
There are various indirect costs and benefits associated with renewable energy projects, which are 
difficult to quantify and have not been modelled. These externalities reflect real costs (and some 
benefits) that projects do not experience; instead electricity users, rate payers or tax payers either 
make payments or benefit. These externalities are not currently experienced by project developers 
and therefore do not influence their decision-making (in entering into renewable energy projects) 
but this may not be the case in future, with a greater emphasis expected to be on projects 
incurring their full costs. 
There are also cases where the parties experiencing extra project-related costs do have some 
ability to reduce these costs, rather than attempt simply to pass them on. Possibly the best 
example, in the case of PV, is where network companies may have to undertake network 
upgrades to accommodate electricity being feed back into the grid. Network companies are 
considering addressing this issue by installing battery storage at network substations to allow 
electricity to be stored and re-injected into the network when the problem has dissipated (AEMC, 
2015). This is a larger-scale approach to similar action households with PV could take when 
attractive FITs terminate. Households will be driven by maximising the revenue potential of PV 
whereas networks are driven by reducing costs; different drivers but achieving same peak load 
reduction on the network. These issues were noted in a UK context by Balcombe et al (2015) who 
sampled 30 households noting that inclusion of battery storage “Improves the grid demand profile 
by 28% in terms of grid demand ramp-up requirement and 40% for ramp-downs” (Balcombe et 
al, 2015, p 393). Although not part of the 20 year model developed, the economics of battery 
storage as a supplement to household PV has however been examined later in this thesis. 
The overall economics of large-scale electricity (battery) storage, although not modelled, is likely 
to become more prominent in future. As mentioned in Section 2.3 the key areas are molten salt 
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storage associated with large-scale solar energy viability and pumped storage for both hydro and 
wind generation (PIN, 2013).  
Often overlooked are the externalities associated with wind generation, which is forecast to 
provide the largest share of renewable energy generation to ensure the LRET target is met. 
ARENA (2013) commented that wind provided 1.5% of Australia’s energy in FY 2008 and is 
forecast to provide 12.1% in FY 2030. The intermittent nature of wind generation means that 
back up generation, particularly fast start generation such as gas or hydro, is required, being an 
added expense. In addition networks must be capable of meeting both extremes of wind 
generation at maximum output and at no output, when back up electricity generation will be 
necessary which is likely to be “carried” along a different part of the network. In effect double the 
level of network capacity could be required to ensure supply reliability. Simshauser (2011) 
concluded that the extra network costs associated with wind generation would be “trivial”. 
Schleicher-Tappeser (2012) noted, in a German context, that because PV is almost viable without 
subsidies, an aspect also noted by McKinsey (2012), that issues relating to networks and peaking 
will come more into focus, being the likely future situation in Australia. There are also often 
unnoticed favourable renewable energy outcomes, such as PV increasing property values (Ma, 
2015) and in the case of wind power, farmers receiving extra income for their land being used for 
generation purposes (Sutherland and Holstead, 2013). 
Cross subsidies are coming more into focus with the growth in PV. Nelson et al (2011) concluded 
that FITs result in low income households subsidise wealthier households by a factor of 3. These 
examples highlight the fact that subsidies supporting renewable energy are likely to be associated 
with additional costs. These additional costs will in most cases be paid for by electricity 
consumers so that as well as the more obvious direct subsidies there are additional non-quantified 
subsidies paid for by electricity consumers. These have not been modelled but need to be 
recognised as they are likely to be more substantial over time and could eventually become 
additional costs experienced by project developers effectively lowering the viability of some 
renewable energy projects.  
5.5 Model concept adopted 
  
The focus of this thesis is on modelling of the relationship between renewable energy subsidies 
and GHG emission reductions in Australia, of which there is little published research either in 
Australia or overseas. There are however papers on abatement costs of different types of 
electricity generation, with the works of McKinsey & Company being prominent. There is some 
research on a piecemeal basis in Australia, such as Treasury’s modelling of carbon and GHG 
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emissions (Treasury, 2011a; Treasury, 2011b), and publications by consulting companies on how 
carbon pricing has impacted wholesale electricity prices (SKMMMA, 2011) which included a 
cost benefit analysis of the impact of a national carbon pricing mechanism on the electricity 
market. 
The model developed is a simple year by year capture of the electricity output of renewable 
energy types, the associated GHG emissions and, where available, input costs. The availability of 
input data is the key determinant of the detail in which each of the renewable energy types is 
examined, which is now discussed in descending order of level of detail. Household PV has 
detailed input costs and revenues data available enabling payback periods and GHG emission 
reductions to be built up on an individual household basis and factored up to national figures, 
using numbers of installations and their capacities. Regression analysis of payback periods 
against levels of new household PV was then used. 
The second most detailed analysis was of large-scale renewable energy projects, where input 
costs and revenues were built up on a project-by-project basis to create payback periods and then 
factored up to produce national figures. Different subsidies were involved compared with 
household PV, including grants for specific projects. 
The third most detailed level of analysis was on demand-side management, where the focus was 
on electricity conservation by households in response to the movement in real electricity prices, 
using regression analysis to produce price elasticities of demand. 
The least level of detail has been on non-renewable energy, not being a prime focus of this thesis. 
Nevertheless there is relevance for example in the impact of carbon pricing on electricity prices, 
in turn affecting the economics of renewable energy projects, and household energy conservation. 
There is also the impact of carbon pricing on changing the relative economics of generators 
output thereby reducing GHG emissions. Each of these is quantitatively examined. 
The non-renewable energy analysis modelling does not extend to a level of detail as in the 
household PV analysis. To do this would have required a sophisticated half-hourly generation 
(merit order dispatch model, not considered necessary for the purposes of this thesis. Parties such 
as ROAM Consulting and SKMMMA (now Hatch) have such models that could have been 
accessed had this been necessary.  
A broad measure of the economics of renewable energy projects has been assessed by developing 
payback periods for new renewable energy projects. It is assumed project developers, rather than 
financiers, are decision-makers and that all projects are equity funded. Payback periods for each 
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year are compared with levels of new installed capacity. This is used in most detail in the case of 
household PV where regression analysis concluded that, in broad terms, the shorter the payback 
period the greater the aggregate capacity of newly installed PV. There are some data-related 
limitations such as FITs changing mid-year, the lagging between financial incentives and actual 
installation, and a higher uptake occurring when it was announced that an attractive FIT was 
about to end but close comparisons between model-determined FIT payments and published data 
meant they were not a major concern. The payback to new installations relationship was used to 
estimate the likely uptake of PV in the future based on forecast changes in input variables such as 
capital costs, STC multipliers and FITs. Unlike larger scale renewable energy projects, where the 
price of the environmental credit (LGC) is based on supply and demand, the PV solar credit 
(STC) is capped at AU$40/STC thereby simplifying this part of the analysis. A similar payback 
concept was applied to larger renewable energy projects but the outcome, that is the relationship 
of the payback period to newly installed capacity, is of value but more approximate because such 
projects have longer lead times, and are impacted by other factors such as environmental 
approvals, network or transmission agreements and possible one-off grants.  
These aspects give rise to a difference in the modelling approach between household PV uptake, 
which is built up from the attitudes of households as a whole, and larger renewable energy 
projects that include analysis of some much larger projects on a one-off basis, using various 
sources of information. New wind farms and solar farms are generally noted in the media with 
useful comments also provided by grant providers. Bagasse (from new sugar processing plants) 
and new hydro projects occur less frequently and would, in the few cases of them possibly being 
viable, have materially longer lead times.   
Accessing needed data, particularly back to FY 2000 has been a challenge in some areas. 
Information such as wholesale electricity prices is readily available (from the Australian 
Electricity Market Operator). In addition generation data in terms of annual output by generation 
type is readily available (from Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics) but not the marginal 
generator setting the wholesale electricity price. Knowing the marginal generator is important 
because if electricity consumption reduces (or increases) it is important to know the type of 
generation that is affected to know how the level of GHG emissions are affected.  Another data 
issue relates to retail electricity prices because as states deregulate, retailers franchise tariffs are 
no longer applicable. Instead there are various prices offered to the market from competing 
retailers. Victoria was the state to first deregulate making this the state which has the least 
accurate information on household electricity prices.  
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The model has been developed so that a wide range of input variables can be altered affecting 
outcomes such as generation output, emission reductions and the likelihood Australia’s emission 
targets will be met. The build-up of retail electricity price components in the model is discussed 
in Appendix A. 
5.6 Household PV model approach 
 
The main focus of the 20 year model is on household PV in Australia. The model adopted takes 
the PV related parts of the flows shown in Figure 5.2 and then views the financial relationship 
between these variables that either directly or indirectly impact on household PV, thereby 
producing the flows shown in Figure 5.3.  
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Figure 5-3 Financial flows affecting household PV decision-making 
In broad terms, PV households make purchasing decisions based on household PV installation 
cost (“Capital Cost”), being the installed PV cost discounted by the value of STCs (“STC” and 
“multiplier”) provided by installers, and expectations of revenue from FITs and savings from 
reduced imported electricity costs. Households typically assign STCs to installers who discount 
PV installation prices by the market value of the STCs, less installers’ margin of 20% (Martin 
and Rice, 2013).  
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PV also has some less obvious positive and negative impacts on the wholesale energy market. 
Households, in utilising solar electricity for a portion of their electricity needs, reduce national 
electricity market (NEM) demand from the grid. This has implications generally of a favourable 
nature to consumers, through depressing wholesale electricity prices. In the short-term the 
reduction arises from increased competition between generators to meet lower demand, as has 
been occurring in Australia to the concern of generators (Simshauser, 2014). There is also a 
substitution impact arising from PV exports replacing more expensive generation. Wurzburg et al 
(2013) examined the renewable energy impact on wholesale electricity prices in European 
countries, particularly Germany and Spain, concluding, in line with results of 19 other papers 
they viewed, that renewable energy reduced wholesale electricity prices by between 4 and 12 
percent, with wind having the greatest impact.  
Ciarreta et al (2014) also noted this market price impact concluding that, in Spain over the period 
2008 to 2012, green energy paid for itself in the early years but in later years, following strong 
growth, the impact became a net cost. Although several authors observed the beneficial lower 
wholesale price impact Milstein and Tishler (2011) also noted the increases in price volatility, 
and hence increased risk. Similar conclusions were reached in Australia by Australian 
Government Climate Change Authority (2012) and ROAM (2012). 
Distribution companies need to make modifications to accommodate backflows of electricity 
when electricity is exported to the grid (Australian Government Climate Change Authority, 2012, 
p 43). The impacts on distribution companies are difficult to quantify, but on balance they are 
more likely to be unfavourable than favourable. This is supported by various reports viewed by 
Syed (2012). 
On overcast days non-solar generation (“back up generation”) will be required which, by 
definition will be poorly utilised. This presents a real market challenge because of the expected 
growth in intermittent renewable energy (Spiecker and Weber, 2014; Molyneaux et al, 2013), 
discussed later in this thesis in viewing electricity storage options. Wurzburg et al (2013, p 160) 
commented “A more intensive use of renewables may require an increase of conventional back-
up capacity to cope with the volatility of renewable generation” adding that “These elements 
may, in turn, affect long-run electricity prices in the opposite direction”. A more extreme 
comment was made by Feuerriegel and Neumann (2014) who suggested that electricity retailers 
can partially meet the back-up generation problem through demand response. They modelled this 
suggestion concluding that in doing this, retailers costs could be reduced by 3.52%. 
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There is an administration “Cost to manage” arising from large numbers of households, rather 
than a small number of large-scale generators, having to make investment decisions, go through 
the process of installation, have retailers modify invoices and gather extra meter data, as well as 
the AEMO having to accommodate a less certain form of generation into its dispatch process. 
These extra activities (involving a large number of parties) could be seen as negative but because 
households have decision control, rather than large businesses, this is considered a broadly 
neutral outcome. 
An “Efficiency of decision making” benefit arises from solar output automatically occurring, that 
is without human involvement, in contrast with non-renewable market generators bidding their 
output into the wholesale market on a five minute basis. 
These non-quantifiable costs and benefits, from a consumer viewpoint, are summarised in Table 
5.1, where H is high market impact, M is medium market impact and L is low market impact.  
                                        Table 5-1 Indirect market consequences of PV  
Market Feature and Market Impact          Positive    Neutral          Negative 
NEM demand reduction               H 
  Displacement of higher cost generation                  H 
  Distribution upgrades 
  
       M 
Backup generation required 
  
       H 
Cost to manage 
 
          L 
 Efficiency of decision making               M 
        
Note that these impacts are from the perspective of consumers. They are, on balance, favourable 
in the short-term but less likely to be in the long-term when some of these unfavourable cost 
externalities could be passed back to all consumers. Non-renewable energy generators who have 
made investment decisions based on demand growth forecasts which have not transpired, are 
likely to be negatively impacted in the short-term (Simshauser, 2014).   
5.6.1 Choices of project viability   
 
Research into the viability of household PV has tended to focus mostly on how changes in cost 
and revenue components affect viability (Talavera et al, 2010; Orioli and Gangi, 2014). Talavera 
et al (2010) noted the three standard forms of financial evaluation being net present value (NPV), 
internal rate of return (IRR) and payback period, commenting that the payback method ignores 
cash flows beyond the payback period but is the easiest to understand. The IRR method requires 
the life of the system to be included in the calculations which is an uncertain variable in the early 
stages of the life of PV systems.Orioli and Gangi (2014) adopted the NPV approach using the 
lifespan as the 20 year period of subsidies applying in Italy. Of particular relevance in the work of 
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Orioli and Gangi (2014) is the sensitivity analysis undertaken of the impact of changes in input 
costs on NPV, the closest approach that any articles show to the sensitivity analyses undertaken 
in this thesis.  
No research articles could be found linking costs and levels of subsidies firstly to payback 
periods and then to the uptake of household PV, possibly because time series are either too short 
(given household PV developments are comparatively recent) or because by using say weekly 
rather than annual data, the uptake is unlikely to show meaningful trends. Grau (2014) examined, 
on a weekly basis, the relationship, in Germany, between net benefits (present value of FITs less 
PV costs) and PV installations over the period 2009 to 2011. Grau (2014) noted that FIT levels 
had been declining at a similar rate to the decline in PV costs so net benefits did not show large 
variations over time. Complicating the analysis, as mentioned above, is the fact that in reality 
there would be many weeks before improved viability was reflected in increased PV uptake.  
The approach taken in this thesis is to use the payback method of assessing viability rather than 
IRR or cash flow methods. As discussed in Fais et al (2014) the payback method is less complex 
than the IRR method, and hence easier for households to understand, but omits future benefits 
after the end of the payback period. Omitting future benefits beyond the payback period has some 
practical relevance because they ignore the possibility that inverters do not last beyond the 
payback period and that FITs might be changed, both being unlikely but nevertheless possible 
outcomes. Perez et al (2004) compared the payback method with ongoing cash flows concluding 
that simple payback methods may not produce results as attractive as using annual cash flows. 
Hence use of the payback method in this thesis could be considered a conservative approach to 
viability. 
5.6.2 Financial components 
 
The model used in this thesis brings together the financial costs and benefits that Australian 
households experience in deciding whether to install PV and converts them to payback periods, 
being the number of years required for the benefits to exceed the initial outlay. This is captured in 
Figure 5.4. 
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 Figure 5-4 Process of determining household PV payback periods 
Annual payback periods are regressed against actual annual capacities of new household PV 
installations to obtain the “best fit”. The output of household PV is used to assess the associated 
reduction in GHG emissions, as a result of less coal-fired and gas-fired generation being required. 
Sensitivity analyses are then undertaken to show the relative importance of input assumptions, 
being either of a market or political nature, in determining levels of household PV. 
The analysis has limitations in that the regression analysis is over a comparatively short nine year 
time frame and there are some necessary data conversions from calendar to financial years. The 
analysis is on an Australian-wide basis requiring state-weighting of some data, but where this was 
considered an over-approximation, such as with state FITs, separate state analyses were 
undertaken.  
Size of PV systems, costs and STC impact 
 
The size of PV systems installed in Australia has been gradually increasing since 2000 from 
between 1.5 kW and 2.0 kW to an average installed size of over 3.0 kW (SunWiz, 2013), as 
shown in Figure 5.5.  
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 Figure 5-5 Trend in Australian household new PV system sizes 
                                                Source: Green Energy Markets (2014a) 
System size increase is partly a reflection of declining costs, which began falling in 2008 due to 
oversupply in China (Yuan et al, 2014), with production costs dropping to a tenth of earlier levels 
(Honghang et al, 2014b) combined with the strong Australian dollar (Australian PV Association, 
2011; Australian PV Association, 2012).These factors, as well as the STC multiplier, combined 
to provide the most attractive financial conditions for household PV between FY 2011 and FY 
2013, as reflected in payback periods of less than four years. 
Since 2010 the decline in household PV unit costs appears to have stabilised (Figure 5.6), 
although de La Tour et al (2013) believe further reductions are possible, and even though FITs 
are lower than they were five years ago the demand for household PV remains reasonably strong 
(Clean Energy Council, 2013). Nevertheless at some stage a saturation level will be reached 
whereby the non-PV household group will take an increasing level of enticement to be attracted 
to PV. In late 2013 the Australian states of Queensland and South Australia penetration rates had 
increased to 22% and 25% respectively with a nation-wide average of 14% (Parkinson, 2013).  
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 Figure 5-6 Trend in Australian PV unit costs 
                               Source: Australian PVA (2011), Australian PV Institute (2015) 
Household PV costs are net of the value of 15 future years of STC benefits which installers seek 
to be assigned to them from households thereby reducing the PV costs paid by households. STCs 
generally have a market price range of between AU$35/STC and AU$40/STC (Clean Energy 
Regulator, 2015) but installers take substantial margins of at least 20% (Martin and Rice, 2013), 
which unfortunately most households are not aware of. This is recognised in the model. 
Between FY 2010 and FY 2013 additional incentives were provided by the Australian 
government in the form of multiples of STCs that were deemed to be produced up to the first 1.5 
kW of capacity. This multiplier increased from a factor of 1 in FY 2009 to 5 in FY 2010. That is 
for PV systems installed in FY 2010 households could receive 150 deemed STCs per solar from 
each installation5. At an installers price of AU$32/STC this converts to a AU$4,800 benefit. 
Installation of a 1.7 kW system in FY 2010 cost about AU$8,800 which meant that installers 
could afford to price 1.7 kW systems at AU$4,000, providing a 5.4 year payback period. Two 
years later the installed price of systems dropped substantially, from AU$5,000/kW to 
AU$2,000/kW, more than compensating for the STC multiplier dropping to a factor of 3, 
resulting in FY 2012 having the lowest payback period of 2.8 years. 
STC costs included in household electricity tariffs 
 
In Australia, electricity retailers are required to purchase a percentage of their sales in the form of 
STCs (and also LGCs) known as the Small-Scale Technology Percentage (STP). The STP is set 
5 The 150 was determined by multiplying 5 (the multiplier) by 15 (the number of years the allocation could be applied 
to) by 2 (the number of megawatt hours deemed to be produced annually  by a 1.5 kW solar installation) 
From 1 January 2017 the years of allocation are to be reduced by one for that year and each subsequent year. 
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at the start of each calendar year with a “true up” at year end year to approximate the supply of 
STCs that are created from PV installations.  In the years of high PV uptake this percentage is 
much higher than in other years. The trend in the STC purchase proportions (Table 5.2) is a 
useful guide to the trend in the uptake of household PV and expectations as determined by the 
Clean Energy Regulator. The lower, more recent, percentages reflect the regulator’s expectation 
of household PV uptake in future. 
                 Table 5-2 Proportion of STCs required to be purchased by electricity retailers 
Calendar year   Retailer STC proportion 
2008 3.14% 
2009 3.65% 
2010 19.70% 
2011 14.80% 
2012 23.95% 
2013 19.70% 
2014 10.48% 
2015 10.10% 
2016 10.32% 
 
Source: Clean Energy Regulator 
 
Average daily hours of consumption offset and export 
 
Households financially benefit from PV by reducing imported electricity and by obtaining FIT 
payments from exported electricity. For modelling purposes it was assumed that on an “average” 
day electricity consumption is reduced 2.0 hours, and 1.5 hours of electricity is exported to the 
grid, that is total daily solar output occurs for 3.5 hours each day (AEMO, 2012; NSW 
Government, 2011; RAA, 2014). Model sensitivities are run on these assumptions. An indication 
of how household PV affects electricity consumption and exports is shown in Figure 5.7, utilising 
data contained in Frontier Economics (2012) which is based on 10,000 households in a NSW 
network area consuming an average 8,000 kWh pa. It is difficult to obtain accurate household 
consumption data as most Australian households do not have time-of-use (TOU) meters, although 
this is gradually changing. The figure of 8,000 kWh used by Frontier Economics (2012) does 
however compare favourably with the nationwide average household electricity consumption 
figure of 7,100 kWh pa reported by Clean Energy Council (2012).  
The household consumption load shape used by Frontier Economics (2012) was compared with 
AEMO’s “net system load profile”, that is electricity consumption net of TOU metered 
consumption in 2013 (AEMO, 2014). The result was very similar with twin peak ratios of 67% 
for Frontier Economics (2012) and 71% for AEMO (2014) and trough to peak ratios of 44% for 
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Frontier Economics (2012) and 42% for AEMO (2014). An effective 2.0 kW PV system has been 
used, being the average PV system size in Australia in 2011 (Green Energy Markets, 2014a).   
A similar analysis was undertaken by Ausgrid (2014) who gathered half-hour data from 300 solar 
customers in their NSW network over the FY 2013 year. Solar system size was slightly smaller 
(1.7 MW) but gross generation averaged 3.6 hours each day, marginally greater than assumed in 
this thesis. Peakiness of the load was also greater but this could reflect the sample being solar 
customers who are m ore likely to benefit from PV compared with non-solar customers. 
 
 
Figure 5-7 PV impact on household electricity consumption in NSW Australia 
                                                Source: Frontier Economics (2012) 
Annual variation in feed- in tariffs 
 
Commencing in 2008 states and territories gradually introduced FITs. The average FIT increased 
from being negligible in FY 2008 to AU20c/kWh in FY 2009 to an effective6 peak of 
AU58c/kWh in FY 2011, due largely to the NSW gross FIT of AU60c/kWh, and then gradually 
declined to the current average of AU5c/kWh (Australian PV Association, 2012). An additional 
AU6 to AU8c/kWh, is commonly added to the FIT, being the value of the exported electricity to 
6 Gross FITs were converted to effective net FITs by also including the difference between the FIT and retail electricity 
price for consumed electricity in the net FIT.  
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the retailer involved, but this is not included as part of consumer subsidies. The attractiveness of 
these early FITs can be seen by comparison with the typical average retail tariff in FY 2013 of 
AU26c/kWh (AEMC, 2013; Simshauser, 2014).    
 
Figure 5-8 Trend in Australian feed-in tariffs 
                                     Source: Australian PVA (2011) 
The combination of the subsidy components of STCs and FITs is shown in Figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5-9 PV subsidies by financial year in Australia 
  Source: See Figure 5.8 and Clean Energy Regulator 
Of particular significance is the impact from STCs in FY 2011 and the increasing contribution 
from FITs; the latter reflecting the fact that although attractive FITs averaged AU58c/kWh in FY 
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2011 reducing to AU15c/kWh in FY 2013, the historically attractive FY 2011 FITs continue for 
those households that secured them for five to 20 years, depending on the state involved. 
The STC subsidies, reflecting STC prices and STC multipliers, only apply in the year concerned 
so with the STC multiplier reducing the STC subsidy eventually falls below the FIT subsidy. It is 
estimated that in FY 2014 of the total subsidy of AU$704 million, AU$520 million or 74% of the 
subsidy relates to the FIT of previous years. This highlights future policy issues including the fact 
that, because of historic high FITs, electricity consumers will continue to subsidise PV 
households at an average AU$500 million pa over the next five years, but dropping to AU$400 
million pa post 2020 due to termination of most of the high FITs. (Australian PV Association, 
2012). It is the ongoing cost of FITs that makes the scheme cost-inefficient as the payback 
periods will have been well exceeded much earlier than 2020. This concern has been experienced 
in many other countries as mentioned in Section 2.1.2. 
Determination of household tariffs 
 
In Australia household electricity prices are set either by regulation or through competition 
between retailers. Retail deregulation has been gradually occurring in each state, beginning in 
Victoria in 2004. Where deregulation has yet to occur regulatory bodies in each state determine 
household electricity tariffs through similar component build-up processes with the two largest 
components being network, including transmission, charges determined by the Australian Energy 
Regulator, and energy charges comprising a mix of spot prices, electricity derivative prices and 
long run costs of new generation (Queensland Competition Authority, 2013, p 22). Added to this 
is a retailer margin, covering overheads, renewable energy and a margin for risk, being in the 
order of 11% to 15% (Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, 2013).     
Household tariffs have been increasing in real terms over the analysis period, providing an 
additional incentive to households to install PV. The main reason for the increases has been 
network companies initially spending to levels that guaranteed security of supply. Network 
charge increases are expected to be less substantial in future because the Australian Energy 
Regulator has sought a more prudent expenditure approach, in effect changing from a “n – 1” 
approach, with considerable redundancy, to a level where at the worst some occasional blackouts 
could occur (Simshauser, 2014). 
5.6.3 PV impact on GHG emissions 
 
Household PV impacts on GHG reductions in two ways: generation reduction and generation 
displacement. Generation reduction occurs through solar being used for domestic electricity 
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consumption (with the excess being exported to the grid). This is part of the reason why 
Australian electricity demand has been falling in recent years, reducing generation required with 
a consequent reduction in GHG emissions. The actual reduction reflects the fuel types of 
generation not now required, being the “marginal” generators. As revealed in Figure 5.7 this 
occurs, on average between 7.00 am and 6.00 pm, when (in Australia in 2012) 38% of marginal 
generation was gas-fired (AEMO, 2014). Gas-fired generation emissions in Australia at that time 
averaged 0.60 t CO2e/MWh, in comparison with coal-fired generation at 1.02 t CO2e/MWh 
(Australian Government Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2012a; Skoufa 
and Tamaschke, 2011; Energy Supply Association Australia, 2010). Gas and coal-fired 
generation together produced an overall weighted average of 0.86 t CO2e/MWh. Hence in broad 
terms in Australia, GHG reductions of 0.86 t CO2e occur for each MWh of reduced electricity 
consumption. This approach and the results are similar to those in Oliva and MacGill (2011).  
The second impact arises from exported PV displacing generation which would otherwise have 
been required to meet electricity demand. Solar output is generated between 7.00 am and 7.00 pm 
(Figure 5.7) but because it is first used to satisfy domestic demand the period of exporting is 
between 10.00 am and 3.00 pm (AEMO, 2012; Burtt, 2009). During these five hours the gas-fired 
generation proportion was (in Australia in 2012) 17%. Using the same method as for generation 
reduction produces GHG reductions of 0.93 t CO2e/ MWh. It is these generation reduction and 
displacement impacts that, together, determine the GHG reduction benefit from PV.  
The emission benefits are however marginally less than those determined by this calculation 
because PV, of itself, involves GHG emissions in the process of solar panel manufacture 
(Weisser and Strasse, 2007; Fthenakis et al, 2008) the latter making their determination through 
analysing the lifecycle of a 1.8 kW PV system in either southern Europe or USA. This has been 
captured in the model by reducing the PV emission benefit by 5%, being at the upper end of the 
range suggested by Lu et al (2010). 
5.7 Large-scale renewable energy model approach 
Large-scale renewable energy, being renewable energy other than household PV, has been 
modelled in less detail than that of household PV and hence does not allow the same form of 
sensitivity analysis. This reflects the level of available data detail and the different type of 
decision-making involved in projects of a much larger scale than household PV. Project decisions 
involve costs, subsidies and revenues peculiar to each project. Rather than uniform state FITs 
being available, project developers are likely to seek fixed energy and LGC pricing from 
electricity retailers for their output in the form of power purchase agreements (PPAs), and may 
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also seek financial support on a one-off basis from the state government in the region involved. 
Nevertheless with the level of aggregated data available it was possible to determine realistic 
payback periods, in a similar manner to household PV, which was used as part of a broad analysis 
for each of large-scale solar, wind, biomass and hydro. 
The need for large renewable projects to have fixed output pricing is a reflection of the desire to 
have financial certainty, sought in particular by financiers. The alternative is to go “merchant”, 
that is to receive pool price revenue (from AEMO, the grid operator). Pool prices are determined 
on a half-hour basis and can vary between -AU$1,000 and AU$12,500/MWh, creating revenue 
volatility that project financiers prefer to avoid. 
As with household PV, large-scale renewable projects can also access renewable energy credits, 
being large-scale generation credits (LGCs). Unlike STCs, which have a legislative AU$40/MWh 
price cap, and a trading price range typically within a price range of AU$2/MWh to AU$4/MWh, 
LGCs have a much higher cap at AU$92.85/MWh and a much wider trading range, reflecting 
both political factors and future expectations of large-scale renewable energy projects. Political 
influences were most noticeable during the period leading up to the revised 33,000 GWh total 
renewable energy target in late 2104 and early 2015 (Graham et al, 2013). This markedly 
changed in early 2015 with the market reacting positively to the increased certainty (Figure 5.10). 
  5.7.1 Key aspects of model data analysis 
Assumptions used for model build of each large-scale renewable energy type are discussed in 
detail in Appendix A3. In summary, for each year there are four aspects of model data analysis. 
The first involved ensuring capacity (in MW) and annual hours of operation produce output that 
approximates annual output advised by the Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (BREE), 
a function now under the control of the Office of the Chief Economist. Levels of (MW) capacity 
were available from ESAA, EGA (2010) and EGA (2014). This aspect of analysis is important in 
assessing how Australia has been and will progress towards meeting its target of at least 20% of 
energy being met by renewable energy in 2020. 
The second aspect of model data analysis related to the process by which renewable energy 
growth is stimulated, being through LGCs (and grants), to help ensure Australia meets the 20% 
renewable energy target. LGCs are determined from a 1997 output baseline, but used from 2000, 
for each energy type and reported in the  Clean Energy Regulator’s REC Registry making it 
critical that the model reflects these LGC numbers, This was a time-consuming analysis as the 
Registry is very detailed and involved the need to obtain explanations from the CER. As an 
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example the model-determined volume of hydro LGCs created was less than that shown in REC 
Registry, suggesting a lower baseline than that determined by 1997 output levels, as observed by 
MacGill et al (2006) who commented that some analysts had “identified that baselines for some 
of Australia’s large-scale hydro generators may have been set below their present long run 
average system yield” (MacGill et al, 2006, p 16). On contacting the CER I was advised hydro 
energy baselines change year by year. 
 The model uses BREE calibrated output figures from which were deducted CER baseline figures 
to determine LGC figures. These LGC figures plus grants represent large-scale renewable energy 
subsidies, the focus of this thesis. 
The third aspect of model data analysis involved expanding the information contained in first two 
aspects of data analysis, in effect moving from volume to financial data, to enable payback 
periods to be determined for each renewable energy type for each year. This was considered 
necessary to ensure input data, such as the level of renewable energy subsidies, could be reduced 
to determine the effect on pay back periods and hence the likelihood that renewable energy 
growth might be reduced, in a similar manner to the approach with household PV. The financial 
aspects are discussed below. 
The fourth aspect of model data analysis related to the reduction in GHG emissions arising from 
the growth in renewable energy, and hence the contribution made towards Australia meeting its 5 
% reduction in GHG emissions. This was a comparatively simple process as the second aspect of 
model data analysis determined renewable energy growth volume and as was the case with 
household PV a counter-factual approach was taken to determine the type of generation displaced 
and hence the level of emission reductions. 
5.7.2 Model Data Input 
Assumptions relating to financial model inputs, output growth and carbon intensity factors are 
now discussed. Capital costs, developed from a cost per MW basis (CSIRO, 2014; ARENA, 
2015), were used to develop the capital costs for each renewable energy type. Revenue was 
determined from energy pool prices and contract prices plus LGC revenue For LGCs a 
continuation of the most recent AU$60/MWh price has been used (Figure 5.10), although recent 
data suggests this could be a conservative assumption (Mercari, 2015). In practice contract LGC 
prices would be lower than those shown in Figure 5.10 but the recent increases in LGC prices 
would broadly compensate for this adjustment. 
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Pool prices used were the same for each renewable energy type except for a sculpting factor used 
to convert annual average flat pool prices to pool prices specific to each renewable energy type. 
Sculpting factors were applied as follows: for bagasse output, where  production is mostly in 
summer, a 40% premium was applied reflecting higher summer pool prices compared with the 
NEM annual average pool price; for solar energy, where output is mostly during times of high 
demand and high pool prices, a 50 % premium to average pool prices was applied up to FY 2013 
then gradually reduced reflecting, in particular, the solar generation impact on the distribution of 
pool prices; with wind energy having a 10% discount factor reflecting greater uncertainty in wind 
output. Hydro output is often run-of-river but because there are sometimes opportunities to hold 
back water to take advantage of higher pool prices a 10% premium to average pool prices was 
applied. These premia and discount factors were based on market information, AEMO pool price 
data and research carried out by the author, having PPA pricing responsibilities at Energex and 
Ergon Energy over the period 1999 to 2012. 
 
 
Figure 5-10 Large-scale generation certificate price trend                                
Source: IES. (2007), Australian Government Climate Change Authority (2012), Green Energy Markets 
(2014a), Mercari (2015)  
Information on revenue from one-off grants, and low cost finance, from Commonwealth and state 
governments is not always made public. Fortunately the Australian Renewable Energy Agency 
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(ARENA) provides a substantial amount of information, being the main source of subsidy data. 
These figures can be quite substantial as in the case of the two solar farms in NSW, the 56 MW 
Moree solar farm, with AU$102 million of ARENA funding in FY 2011, and the 147 MW 
Nyngan solar farm with AU$231 million of ARENA funding spread over FY 2015 and FY 2016. 
ARENA also provided AU$35 million for the 46 MW Kogan Creek solar expansion in FY 2012. 
Queensland state funding of AU$9 million was provided in FY 2013 for 36 MW Mackay 
Racecourse bagasse expansion (Mackay Sugar annual reports). ARENA also provided, and still 
does, funding for smaller scale projects, mostly involving new types of renewable technology. 
This agency has had the largest impact on renewable energy projects in recent years, but being a 
political body its future remains in doubt, particularly under a Coalition government which 
unsuccessfully sought to have it abolished in 2014. 
GHG emission reductions were determined by noting the marginal generator that would be 
displaced through renewable energy generation being dispatched, using the same counter-factual 
process as used for household PV. That is because renewable energy generation has been 
reducing the overall level of NEM generation emissions, it is necessary to determine the level of 
emissions that would have occurred without renewable energy generation. This was determined 
by proportionately increasing the proportions of generation fuel types setting the pool price 
(Table 5.3).  
Reduced emissions were determined by noting the generation type, being black coal-fired, brown 
coal-fired or gas-fired, which was not now operating. Solar operated mostly in peak periods, 
thereby displacing gas-fired generation, having carbon intensity factor (CIF) of 0.64 (t 
CO2e/MWh). 
Wind generation, operating on a random basis, is assumed to displace marginal generators 
reflective of the NEM as a whole (CIF of 1.0 reducing to 0.70 over time, but on a counter-factual 
basis reducing to 0.88). 
Bagasse generation is provided mostly by plants from the largest sugar mills, being those 
operated by Mackay Sugar and Wilmar (previously Sucrogen). These companies operate their 
generation plant on a 24/7 basis during and following the annual sugar crush, thereby taking 
advantage of higher summer pool prices and minimising stock piling of bagasse, which has 
combustibility risks. Hence generation displaced is likely to be that of the NEM as a whole, as in 
the case of wind generation. 
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Biomass generation arises from a range of fuel sources including land-fill gas, wood and 
agricultural waste, and black liquor not receiving specific grants. Like bagasse the fuel is a by-
product of another process and is also assumed to displace generation reflective of the NEM as a 
whole.  
Hydro generation occurs using both run-of-river flows and flows from dams when there is some 
discretion as to when hydro generation may occur. A greater proportion of hydro output could 
therefore be expected to occur in peak periods. It is assumed that, on average, 50% of hydro 
occurs in peak periods and 50% evenly spread throughout the year, being the basis for the hydro 
generation CIF. This produces a counter-factual CIF lower than for wind and bagasse, and higher 
that solar reflecting types of generation being displaced   
The counter-factual CIFs used for these five types of renewable generation are shown in Table 
5.3.   
        Table 5-3 Carbon intensity offset factors for large-scale renewable energy (t CO2e/MWh) 
  Large-scale renewables NEM 
FY solar Wind Hydro Bagasse/Biomass All output 
Excluding 
renewables 
2001 0.64 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2002 0.64 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2003 0.64 1.01 0.82 1.01 1.01 1.01 
2004 0.64 1.01 0.83 1.01 1.01 1.01 
2005 0.64 0.99 0.81 0.99 0.99 0.99 
2006 0.64 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 1.00 
2007 0.64 0.93 0.79 0.93 0.93 0.93 
2008 0.64 0.93 0.78 0.93 0.93 0.93 
2009 0.64 0.93 0.78 0.93 0.93 0.93 
2010 0.64 0.88 0.88 0.76 0.88 0.88 
2011 0.64 0.85 0.75 0.85 0.85 0.88 
2012 0.64 0.88 0.76 0.88 0.82 0.88 
2013 0.64 0.85 0.74 0.85 0.78 0.85 
2014 0.64 0.85 0.75 0.85 0.76 0.85 
2015 0.64 0.85 0.75 0.85 0.72 0.85 
2016 0.64 0.85 0.75 0.85 0.71 0.85 
2017 0.64 0.87 0.75 0.87 0.72 0.87 
2018 0.64 0.87 0.76 0.87 0.71 0.87 
2019 0.64 0.87 0.76 0.87 0.71 0.87 
2020 0.64 0.88 0.76 0.88 0.70 0.88 
                               Source: Energy Supply Association of Australia. (2010) 
Note that CIFs have gradually reduced over time being a reflection of the higher proportion of 
gas-fired electricity operating at the margin, having a lower CIF than coal-fired electricity. The 
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carbon intensity factors were applied to the output of each renewable energy type to produce 
annual emission reduction figures. Using the subsidy costs, mentioned earlier, produces an annual 
emission reduction cost (AU$/CO2e).  
5.8 Non-renewable energy model approach 
 
Non-renewable energy has been analysed broadly on an annual basis by noting the key input and 
output variables for each of brown coal-fired, black coal-fired, gas-fired and renewable energy, 
and observing trends to assist in forecasting. The analysis is not at the level of detail of household 
PV but this was not considered necessary as sensitivity analyses were not used. A screen shot for 
FY 2013 is shown in Appendix A. 
Inputs for each financial year are on a AU$ per MWh basis for fuel, carbon cost (if any), capital 
recovery cost and total cost. Outputs are total output, emissions and the proportion of each fuel 
type used to set the pool price. This information is later used as input into determination of retail 
prices through the inclusion of renewable energy subsidies (LGCs, STCs and FITs), network 
charges and retailer margins.  
The main purpose of the non-renewable energy evaluations is to examine how household PV 
reduces total electricity demand and displaces non-renewable energy, how large-scale renewable 
energy displaces non-renewable energy fuel sources and how demand-side management, reduces 
total electricity demand. 
The information was also used to ensure consistency in the use of Australian-wide energy data, 
including consistency with total electricity production and levels of total GHG emissions. 
Forecasting involved noting trends in output by fuel types, to determine how expected increases 
in renewable energy output and DSM will input on total level of GHG emissions. In addition an 
evaluation was made on how carbon pricing since 1 July 2012 has impacted on fuel type output.  
5.9 Demand-side management model approach – price elasticity of demand 
 
Demand-side management is the response of electricity consumers to managing their energy 
usage, partly as a means of conservation and partly in response to higher electricity prices, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. The modelling approach attempts to quantify the impact of higher 
electricity prices in reducing electricity demand. Electricity is generally considered an essential 
item, that is having a low price elasticity of demand, but this has been changing in Australia as 
shown at the macro level in reduced national electricity demand since FY 2011, and at the micro 
level in the uptake in energy efficient appliances, household PV and battery storage. This change 
88 
 
is likely to be magnified in future as a result of the gradual move by state, from one to two or 
three part pricing thereby providing market price signals for consumers to optimise their 
electricity usage (Burtt, 1999). As mentioned by Burtt (1999), Fan and Hyndman (2011) and 
Wang et al (2015) the highest level of responsiveness occurs when households experience time-
of-use (TOU) or half-hourly price signals. Although consumers reduce electricity consumption 
for more reasons than just price increases there is little doubt that increases in real electricity 
prices have and will continue to impact on electricity demand. For this reason the price elasticity 
of demand for electricity (PEDE) has been closely analysed, firstly overseas and then in 
Australia. 
In viewing various papers on PEDE attention has been given to more recent articles because of 
the more recent trend world-wide for electricity prices to increase in real terms and because of the 
environmental influence. In an analysis using California data over the period 1993 to 1997, 
Lavin, Dale et al (2001) noted that demand outcomes are affected by the possible substitution 
between electricity and gas, deriving a PEDE of -0.28; that is they concluded that households will 
materially reduce electricity consumption when prices rise while also switching between 
electricity and gas. The analysis by Espey and Espey (2004) is more relevant as they summarised 
price elasticities from other studies, concluding 
… the broad spectrum of estimates can create confusion without more detail about the 
differences in data and analysis techniques utilised. For example, price elasticities reported 
in the literature range from 0.076 to -2.01 for the short run and -0.07 to -2.5 for the long run. 
(Espey and Espey, 2004, p 65) 
Not surprisingly PEDEs were more negative in the long-run when consumers have more time to 
find a more permanent electricity consumption reduction solution. 
In a Chinese context Sun and Ouyang (2016) developed a model and used a data base of 10 
Chinese provinces to determine a PEDE -0.387. Bonte et al (2015) examined the PEDE in the 
European Power Exchange for Germany and Austria over the period 2006 to 2014. A different 
methodology was adopted post 2009 making the almost inelastic demand pre 2009 not strictly 
comparable with the -0.3 to -0.9 elasticity factors post 2009. As part of their research, each of 
Sun and Ouyang (2016) and Fan and Hyndman (2011) examined literature on PEDE. Sun and 
Ouyang (2016), in a Chinese context, observing PEDEs between -0.12 and -0.50 whereas Fan and 
Hyndman (2011) noted PEDEs varying between -0.2 in the short run and -0.7 in the long run, for 
reasons given earlier.  
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In an Australian context, demand-price elasticities from studies 10 years ago, were noted by 
Narayan and Smyth (2005) as being -0.26 in the short run, and between  -0.55 and -0.95 in the 
long run. More recently Fan and Hyndman (2011) developed two models, an annual model and a 
half-hourly model, to measure South Australian PEDE over the period 1997 to 2008 producing 
PEDE’s within a -0.363 to -0.428 range. In summary, not surprisingly the PEDE tends to be 
higher in the long-term, following time for adjustments to occur, ranging from -0.5 to -0.9 in the 
long-term and from -0.3 to -0.6 in the short-term.  
The objective has been to use this information to assist in viewing the reduction in electricity 
consumption in Australia since 2006 when electricity prices began increasing in real terms and to 
use the information to assist in demand forecasting. The relevance to this thesis is the fact that 
reduced electricity consumption means less generation output and lower emissions. The fact that 
part of the increase in real electricity prices is due to the inclusion of renewable energy subsidies, 
in the form of the two year carbon price, STC, LGC and FIT price components is evidence of a 
further subsidy-related emission reduction outcome.  
The approach taken has been to note the increase in real retail electricity prices and to then relate 
this to the reduction in electricity demand. It was noted that although retail prices have been 
increasing in real terms it was only since FY 2010 that substantial increases have occurred. Not 
surprisingly consumers did not immediately react to higher tariffs but when they rose above a 
“trigger” level it appears they considered demand responsive action was necessary. This is 
reinforced by media publicity on increased tariffs, their own expenditure experiences, media 
publicity on energy conservation appliances and the increasingly attractive viability of rooftop 
PV. To avoid double counting of the demand-reduction benefit, the reduction in household 
demand arising from household PV has been added back to total generation demand as this 
emissions reduction benefit has already been evaluated in the analysis on household PV. 
5.10 Model data limitations 
 
Data used in the model analysis is almost entirely from public sources for financial years ending 
June. Cross checks were undertaken to ensure outcomes aligned with information reported in the 
media. For example FITs and the number of installations by state were compared with state 
announcements of FIT costs, and the number of STCs arising from number of installations was 
found to align with numbers of STCs, excluding those for solar hot water systems, reported by 
the Clean Energy Regulator. 
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The limitations of this research relate mainly to the conversion of some annual data to FY data 
such as FITs by state. Various cross checks were undertaken, for example in regard to total FIT 
payments by state, to ensure approximations were realistic. Estimates of annual network costs, for 
inclusion in retail electricity costs were also undertaken using information from a range of 
sources including the AER and AEMO. FIT costs were deducted from network costs so that 
network costs did not include any subsidy components. 
The annual generation mix required the addition of Western Australia and Northern Territory 
figures to National Electricity Market (NEM) data. This information is used to examine the 
switch from coal-fired to gas-fired electricity generation during the two year carbon price period 
but their impact is of a minor nature. 
Measuring the level of reduced GHG emission reductions from renewable energy generation 
required a counter-factual approach, that is noting which generators were operating and setting 
the pool price each half hour to determine how emissions would have been reduced when 
replaced by renewable energy. This analysis was undertaken in substantial detail for 2012 with 
the same mix of coal and gas-fired generation assumed to exist in other years. This approximation 
is not crucial as it relates to the entire year and not individual half-hours. 
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Chapter 6 Model results 
 
Summary  
Chapter 6 discusses the outcome of modelling Australian household PV including the sensitivity 
of the emission reduction results to changes in input data. The household PV analysis is then 
extended to include the economics of adding battery storage. The effect of subsidies on large-
scale renewable energy output and emission levels, by renewable energy type, is then combined 
with household PV results to provide a total renewable energy picture. How non-renewable 
energy is affected by renewable energy developments is also examined. The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the effect of increases in real retail electricity prices on reduced electricity 
demand. 
The results should be seen in the context of data accuracy, with FITs requiring the greatest level 
of approximation followed by large-scale renewable energy capital costs and LGCs created by 
large-scale renewable energy (see also Section 5.10). These data have however been compared 
with related information to ensure they are broadly accurate, as mentioned in the Appendices.  
The results of analyses such as this involving small date sets is subject to greater  variation in 
outcomes often resulting instead in Monte Carlo or simulation models. The close relationship 
between the variables being examined suggests other approaches may not be necessary but the 
outcome, for this reason still needs to be treated with caution. 
6.1 Household PV model results and PV forecasts 
 
The household PV model is used to determine financial viability, measured by payback periods, 
and then to determine the relationship and sensitivity between financial viability and new PV 
capacity, measured in MW. This relationship is examined over FYs 2006 to 2014, then forecast to 
2020, with the results summarised in Table 6.1 and portrayed in Figure 6.1. The nine year period 
is comparatively short for regression analysis, lending itself more to other forms of analysis such 
as  but the relationship is strong; nevertheless the results need to be treated with some caution. 
The model allows the various inputs into payback periods, such as household electricity prices, 
FITs, STC prices and STC multipliers, to be changed producing sensitivity analyses on payback 
periods. Payback periods were then able to be converted into associated levels of actual PV, 
which in turn were used to determine reductions in levels of GHG emissions, so that the 
relationship was then established between household PV financial inputs and resultant levels of 
emission reductions. 
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There are only a small number of data weaknesses, including the conversion of some calendar 
year data into financial year (ending 30 June) data and evaluating the time delay between when 
states announced FIT termination dates and the time taken for households to actually have PV 
installed. This was accommodated in the model by having a six month lag between payback 
periods and PV installation dates. Lags of periods greater and shorter than six months were also 
tested but six months, used consistently over the nine years, provided the best “fit”.  
                                                   Table 6-1 PV payback periods 
Financial                  
year   
     PV capacity 
(MW)   
Payback 
(years) 
Payback post lagging 
(years) 
2006 2 47.4 47.4 
2007 6 43.4 45.4 
2008 23 32.5 38.0 
2009 56 16.1 24.3 
2010 227 5.4 10.7 
2011 600 3.3 4.4 
2012 901 2.8 3.1 
2013 860 3.9 3.4 
2014 662 4.3 4.1 
 
                       Source: PV capacities from Green Energy Markets (2014a) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1 Relationship between payback periods and new PV capacity 
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The four years of most growth, since FY 2010, have payback periods of less than five years. 
More recent data suggests payback periods will soon exceed five years, reflecting reduced FITs 
and expectations that household electricity price increases may not be as great in future. These 
payback period results are similar to those contained in ACT Government (2015). 
6.1.1 Household PV forecasts and emission costs per tonne of CO2e 
 
Household PV has been forecast to 2020 using forecasts from Green Energy Markets (2014a) to 
FY 2016. Forecasts beyond 2016 are derived by assuming PV panel costs increase gradually to 
AU$2/watt in 2020, new PV system sizes remain at 3.4 kW, as used in Green Energy Markets 
(2014a) forecasts, STCs remain at their current price of AU$37/STC, FITs covering only the non-
subsidised retailer payment of an average AU8c/kWh and retail electricity prices built up by 
individual components (Table 7.9). These assumptions produce model-related payback periods 
increasing gradually to between five and six years by FY 2020.  
The weakness in this approach is that there will be increasing resistance from non-PV households 
who were not able to be enticed to install PV when payback periods were nearly half what they are 
now and there is a physical uptake limit due to the finite number of houses in Australia regardless 
of how attractive the economics may be. Queensland and South Australia had reached penetration 
rates of 22% and 25% as at December 2013 (SunWiz, 2013) with Australia as a whole at 14% 
(Parkinson, 2013). AEMO (2012) used a 75% saturation uptake rate in their Australian rooftop PV 
forecasts, being higher than has been modelled, a view shared by Williamson (2016). 
These factors have been accommodated by reducing the model-determined output by 10% in FY 
2017, 20% in FY 2018, 30% in FY 2019 and by 40% in FY 2020. This assumption could be an 
over-reaction so model-determined output reductions of 7% in FY 2017, 14% in FY 2018, 21% in 
FY 2019 and 28% in FY 2020 were also examined. The two scenarios are shown in Table 6.2 
under “Base forecast” and “Optimistic forecast” respectively.    
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              Table 6-2 Household PV forecasts under different saturation factor assumptions 
  Base forecast Optimistic forecast 
 
Annual 
uptake 
Accum. 
uptake 
Annual 
output 
Accum. 
Output 
Annual 
uptake 
Accum. 
uptake 
Annual 
output 
Accum. 
Output 
FY (MW) (MW) (GWh) (GWh) (MW) (MW) (GWh) (GWh) 
2006 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
2007 6 8 8 10 6 8 8 10 
2008 20 30 30 40 20 30 30 40 
2009 60 90 70 110 60 90 70 110 
2010 230 310 290 400 230 310 290 400 
2011 600 910 770 1,170 600 910 770 1,170 
2012 900 1,820 1,150 2,320 900 1,820 1,150 2,320 
2013 860 2,680 1,100 3,420 860 2,680 1,100 3,420 
2014 660 3,340 850 4,260 660 3,340 850 4,260 
2015 570 3,910 730 4,990 570 3,910 730 4,990 
2016 560 4,460 720 5,700 560 4,460 720 5,700 
2017 530 5,000 680 6,380 550 5,010 700 6,400 
2018 460 5,460 590 6,970 500 5,510 640 7,040 
2019 400 5,860 510 7,480 450 5,960 580 7,620 
2020 330 6,190 420 7,910 400 6,360 510 8,120 
 
Note: non-single figures rounded to nearest 10. 
The sensitivity analysis of less saturation resistance suggests that by FY 2020 an extra 170 MW 
of capacity would be installed, being an extra 210 GWh of output pa. The base forecast, which is 
very similar to that of AEMO (2015b) over the period FY 2015 to FY 2018 (of 6,950 GWh in FY 
2018), is equivalent to a household penetration rate increasing from 14% in late 2013 to 21% in 
FY 2020, that is 2.1 million installations out of an expected 10.0 million households (Australian 
Bureau of Family Studies, 2014).  
Household PV capacity is forecast to reach 6,190 MW, equivalent to 7,910 GWh pa (Table 6.3). 
This is higher than most other forecasts (Sunwiz, 2012; AEMO, 2012), most likely because other 
forecasts were made prior to the strong continuing growth in household PV in FY 2013 and FY 
2014. This is supported by the more recent forecasts of Green Energy Markets (2014b) which are 
marginally higher than those forecast in this thesis, mainly because Green Energy Markets 
(2014b, page 6) assume little withering, that is reducing household penetration. Forecasts by 
Oliva and MacGill (2013), assuming different FIT assumptions, are consistent with the forecasts 
developed in the model when viewed at the higher end if FIT assumptions. More recent AEMO 
research suggests that the FY 2020 forecast could be conservative, highlighting the variations in 
forecasts (AEMO, 2016).    
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                            Table 6-3 Household PV output, emissions and associated costs 
Financial 
year 
Total solar 
output 
Solar emission 
reductions Subsidy Cost  
Amortised subsidy unit 
cost 
Total elec. 
Emissions 
  (GWh pa) (t CO2 pa ) (AU$thous) (AU$/t CO2 pa ) (t CO2 pa ) 
2006 2 2,110 $730 $9 212,350,800 
2007 10 9,230 $1,430 $18 219,832,780 
2008 40 34,800 $10,320 $35 220,074,720 
2009 110 97,050 $60,300 $71 225,834,740 
2010 400 349,020 $708,470 $212 223,869,740 
2011 1,170 1,016,390 $1,093,340 $174 219,107,220 
2012 2,320 2,017,710 $1,199,240 $144 216,957,560 
2013 3,420 2,973,290 $853,650 $125 205,746,400 
2014 4,260 3,709,580 $703,730 $118 199,186,720 
2015 4,990 4,341,140 $685,870 $116 198,100,000 
2016 5,700 4,963,150 $680,730 $114 202,920,000 
2017 6,380 5,553,470 $566,890 $112 203,560,000 
2018 6,970 6,069,310 $471,240 $112 203,560,000 
2019 7,480 6,512,880 $449,590 $109 203,560,000 
2020 7,910 6,879,750 $421,860 $110 203,560,000 
Total 51,170 44,528,880 $7,907,380     
 
Note: non-single figures, except subsidy unit costs, rounded to nearest 10. 
                                          Source:  ARENA, Green Energy Markets (2014b) 
Table 6.3 highlights the high cost of subsidies in FYs 2011 and 2012, exceeding AU$1billion 
each year. The costs are higher a year earlier on a emissions reduction unit basis because of the 
increasing average size of installed units. STC subsidies apply only to the first 1.5 kW so that as 
average sizes increased, from 1.7 kW in FY 2010, to 2.2 kW in FY 2011 to 2.6 kW in FY 2012, 
the extra output is not associated with extra STC subsidy costs.  
Household PV emission reduction costs 
Most papers addressing the cost of reducing GHG emissions, including Bakhtyar (2014), view 
costs on a per tonne of CO2e in the year concerned. This does not recognise the fact that PV 
subsidies provide emission reduction benefits well beyond subsidy cost years. This necessitated 
subsidies being allocated over future emission reduction years to determine effective annual 
subsidy costs. The Australian Government Productivity Commission undertook such an analysis 
assuming an economic life of 20 years and applying a discount rate of 7% (Australian 
Government Productivity Commission, 2011, p 10). As PV systems may have an economic life in 
excess of 20 years and because the results could be sensitive to the discount rate used, scenarios 
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of 20 and 35 year terms and discount rates of 5%, 7% and 10% have been used to determine 
effective annualised emission benefits (Table 6.4). 
Table 6-4 Discount rate and term sensitivity of annualised emission reduction costs from household PV 
in Australia between 2007 and 2020 (AU$ per t CO2e) 
         Discount Rate 5% 5% 7% 7% 10% 10% 
          Term (Years)   20 35 20 35 20 35 
2007 
 
15 12 18 15 22 20 
2008 
 
30 23 35 29 43 38 
2009 
 
60 46 71 58 88 77 
2010 
 
180 137 212 173 263 232 
2011 
 
148 113 174 143 217 192 
2012 
 
122 93 144 118 179 158 
2013 
 
106 81 125 102 155 137 
2014 
 
100 76 118 96 147 130 
2015 
 
98 75 116 95 144 127 
2016 
 
97 74 114 93 142 125 
2017 
 
95 72 112 92 139 123 
2018 
 
93 71 112 90 137 121 
2019 
 
93 71 109 89 136 120 
2020 
 
93 71 110 90 136 120 
           Average   95 72 112 92 139 123 
 
The benchmark of 20 years and a 7 % discount rate resulted in effective emission costs peaking at 
AU$212 per t CO2e in 2010 decreasing to a steady AU$110 per t CO2e, and averaging AU$112 
per t CO2e over the 14 year period. Increasing the term to 35 years and reducing the discount rate 
to 5% reduced average emission costs to AU$72 per t CO2e. At the other extreme of a 20 year 
term and 10% discount rate, average emission costs increased to AU$139 per t CO2e, thereby 
highlighting the sensitivity of emission reduction unit costs to the term and discount rate used. 
6.1.2 Sensitivity of model results 
 
The model has been used to analyse how payback periods change when inputs such as the cost of 
solar, FITs and household electricity prices change. Changes in resultant payback periods are 
then used, based on the relationship shown in Figure 6.1, to determine expected changes in 
installed PV and consequent GHG emission reductions.  
The sensitivity analysis examines the nine year period from FY 2006 to FY 2014, when most PV 
activity occurred. It is important to note that when payback periods are low a small change in the 
payback period gives rise to a substantial uptake in household PV (Figure 6.1). This was also 
noted by Antonelli and Desideri (2014) who commented “A comparison among different EU 
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countries showed that FITs push the market to significant levels only when they are high enough” 
(Antonelli and Desideri, 2014, p 583).  
For policy purposes this means that extra incentives are most effective when almost all financial 
factors are also favourable; hence the high PV uptake in FY 2012. On the other hand the 
Australian Government Productivity Commission (2011, p. 83) concluded that FITs and STCs 
were providing duplicating and therefore excessively costly incentives which together did not 
provide any additional emission reduction benefits. 
6.1.3 Effect of increasing the cost of household PV 
  
PV unit costs in Australia are likely to increase in future because the world-wide solar panel 
supply overhang will eventually correct itself; however this has yet to be apparent in Australia 
despite the reduction in the value of the Australian dollar in the last two years.  
If the average cost of installed PV, net of the STC benefit, had been 20% higher over the nine 
year period the volume of PV would have been 15% lower, that is 2780 MW compared with 3270 
MW. An extreme situation was also examined by assuming PV costs had not reduced over time 
but remained at AU$8,000 per kW from FY 2006 to FY 2014, rather than falling to AU$1,500 
per kW. The outcome was that over the nine year period household PV would have totalled 790 
MW rather than 3270 MW, a reduction of 76 %, suggesting that most of the uptake of PV was 
due to the declining cost of PV rather than consumer subsidy incentives. 
6.1.4 Effect of lowering the STC price 
 
In Australia, a review of the LRET in 2015 resulted in a reduction in the LRET 2020 target but 
small-scale renewable projects, impacted by STCs, were not affected.  Nevertheless a change in 
legislation could occur and so some sensitivity runs were undertaken. Since FY 2006 the STC 
price has been comparatively stable, varying between AU$35 and AU$40/STC reflecting the 
comparatively short quarterly STC acquittal period and the AU$40/STC price cap. A material 
change to the price cap would need to occur for there to be a noticeable change to household PV 
uptake.  
A sensitivity run was undertaken with STC prices being AU$10/STC lower, being an average 28 
percent price reduction. The outcome was PV capacity reducing by 8% from 3270 MW to 3010 
MW over the nine year period. Another possibility is that legislation is altered so that retailers no 
longer had an STC liability, resulting in a model run being undertaken with STCs having a zero 
price and FITs at current historically low levels. The outcome was that for FY 2014 the payback 
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period increased from 4.3 years to 5.7 years, suggesting that, in this extreme example, households 
will continue to have an interest in installing PV.  
6.1.5 Effect of reducing the STC multiplier 
 
The STC multiplier, producing additional “deemed” STCs not reflective of actual output, came 
into effect during FY 2010 and ended in 2013, resulting in the creation of an additional 65 million 
STCs over the four year period, having a market value of AU$2.2 billion, indicating the 
substantial subsidy that was involved (and paid for by all electricity consumers).   If no deeming 
had existed and the multiplier remained at unity for each year, PV uptake would have been 2740 
MW rather than 3270 MW, a decrease of 530 MW or 16% over the four year period. This is 
almost twice the impact that would have occurred if STC prices had been reduced by AU$10 per 
STC. 
6.1.6 Effect of reducing feed-in-tariffs 
 
States and territories introduced attractive FITs in FY 2009 and FY 2010, being phased out in FY 
2013. Some FITs were briefly reduced to AU8c/kWh for new installations post FY 2013 which 
was used for a model run. Over the five year period household PV uptake would have been 550 
MW lower, that is 2720 MW rather than 3270 MW, a reduction of 17 percent. This reduction is 
not as great as might have been expected from high FITs, and so a further sensitivity run was 
undertaken with all FITs set at zero. The outcome was a reduction of 1060 MW or 33%. 
Expressed another way 67% of PV uptake would have occurred had there been no FITs.  
6.1.7 Effect of lowering household electricity tariffs 
 
Household electricity prices have been increasing in real terms for nearly 10 years. The higher 
this increase the more attractive it is for households to install PV to reduce their domestic power 
bills. This is one of the main reasons why there continues to be a strong interest in PV even 
though retailer payments are only for retailer avoided energy costs of AU6c/kWh AU8c/kWh.  
A model run was undertaken with household electricity prices increasing by 2.5% pa from FY 
2006 to FY 2013, approximating being constant in real terms, compared with higher actual retail 
tariffs averaging 11% pa over this period (Energy Supply Association of Australia, 2013). The 
outcome was that PV uptake would have been 234 MW lower, at 3030 MW compared with 3270 
MW (a decrease of 7%). 
The sensitivity results are summarised in Table 6.5. 
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                 Table 6-5 Summary of model sensitivity results from FY 2006 to FY 2014 
Input Variable    Input Change  Changes in PV output and emissions 
 
  Percentage MW GHG increase (t CO2e) 
Cost of PV Increased by 20%  15% lower 490       566,000 
Cost of PV Fixed at FY 2006 price  76% lower 2470       2,845,000 
STC price           AU$10/STC lower 8% lower 260       299,000 
STC multiplier Fixed at unity 16% lower 530       554,000 
FITs Fixed at 8c/kWh 17% lower 550       629,000 
FITs Zero FIT 33% lower 1060       1,224,000 
Household tariffs Constant in real terms 7%  lower 230       273,000 
 
6.1.8 Sensitivity of hours of solar offset and export 
 
The assumptions of an average 2.0 h per day for domestic consumption offset and 1.5 h per day 
export for Australia as a whole were reviewed. If export hours were held constant at 1.5 hours per 
day and consumption offset hours initially increased and then decreased by 0.5 h per day the 
outcome would be emission unit costs decreasing by 12 % and increasing by 16% respectively. 
This is because the total level of subsidy would not change, as STCs are based only on the first 
1.5 kW of output and exported energy does not change. However with increased consumption 
offset hours the level of emission reductions is increased resulting in lower emission unit costs, 
and conversely for reduced consumption offset hours. 
If instead consumption hours are held constant and export hours initially increased and then 
decreased by 0.5 hours per day the outcome would be emission unit costs increasing by 9% and 
decreasing by 12% respectively. The former reflects the subsidy level increasing by more than 
the increase in export emission reductions, and conversely for the latter. The outcomes are not 
more extreme as in all four examples subsidy costs and emission reductions change in the same 
direction. 
6.1.9 Energy storage developments world-wide  
 
Although not part of the modelling in this thesis there is the potential for PV to provide 
substantial market benefits in the wholesale market through the storing of excess electricity at 
times when wholesale electricity prices are low for later exporting to the grid at times of high 
(peak) prices. This is currently exhibited mostly in the form of pumped storage, whereby water is 
pumped uphill to a catchment area to be later released, to flow through hydro-turbines at times of 
high electricity prices (IEA, 2014a). Similar energy storage benefits are not yet able to be 
achieved in the retail market as households generally experience one-part tariffs, not showing 
variations reflective of wholesale electricity prices. Furthermore households in most Australian 
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states do not have time-of-use meters (Burtt, 2009) and the cost of storage is prohibitive (Mayr et 
al, 2014). However battery storage costs are rapidly declining. Edis (2014) summarised results 
from seven authors showing the cost of battery storage had declined by an average 40% between 
2011 and 2014, with a further reduction of 35% expected between 2014 and 2020. In a Japanese 
context Komiyama and Fujii (2014) concluded that better use of LNG combined cycle plant and 
lower battery costs were necessary to secure the full potential of PV. Offsetting the improving 
economics of battery storage is the development of network companies, in an endeavour to 
protect revenue levels, to increase the fixed charge tariff component and reduce the variable 
charge component. This reduces the avoided costs associated with consumers becoming less 
reliant on imported electricity. This is a recent development and has not been modelled. 
Chiang et al (1998) examined the most efficient relationship between household PV output and 
household consumption with a battery storage system, to determine how to most cost-effectively 
satisfy a utility’s power requirements. An experimental 600 watt system was used concluding that 
although set-up costs made the proposal uneconomic this could change in the future. Zahedi 
(2011) provided similar comments particularly in regard to the value of energy storage in 
improving overall PV reliability.   
The increasing focus on energy storage has prompted research into the most efficient types of 
battery systems. Yang et al (2011) examined the technical efficiency of a wide range of 
electrochemical battery types concluding that “the applications in terms of capacity, siting, 
performance parameters, etc. need to be further refined” (Yang et al, 2011, p. 3605). Hu et al 
(2014) examined three energy storage systems, a Li-ion battery, a supercapacitor pack and a 
combination of the two to determine which choice was most cost effective in powering a hybrid 
powertrain, concluding that in general the hybrid option was most cost effective but the outcome 
could vary depending on battery and diesel costs. Utilisation of used electric vehicle batteries is 
seen by Heymans et al (2014) as a valuable energy storage option, possibly not immediately but 
in the future as usage of electric motor vehicles increases world-wide. The inclusion of cost-
efficient battery storage with household PV increases the likelihood that households will at some 
time in the future disconnect from the grid, with utilities seeing this as a threat requiring a review 
of their business models (Rocky Mountain Institute, 2014). This could become a real challenge 
for network companies world-wide in the near future.   
6.1.10 Economics of household energy storage post expiry of FITs 
 
There is the potential to extract more value from household PV through storing excess PV and 
utilising this output to reduce electricity costs. At times when households are still benefitting 
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from attractive FITs this is unlikely to be the most economic option, because households can earn 
more from FITs compared with saving from reduced electricity imports. Hence the evaluation in 
this section is for 1. households with existing PV but only able to obtain the lower retailer 
avoided cost of AU8c/kWh and 2. households without PV looking to install both PV and battery 
storage. The economics will be less favourable in the case of 2. as capital costs of both PV and 
battery storage are involved. The main reason for the increasing interest in battery storage reflects 
the continuing decline in the cost of lithium-ion batteries, in a similar manner to the increasing 
interest that occurred in household PV in 2009 and 2010. The cost reductions are first being 
experienced in USA and are expected to be experienced in Australia in the near future 
(Parkinson, 2015).  
The evaluation is undertaken from the point of view of households having the load profile and PV 
output profile referred to in Section 5.7. These features are those of an average Australian 
household and will therefore be indicative only given variations in factors such as levels of 
household consumption, electricity tariffs, and efficiency of PV panels, reflective of geographical 
location. 
As mentioned above the economics of battery storage are least favourable when households have 
attractive FITs, and also when they experience flat tariffs. The outcome improves when attractive 
FITs are no longer available and when electricity tariffs show some reflection of wholesale 
market prices, such as three part tariffs as exist in NSW. AEMO (2015a) noted this in predicting 
that for this reason the highest growth in battery storage in Australia would be in NSW (AEMO, 
2015a, p 4). If electricity tariffs are restructured and continue to increase in real terms, while 
energy storage costs continue to decline, the economics of household energy storage will become 
increasingly attractive. Hence the analysis has relevance for both today and the future. 
A comparatively simple model, based on data used in previous sections, has been developed to 
show the cost impact from various sizes of battery and the associated economics. 
The 2 kW PV example in Table 6.6 reflects data contained in Figure 5.6, being on an hourly 
basis, with the addition of larger sizes of PV units. The level of export to the grid clearly 
increases while the level of domestic offset only marginally increases; the reason being that it is 
only at the start and end of the solar output period that increased solar size (marginally) reduces 
domestic consumption. The important feature of Table 6.6 is that for a 2 kW system the level of 
exports (2.90kWh/day), if stored rather than exported, only reduces imported electricity from 
17.80kWh/day to 14.90 kWh/day, on average. To avoid having to import any electricity from the 
grid the PV system would need to be at least 7 kW, shown by the export volume being 
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2.60kWh/day in excess of import requirements, the 2.60kWh/day being a buffer necessary to 
accommodate day-to-day fluctuations. In reality the buffer would probably need to be even 
greater than this to avoid occasional blackouts while still requiring close monitoring of daily 
consumption in case some demand-side management is still required. 
                     Table 6-6 Household PV output relationship to household consumption 
H/Hold consumption Solar output Domestic  
Excess 
export  Import from Import from grid 
annual  daily average size  daily average offset to grid grid less exports 
(kWh pa) (kWh per day) (kW) (kwh) (kWh/day) (kWh/day) (kWh/day) (kWh per day) 
8,000 21.92 2.0 7.0 4.13 2.87 17.79 14.92 
8,000 21.92 4.0 14.0 4.53 9.47 17.39 7.92 
8,000 21.92 6.0 21.0 4.77 16.23 17.15 0.92 
8,000 21.92 7.0 24.5 4.82 19.68 17.10 -2.58 
 
                                                                  Source: Figure 5.6 
The economics of the options in Table 6.6 are shown in Table 6.7. 
                                          Table 6-7 Household energy storage viability 
PV 
Import 
savings, Battery  Battery  
Payback period with 
existing solar Solar system 
Payback period with new 
solar 
size 
not 
exporting  Storage cost 
low batt. 
cost 
high batt. 
cost costs 
low batt. 
cost 
high batt. 
cost 
(kW) (AU$ pa) (kWh)  low (AU$) high (AU$) (years) (years) (AU$) (years) (years) 
2.0 283 3 kWh $3,500 $7,000 12 25 $2,700 9 14 
4.0 933 10 kWh $5,000 $10,000 5 11 $6,700 8 12 
6.0 1599 17 kWh $6,500 $13,000 4 8 $10,700 8 11 
7.0 1939 20 kWh $7,000 $14,000 4 7 $12,700 8 11 
 
                                             Source: Parkinson (2015), Dolev (2015) 
The import savings from using stored electricity need to be matched against the cost of battery 
storage and, where households do not already have solar, the combined cost of battery storage 
and new PV costs (Table 6.7).  The same approach to viability as discussed in Section 5.7.1, that 
is the payback number of years, has been used. There is substantial variability in gross battery 
costs, conversion of costs from US dollars to Australian dollars, and the ongoing decline in 
battery costs. For this reason an upper and lower level of battery costs has been included. The 
USA company Tesla is the world leader in lithium-ion batteries, manufacturing them principally 
for electric motor vehicles. Tesla’s soon-to-be–opened Gigafactory in Nevada is, according to 
Dolev (2015), expected to reduce a 60 kWh Tesla battery from US$250/kWh to US$88/kWh with 
the outcome being that “battery prices are dropping faster than anyone ever expected”.   
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For households already with PV the payback period is comparatively high if their PV is the most 
common size of 1,500 to 3,000 watt, being at least 12 years. The payback period falls 
substantially for households with PV systems in excess of 4kW because PV exports increase at a 
proportionately faster rate with PV system size, and battery costs exhibit substantial economies of 
scale. Although the payback period is currently about 11 years it is expected to eventually fall to 
nearly four years. Based on the experience with household PV a four year payback period will 
result in a substantial uptake of battery storage systems. Unlike household PV this mini boom is 
not driven by subsidies, although subsidies were largely responsible for the initial household PV 
boom.  
These results are consistent with those in AEMO (2015a) and those of Vorrath (2015) who 
commented on a report by UBS entitled “UBS: Battery storage payback for solar households will 
be 5-6 years by 2020” highlighting the over 50% decline in lithium-ion battery costs and 
expectations of a four year payback period by 2020 for households with PV and an eight year 
payback period for those without PV.  
For households without PV, without the advantage of sunk PV costs, payback periods are 
currently at least 11 years but are expected to fall to 8 or 9 years. Based on experience with 
household PV the uptake is unlikely to be substantial. However if retail tariffs continue to rise in 
real terms and battery storage costs decline faster than anticipated, payback periods may drop to 
levels where households will show an active interest. 
An additional factor is the life-cycle of batteries with Khalilpour and Vassallo (2016) noting that 
Lithium-ion batteries have a 10 year life span. This does not become a critical factor as it is 
unlikely decisions to install battery storage would be taken where the payback period exceeded 
10 years. As well as economics being the driver of the interest in battery storage there is also the 
desire by some households to be independent of electricity from the national grid, that is to go 
“off-grid”. This may not be quite as simple as some households imagine, because they are likely 
to still want electricity 24 hours a day and there will be times, in overcast conditions, when little 
power is being stored resulting in batteries having no charge. Choices then are to install much 
larger PV systems and have much larger batteries, which will test the strength of the desire to go 
off-grid to avoid paying network standing charges. 
6.2 Large-scale renewable energy model results 
 
The large-scale renewable energy model involves substantial detail so only result summaries have 
been reproduced. Detail not shown relates to determination of payback periods, involving plant 
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capacity, operating hours pa, capital costs, revenue from LGCs, grants and exports to the grid. A 
key model input into the viability of large-scale renewable energy is revenue  from LGCs. LGC 
prices have risen sharply since early 2015 and are assumed to remain between AU$60/LGC and 
AU$70/LGC (Figure 5.10).  
Large-scale renewable energy forecasts are based on BREE (2015). Forecasts have been 
determined by viewing proposed projects at the approved stage contained in Energy Supply 
Association of Australia (2014) for the period FY 2016 to FY 2020. Projects averaged 860 MW 
pa for wind and 100 MW pa for large-scale solar with 30 MW pa for bagasse. On a conservative 
basis, capacity for the five years to FY 2020 was forecast at 500 MW pa for wind and 100 MW 
pa for large-sale solar. They were not considered overly optimistic by Rose (2015) and, as the 
results suggest, indicate that the LRET target is likely to be met. This is not surprising as 
achieving the LRET target is close to being a self-fulfilling prophesy because if this were not the 
case the LGC price would trade at the tax-adjusted penalty price (of AU$92.86/MWh) being 
sufficient to ensure viability of the required projects that generate this outcome. The key 
variations would be (project delayed) timing, in which case the target might be met after 2020 
and over-shooting, mainly due to growth in unexpected household PV. Details on how output 
figures and payback periods for each renewable energy type were determined are contained in 
Appendix A.3. 
The approach taken to determine how subsidies have stimulated renewable energy was to note, 
for each large-scale renewable energy type, the baseline reported by CER, with this output level 
deducted from actual output each year. This difference should replicate the level of LGCs created 
by each renewable energy type each year, but this was not always the case due to timing 
differences and the possibility of unreported generation (such as off-grid generation) as suggested 
by CER. Hydro energy results differed the most from expectations, which is discussed further in 
the hydro energy section that follows. 
Subsidy costs are shown as costs that arose in the year of expenditure except for grants that have 
been amortised over future years, in effect spread over the years in which the emission reduction 
benefits occur, as was undertaken with household PV. A minor disadvantage of the amortised 
approach is that costs are spread over the 20 years that follow so that at the end of the 20th year 
these costs will terminate. Results for individual fuel types exhibit some volatility so ideally the 
results should be viewed for renewable energy as a whole. 
There is a small timing mismatch relating to the period of analysis being the 20 year period from 
FY 2001 to FY 2020. The RET scheme began on I January 2001 and the emission reduction and 
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renewable energy target periods are from calendar year 2001 to calendar year 2020. Therefore the 
analysis covers a 20 year period starting and ending six months earlier than the legislated period. 
The availability of most data is on a financial year basis and the difficulties of having a half year 
adjustment at the start and end of the analysis period meant that a timing change was not justified. 
This is not considered a major concern.  
There are two aspects that impact on the results for each of the renewable energy types. Firstly 
emission reduction benefits are calculated by comparing the carbon intensity factors (CIFs) of the 
generation displaced with the much lower renewable energy CIF. Over time coal-fired generation 
is being replaced by gas-fired generation and renewable energy so the CIF of the NEM as a 
whole is declining (discussed in more detail in Section 5.7.2). This in effect increases renewable 
energy unit emission costs and is the main reason why these costs increase towards FY 2020. 
Secondly the large increase in LGC prices in FY 2008 and FY 2015 (Figure 5.10) has resulted in 
a material step-wise increases in emission reduction unit costs. In reality renewable energy 
producers are likely to have secured fixed price LGC (and energy revenue) prices for at least 
three years so the trend may not be exactly as shown.  
6.2.1 Large-scale solar energy model summary 
  
Large-scale, being non-household, solar energy has shown sustained growth due mostly to the 56 
MW Moree Solar farm in NSW, the 46 MW solar thermal booster to the Kogan Creek power 
station in Queensland and the 147 MW Nyngan solar plant in NSW (Table 6.8). There are also a 
range of solar projects varying from 10 MW to 60 MW. Grants have been associated with each of 
these large-scale projects which also receive subsidies relating to LGCs, credited for each MWh 
of output  
The cost of emissions increased substantially in FY 2012 as a result of grants associated with the 
large-scale projects previously mentioned. On an amortised cost basis, unit reduction costs rose to 
over AU$200/t CO2e but are forecast to decrease to AU$130/t CO2e by FY 2020, reflecting rapid 
output growth over which costs are allocated. 
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      Table 6-8 Non-household solar generation output, subsidy costs and GHG emission reductions 
  Output 
Total GHG 
emissn redns 
Subs. related 
output 
Subsidy rel'd 
emissn redns 
Subsidies, 
grants 
GHG redn 
subsidy  
cost 
Amortized 
cost 
FY 
(GWh 
pa)  (thous t CO2e)  (GWh pa) (thous t CO2e) (AU$thous) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
2001 50  0  0  0  $0 $0 $0 
2002 60  0  0  0  $10 $57 $57 
2003 60  0  1  0  $20 $59 $59 
2004 70  1  1  1  $40 $60 $60 
2005 80  1  1  1  $50 $54 $54 
2006 90  1  2  1  $40 $38 $38 
2007 90  1  2  1  $50 $41 $41 
2008 80  1  2  1  $110 $78 $78 
2009 40  1  2  1  $120 $83 $83 
2010 20  2  4  2  $140 $63 $63 
2011 360  3  5  3  $190 $60 $60 
2012 240  8  10  8  $11,820 $1,468 $193 
2013 400  40  70  40  $67,970 $1,642 $230 
2014 590  80  120  80  $51,630 $660 $199 
2015 730  150  230  150  $101,060 $698 $205 
2016 940  250  390  250  $174,710 $707 $236 
2017 1,180  360  580  360  $34,490 $95 $191 
2018 1,710  670  1,060  670  $63,620 $95 $147 
2019 2,020  830  1,320  830  $78,950 $95 $137 
2020 2,320  990  1,570  990  $94,280 $95 $130 
Total 11,140  3,380  5,370  3,380  $679,290 $6,150   
 
Note: non-single figures, except subsidy unit costs, rounded to nearest 10. 
Source:  IRENA (2015), AEMO Annual Statements of Opportunities, Energy Supply Association of 
Australia annual reports, Research paper to Australian Parliament 2001, Clean Energy Regulator (2015), 
Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science (2015a), AEMO (2015b). 
6.2.2 Wind energy model summary 
 
Wind generation has, and is expected to continue to show most growth of any renewable energy 
type. Wind energy forecast output assumes 500 MW of new wind generation each year from FY 
2015 to FY 2020 reflected in Table 6.9. Following the hike in LGC prices in mid 2015, this 
growth now appears achievable. This forecast may be over-optimistic but large-scale solar 
installations have been conservatively forecast suggesting that large-scale renewable energy 
output forecasts are best viewed in aggregation. Further information on how output figures were 
determined is contained in Appendix A.3. 
The cost of wind emissions is comparatively low, averaging AU$40/t CO2e to AU$50/t CO2e, 
because there are few grants provided for wind projects. The only material subsidies are from 
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LGCs which, combined with substantial output growth, has resulted in amortised unit emission 
reduction costs forecast to increase to a comparatively low AU$73/t CO2e (Table 6.9).   
                 Table 6-9 Wind energy output, subsidy costs and GHG emission reductions 
  Output 
Total GHG 
emissn 
redns 
Subs. 
related 
output 
Subsidy rel'd 
emissn redns 
Subsidies, 
grants 
GHG redn 
subsidy  cost 
Amortized 
cost 
FY (GWh pa) 
 (thous t 
CO2e)  (GWh pa) (thous t CO2e) (AU$thous) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
2001 230  220  220  210  $8,060 $38 $38 
2002 350  330  340  320  $12,200 $38 $38 
2003 670  640  670  640  $24,700 $39 $39 
2004 740  710  730  710  $27,860 $39 $39 
2005 900  850  900  840  $30,510 $36 $36 
2006 1,690  1,610  1,690  1,600  $40,460 $25 $25 
2007 2,680  2,360  2,670  2,350  $69,450 $30 $30 
2008 3,660  3,210  3,660  3,210  $179,180 $56 $56 
2009 3,360  2,950  3,350  2,950  $174,400 $59 $59 
2010 4,980  4,150  4,970  4,150  $198,830 $48 $48 
2011 5,800  4,670  5,790  4,660  $220,100 $47 $47 
2012 5,960  4,930  5,950  4,930  $226,130 $46 $46 
2013 7,640  6,100  7,630  6,100  $259,540 $43 $43 
2014 10,280  8,250  10,270  8,240  $308,170 $37 $37 
2015 13,210  10,570  13,200  10,570  $527,990 $50 $50 
2016 14,850  11,950  14,840  11,940  $890,530 $75 $75 
2017 16,490  13,500  16,490  13,500  $989,080 $73 $73 
2018 18,130  14,890  18,130  14,890  $1,087,630 $73 $73 
2019 19,780  16,280  19,770  16,280  $1,186,180 $73 $73 
2020 21,420  17,680  21,410  17,680  $1,284,730 $73 $73 
Total 152,800  125,840  152,680  125,740  $7,745,740  
 
  
 
Note: non-single figures, except subsidy unit costs, rounded to nearest 10. 
Source:  IRENA (2015), AEMO Annual Statements of Opportunities, Energy Supply Association of 
Australia annual reports, Research paper to Australian Parliament 2001, Clean Energy Regulator (2015), 
Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science (2015a), AEMO (2015b). 
6.2.3 Hydro energy model summary 
 
Hydro energy was the prime source of renewable energy in FY 2000, mainly from Snowy Hydro 
but also Tasmanian hydro. Government money would have been used to help construct Snowy 
Hydro but these have not been considered as subsidies in this thesis, given the time-line used. In 
FY 2013 the level of output exceeded the FY 2001 level for the first time but with little new 
hydro generation capacity being added this is more likely to be reflection of water being used to 
optimise LGHC revenue. The cost of emission reductions rises considerably to over AU$90/t 
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CO2e over the 20 year period for reasons mentioned at the start of this section (Table 6.10). 
Further information on how output figures were determined is contained in Appendix A.3. 
Table 6-10 Hydro generation output, subsidy costs and GHG emission reductions 
  Output 
Total GHG 
emissn 
redns 
Subs. 
related 
output 
Subsidy rel'd 
emissn redns 
Subsidies, 
grants 
GHG redn 
subsidy  cost 
Amortized 
cost 
FY (GWh pa) 
 (thous t 
CO2e)  (GWh pa) (thous t CO2e) (AU$thous) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
2001 16,680  12,010  1,080  780  $38,900 $50 $50 
2002 16,260  11,700  1,130  810  $40,650 $50 $50 
2003 16,270  11,760  1,900  1,380  $70,420 $51 $51 
2004 16,270  11,820  1,620  1,180  $61,440 $52 $52 
2005 16,270  11,590  1,620  1,150  $55,040 $48 $48 
2006 16,270  11,710  1,120  810  $26,900 $33 $33 
2007 14,790  10,130  850  580  $21,980 $38 $38 
2008 12,430  8,500  490  340  $24,130 $72 $72 
2009 11,840  8,100  510  350  $26,630 $76 $76 
2010 13,320  8,820  1,430  940  $57,040 $60 $60 
2011 16,280  10,540  1,800  1,160  $68,300 $59 $59 
2012 14,800  9,750  2,050  1,350  $77,790 $58 $58 
2013 18,060  11,640  3,280  2,110  $111,470 $53 $53 
2014 18,360  11,860  3,080  1,990  $92,330 $46 $46 
2015 17,770  11,470  2,110  1,360  $84,250 $62 $62 
2016 17,770  11,500  2,150  1,390  $128,810 $93 $93 
2017 17,770  11,630  2,150  1,410  $128,942 $92 $92 
2018 17,780  11,650  2,150  1,410  $129,070 $92 $92 
2019 17,780  11,680  2,150  1,410  $129,210 $91 $91 
2020 17,780  11,700  2,160  1,420  $129,340 $91 $91 
Total 324,540  219,540  34,810  23,320  $1,502,640 
 
  
 
Note: non-single figures, except subsidy unit costs, rounded to nearest 10. 
Source:  IRENA (2015), AEMO Annual Statements of Opportunities, Energy Supply Association of 
Australia annual reports, Research paper to Australian Parliament 2001, Clean Energy Regulator (2015), 
Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science (2015a), AEMO (2015b). 
6.2.4 Bagasse energy model summary 
 
Bagasse cogeneration output is a reflection of a wider range of factors than other types of 
renewable energy because it is a secondary activity to the primary activity of sugar cane refining, 
resulting in greater financial viability compared with other types of renewable energy. Output 
each year reflects whether or not it was a good year for sugar production. Bagasse is not 
commonly stored, mainly because it is needed in the cogeneration process that produces 
electricity and steam, essential to the sugar refinery process. The bagasse that is stored provides 
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the larger mills of Racecourse and Pioneer with opportunities to produce excess electricity for 
export to the grid at times of high pool prices. 
Subsidy-related output averages 50% of total output growth because capacity that existed in the 
base year has been better utilised and because the marginal cost associated with increasing levels 
of available bagasse means it will be used to fire boilers rather than transported elsewhere. 
Industry consolidation is a further efficiency factor. The Mackay Sugar expansion is the only 
grant-related new capacity that has occurred since the RET scheme commenced. Further 
information on how output figures were determined is contained in Appendix A.3. 
Volatility in output, reflecting good and bad sugar cane seasons, has resulted in per unit subsidy 
costs being more volatile than with other types of renewable energy. Emission reduction unit 
costs increase sharply in FY 2008 and FY 2015 for reasons mentioned at the start of this section 
(Table 6.11).  
            Table 6-11 Bagasse generation output, subsidy costs and GHG emission reductions 
  Output 
Total GHG 
emissn 
redns 
Subs. 
related 
output 
Subsidy rel'd emissn 
Redns 
Subsidies, 
grants 
GHG redn 
subsidy  cost 
Amortized 
cost 
FY 
(GWh 
pa) 
 (thous t 
CO2e)  (GWh pa) (thous t CO2e) (AU$thous) (AU$/t CO2e) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
2001 215  129  36  21  $1,284 $60 $60 
2002 292  175  204  122  $7,330 $60 $60 
2003 767  465  279  169  $10,306 $61 $61 
2004 737  452  328  201  $12,450 $62 $62 
2005 614  359  405  237  $13,773 $58 $58 
2006 645  386  436  261  $10,464 $40 $40 
2007 645  342  434  230  $11,290 $49 $49 
2008 874  460  561  295  $27,473 $93 $93 
2009 1,024  540  511  270  $26,552 $98 $98 
2010 1,022  495  609  295  $24,376 $83 $83 
2011 1,025  466  612  279  $23,271 $84 $84 
2012 1,654  790  741  354  $28,172 $80 $80 
2013 1,598  717  685  307  $32,275 $105 $79 
2014 1,671  756  758  343  $22,752 $66 $69 
2015 1,676  755  763  344  $30,512 $89 $91 
2016 1,680  764  767  349  $46,030 $132 $134 
2017 1,685  790  772  362  $46,293 $128 $130 
2018 1,689  796  776  366  $46,556 $127 $130 
2019 1,693  802  780  369  $46,818 $127 $129 
2020 1,698  807  785  373  $47,081 $126 $128 
Total 22,903  11,246  11,241  5,546  $515,057 
 
  
 
Note: non-single figures, except subsidy unit costs, rounded to nearest 10. 
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  Source:  IRENA (2015), AEMO Annual Statements of Opportunities, Energy Supply Association of 
Australia annual reports, Research paper to Australian Parliament 2001, Clean Energy Regulator (2015), 
Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science (2015a), AEMO (2015b). 
6.2.5 Biomass energy model summary 
 
Biomass covers a wide range of fuel sources including land-fill gas, wood and agricultural waste, 
and black liquor, with subsidies arising only from the creation of LGCs. Like bagasse the fuel is a 
by-product of another process and is comparatively inexpensive. The upsurge in output from FY 
2005 was examined by noting LGC numbers from the REC Registry, showing an increase in 
black liquor and land-fill gas output, but not from any one development. As with bagasse, 
amortised emission reduction costs rise towards the end of the 20 year period (Table 6.12). 
              Table 6-12 Biomass generation output, subsidy costs and GHG emission reductions 
  Output 
Total GHG 
emissn 
redns 
Subs. 
related 
output 
Subsidy rel'd  
emissn redns 
Subsidies, 
grants 
GHG redn 
subsidy  cost 
Amortized 
cost 
FY 
(GWh 
pa) 
 (thous t 
CO2e)  (GWh pa) (thous t CO2e) (AU$thous) (AU$/t CO2e) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
2001 320  190  160  90 $5,630 $60 $60 
2002 670  400  270  160 $9,680 $60 $60 
2003 830  500  430  260 $15,800 $61 $61 
2004 1,060  650  660  400 $25,000 $62 $62 
2005 3,240  1,890  790  460  $26,760 $58 $58 
2006 3,270  1,960  770  460  $18,430 $40 $40 
2007 3,320  1,760  820  430  $21,220 $49 $49 
2008 3,740  1,970  1,240  650  $60,610 $93 $93 
2009 1,760  930  1,200  640 $62,560 $98 $98 
2010 1,760  850  1,160  560 $46,480 $83 $83 
2011 1,080  490  1,180  540 $44,730 $84 $84 
2012 1,420  680  1,220  580 $46,320 $80 $80 
2013 1,550  700  1,350  610 $45,900 $76 $76 
2014 1,880  850  1,280  580 $38,310 $66 $66 
2015 1,970  890  1,370  620 $54,830 $89 $89 
2016 2,070  940  1,470  670 $88,160 $132 $132 
2017 2,170  1,020  1,570  740 $94,370 $128 $128 
2018 2,280  1,080  1,680  790 $100,890 $127 $127 
2019 2,400  1,130  1,800  850 $107,740 $127 $127 
2020 2,520  1,200  1,920  910 $114,920 $126 $126 
Total 39,280  20,070  22,310  11,000  $1,028,350 $1,699   
 
Note: non-single figures, except subsidy unit costs, rounded to nearest 10. 
  Source:  IRENA (2015), AEMO Annual Statements of Opportunities, Energy Supply Association of 
Australia annual reports, Research paper to Australian Parliament 2001, Clean Energy Regulator (2015), 
Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science (2015a), AEMO (2015b). 
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6.2.6 Total large-scale renewable energy model summary 
 
When all forms of large-scale renewable energy are brought together (Table 6.13), the output 
level in FY 2020 is expected to exhibit an increase of 28,250 GWh (45,730 less 17,490), or 260% 
increase, over the FY 2000 base level. Compared with individual renewable energy types, there is 
a more stable trend in unit emission reduction costs, gradually rising to AU$47/t CO2e  in 2014 
and then to AU$80/t CO2e  in FY 2020. The higher price in later years is a result of the increase 
in LGC prices in 2015 and lower levels of emission reductions caused by the NEM CIF 
continuing to decline. It is possible that LGC prices may increase above the AU$60/LGC used if 
it appears 33,000 MWh renewable energy target may not be met. However LGC prices are 
unlikely to reach the cap of AU$92.86/MWh as this would result in market speculation of very 
high levels of new renewable energy projects resulting in downward LGC market repricing. 
Wind energy subsidy costs are the lowest, followed by hydro and solar energy. Bagasse 
cogeneration and biomass generation have higher remission reduction unit costs because they 
create emissions in the burning process of generating output. It should be remembered that these 
comments only relate to subsidised renewable energy so that hydro energy, although the largest 
source of renewable energy at present, provides the lowest level of subsidised renewable energy. 
Forecasts suggest that wind energy output will overtake hydro energy generation as the largest 
renewable energy source in several years’ time.  
Table 6-13 Total large-scale renewable generation output, subsidy costs and GHG emission reductions 
  Output 
Total 
GHG 
emissn 
redns 
Subs. 
related 
output 
Subsidy rel'd 
emissn redns 
Subsidies, 
grants 
GHG redn 
subsidy  
cost 
Amortized 
cost 
FY 
(GWh 
pa) 
 (thous t 
CO2e)  (GWh pa) (thous t CO2e) (AU$thous) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
(AU$/t 
CO2e) 
2001 17,490  12,540  1,500  1,110  $53,880 $49 $49 
2002 17,630  12,600  1,940  1,420  $69,880 $49 $49 
2003 18,590  13,370  3,280  2,440  $121,240 $50 $50 
2004 18,870  13,630  3,340  2,490  $126,790 $51 $51 
2005 21,100  14,690  3,710  2,690  $126,130 $47 $47 
2006 21,960  15,660  4,010  3,130  $96,290 $31 $31 
2007 21,530  14,590  4,770  3,590  $123,990 $35 $35 
2008 20,780  14,140  5,950  4,490  $291,510 $65 $65 
2009 18,030  12,520  5,580  4,200  $290,260 $69 $69 
2010 21,100  14,320  8,170  5,950  $326,870 $55 $55 
2011 24,540  16,170  9,380  6,640  $356,580 $54 $54 
2012 24,070  16,160  9,970  7,220  $390,230 $54 $53 
2013 29,250  19,190  13,010  9,160  $517,140 $56 $49 
2014 32,780  21,790  15,510  11,230  $513,190 $46 $43 
2015 35,350  23,830  17,670  13,030  $798,640 $61 $56 
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2016 37,310  25,400  19,620  14,600  $1,328,250 $91 $83 
2017 39,300  27,300  21,550  16,360  $1,293,180 $79 $81 
2018 41,590  29,080  23,800  18,120  $1,427,770 $79 $81 
2019 43,660 30,720  25,820 19,740  $1,548,890 $78 $80 
2020 45,730  32,370  27,840  21,370  $1,670,350 $78 $80 
Total 550,670  380,080  226,410  168,980  $11,471,080 
 
  
 
Note: non-single figures, except subsidy unit costs, rounded to nearest 10. 
Source:  IRENA (2015), AEMO Annual Statements of Opportunities, Energy Supply Association of 
Australia annual reports, Research paper to Australian Parliament 2001, Clean Energy Regulator (2015), 
Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science (2015a), AEMO (2015b). 
6.3 Total renewable energy model summary 
 
Renewable energy outcomes from each of household PV and large-scale renewable energy from 
previous chapters are brought together in Table 6.14.  
      Table 6-14 Total renewable generation output, subsidy costs and GHG emission reductions 
Financial 
Year Output  
Emission 
redns 
Subsidy 
related 
output  
Subsidy related 
emission redns  
Grants and 
subsidies  
Emission 
redn 
subsidy 
cost  
Amortised 
subsidy 
cost  
  
 (GWh 
pa) 
 (thous t 
CO2e) 
 (GWh 
pa)  (thous t CO2e) 
 
(AU$thous) 
 (AU$/t 
CO2e) 
 (AU$/t 
CO2e) 
2001 17,490  12,540  1,500  1,110  $53,880 $49 $49 
2002 17,630  12,600  1,940  1,420  $69,880 $49 $49 
2003 18,590  13,370  3,280  2,440  $121,240 $50 $50 
2004 18,870  13,630  3,340  2,490  $126,790 $51 $51 
2005 21,100  14,690  3,710  2,690  $126,130 $47 $47 
2006 21,970  15,660  4,020  3,130  $97,020 $31 $31 
2007 21,540  14,600  4,780  3,600  $125,430 $35 $34 
2008 20,820  14,170  5,990  4,530  $301,830 $67 $65 
2009 18,140  12,620  5,690  4,300 $350,560 $82 $69 
2010 21,510  14,670  8,570  6,300  $1,035,340 $164 $64 
2011 25,710  17,180  10,550  7,660  $1,449,920 $189 $70 
2012 26,390  18,180  12,290  9,240  $1,589,470 $172 $73 
2013 32,670  22,170  16,430  12,140  $1,370,800 $113 $68 
2014 37,040  25,500  19,770  14,940  $1,216,920 $81 $61 
2015 40,340  28,170  22,660  17,370  $1,484,510 $85 $71 
2016 43,020  30,370  25,320  19,560  $2,008,980 $103 $91 
2017 45,680  32,860  27,940  21,920  $1,860,070 $85 $89 
2018 48,570  35,150  30,770  24,190  $1,899,010 $78 $89 
2019 51,140  37,240  33,300  26,250  $1,998,480 $76 $87 
2020 53,640  39,250  35,750  28,250  $2,092,210 $74 $87 
Total 601,840  424,610  277,580  213,510  $19,378,450 
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Note: non-single figures, except subsidy unit costs, rounded to nearest 10. 
Source:  IRENA (2015), AEMO Annual Statements of Opportunities, Energy Supply Association of Australia 
annual reports, Research paper to Australian Parliament 2001, Clean Energy Regulator (2015), Australian 
Government, Department of Industry and Science (2015a), ARENA, Green Energy Markets (2014b), AEMO 
(2015b). 
In FY 2014 subsidy-related renewable energy reduced GHG emissions by 14.9 m t CO2e, being 
3.7 m t CO2e from household PV and 11.2 m t CO2e from large-scale renewable energy (Table 
6.14). By FY 2020 it is expected that the comparative contributions will be 6.9 m t CO2e and 21.3 
m t CO2e respectively, totalling 28.2 m t CO2e having similar growth rates. However emission 
reduction unit costs are very different, with household PV unit costs expected to decrease from 
AU$118/ t CO2e in FY 2014 to AU$110/ t CO2e in FY 2020. Large-scale renewable energy 
emission reduction costs are instead expected to increase from AU$46/ t CO2e in 2014 to AU$80/ 
t CO2e by 2020 (Figure 6.2). Household PV emission reduction costs are higher but decreasing 
whereas large-scale renewable emission reduction costs are lower but increasing. The diverse 
trends reflect the fact that high FITs gradually terminate while LGC prices have instead been 
increasing because of the overall LGC supply-demand balance (Figure 6.1). With the continuing 
expiry of high FITs household PV unit costs will fall below those of large-scale renewable energy 
in the early 2020s.  
 
 
Figure 6-2 Amortised renewable energy unit subsidy costs 
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6.4 Non-renewable energy model results – carbon price 
 
The focus of this thesis is on renewable energy and renewable-energy related issues that 
contribute to lowering GHG emissions. There is however also an emissions reduction benefit 
arising from the carbon price, being an additional cost contained in retail electricity prices, 
applying in FY 2013 and FY 2014. The outcome was a switch of generation from more carbon-
intensive black and brown coal to gas-fired generation (Table 6.15). As discussed in Section 5.6.3 
gas-fired generation has a lower carbon intensity factor than coal-fired generation, the difference 
being approximately 0.4 tonnes CO2e per MWh. This generation type switch has been analysed 
over the two year carbon price period.  
                       
                 Table 6-15 Mix of generation type over carbon price period FY 2013 and FY 2014 
 
Financial year 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Brown coal (GWh pa) 55,070 47,900 46,080 46,000 
% 22% 19% 19% 18% 
Black coal (GWh pa) 116,650 112,060 105,770 105,000 
% 47% 45% 43% 42% 
Gas/oil (GWh pa) 52,360 56,600 59,410 59,000 
% 21% 23% 24% 24% 
Renewables (GWh pa) 25,800 33,200 37,040 40,340 
% 10% 13% 15% 16% 
Total (GWh pa) 249,880 249,760 248,295 250,340 
growth   0% -1% 1% 
  
Note: GWh pa figures rounded to nearest 10. 
 
                   Source: Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science, (2015a) 
 
During the years of the carbon price, FY 2013 and FY 2014, gas-fired generation increased by 
4,240 GWh and 2,810 GWh respectively, with the accumulative effect for FY 2014 being 7,040 
GWh. Coal-fired generation decreased by more than this because of the growth in renewable 
energy. It could be concluded that most of the gas-fired generation increase was at the expense of 
the reduction in coal-fired generation because of the carbon price in FY 2013 and FY 2014. 
Millis (2016) advises that part of the upsurge in gas-fired generation was “due to the short-term 
availability of gas from coal-seam gas wells in advance of its requirement by the new facilities 
being built for LNG production and export”. The carbon price effect can therefore be considered 
only an upper bound. The upper bound of the carbon price effect for FY 2013 is reduced 
generation emissions of 1.7 m tonnes of CO2e (4,238,000 MWh times 0.4) and for FY 2014 2.8 
m tonnes (7,043,000 times 0.4), a combined 4.5 m tonnes of CO2e. No account is taken of events 
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after these two years when some sort of bounce back in coal-fired generation could have been 
expected but this has not happened suggesting that some of the impact was carried forward. 
Hence the two years of benefits could be considered optimistic, when noting the LNG effect, as 
well as being conservative when considering the possible ongoing benefits. 
The outcome is that the carbon price has impacted both consumers and producers quite 
differently. Firstly it represents a form of subsidy paid by electricity consumers in their retail 
electricity prices, supporting household PV viability and encouraging electricity conservation, 
and secondly it represents a penalty paid by non-renewable electricity generators, albeit being a 
lower cost penalty for gas-fired generators compared with coal-fired generation.  
The major anticipated emissions benefit was expected to be the reduction in GHG emissions by 
large, non-generator emitters. However these emitters were, in general, businesses having little 
opportunity to reduce emissions with the result being largely a cost impost. 
The subsidy cost of the carbon price was approximately AU$4.5 billion in each of FY 2013 and 
FY 2014, being a total cost of AU$9 billion, paid by large emitters, which, as discussed in 
Section 6.4, achieved little in the way of emission reductions, but did result in government 
revenue used to drive energy efficiency and compensate households for the resultant electricity 
price rise. The important emissions impact occurred through electricity generators passing this 
cost on to electricity consumers through higher pool prices. The extra pool price cost is estimated 
at AU$4.9 billion, being pool price premium of AU$17.97/MWh (AU$17.62/MWh in FY 2013 
and AU$18.32/MWh in FY 2014) at 270,000 GWh (two years NEM output excluding exempt 
penalty payers). The reduction in emissions of, at the most 4.5 million tonnes of CO2e, creating 
an emission reduction cost in excess of AU$1,000/t CO2e could suggest that this was not a cost-
efficient emission reduction outcome. However the fact that the source of generation was being 
targeted meant that emissions reduction was likely to be more successful than targeting end-users.  
End-user consumption penalties encourage energy conservation which is important but does not 
have nearly the impact that energy producer emission penalties achieve. In summary the carbon 
price on large-scale emitters provided a source of government revenue but only marginal 
emission reductions, whereas the carbon price on energy producers appears to have been 
successful in reducing carbon emissions but at a high cost. The important unknown is the extent 
to which the switch from coal-fired to gas-fired generation might have occurred at a lower carbon 
cost. 
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6.5 Demand-side impact on energy demand and GHG emissions 
 
The modelling of how households have been involved in demand-side energy reductions is made 
difficult by the various influencing factors as mentioned in previous chapters. The ideal outcome 
would be to remove all non-price factors affecting demand reduction so that price elasticities of 
electricity demand could be realistically calculated. Although this is not possible the analysis is 
assisted by the fact that many demand-side initiatives stem initially from high retail electricity 
prices and the consequent desire to take some form of cost savings action the main difference 
being the time span over which benefits will accrue. More energy efficient appliances, installed 
PV, more efficient hot water systems and similar measures will be undertaken with the economic 
impact being that long-run price elesticities of demand will be lower than those in the short term 
Two approaches have been adopted to analysing the relationship between real electricity price 
increases and reduced electricity demand. The first is noting that there appears to be an electricity 
price trigger above which households, rather than accept higher cost consequences, decided to 
take action to reduce their electricity costs.  A view of annual real electricity price increases and 
levels of electricity consumption suggests that this occurred in FY 2010 when real electricity 
price increases, from a FY 2000 base year, first exceeded 10 percent pa (Table 6.16). Saddler 
(2014) came to a similar conclusion commenting in regard to his own modelling “The most 
interesting finding of this part of the modelling is the abrupt change in consumer responsiveness 
to higher prices after 2010” (Saddler, 2014, p 5). 
Electricity demand was first adjusted by adding back reduced consumption caused by households 
with PV to give an estimate of total demand that is influenced only by electricity prices. Demand 
was then “normalised” by applying the 1.6 % pa long-term demand growth rate to FY 2000 
energy demand (of 210,018 GWh) and noting the excess demand above this level. This provides 
a base year to assist in assessing how actual demand has changed over time compared with the 
long-term electricity demand growth, a large part of which, since FY 2008, can be attributed to 
energy conservation measures including the growth in household PV. The key point of Table 6.16 
is the substantial decrease in normalised energy demand after FY 2011 coinciding with the 
increase in real retail electricity prices above the 10% trigger. 
The relationship between demand-reduction and increased retail electricity prices was first 
regressed over the years FY 2010 to FY 2015 but the fit was not good due to the FY 2010 outlier. 
This could reflect the fact that growth in energy conservation  was most apparent post FY 2010, 
which is not surprising because this was the year when household PV exhibited most growth. The 
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regression analysis was then taken over the five year period FY 2011 to FY 2015, with the results 
suggesting a more meaningful relationship (Figure 6.2).                            
                                Table 6-16 Energy reduction and increases in real electricity prices 
 
  
Total 
electricity 
demand 
H/hold PV 
demand 
reduction 
Total elec. 
demand - 
PV adjusted 
Normalised 
elec. 
demand 
incr. Retail tariff 
FY 2008 
tariff 
constant real 
terms 
Real 
tariff 
price 
incr. 
Incr. 
above 
10% 
trigger 
FY (GWh pa) (GWh pa) (GWh pa)   (AU$/MWh) (AU$/MWh)     
2008 243,220 
 
243,220 
 
180.00 181.00 0% 
 2009 249,530 
 
249,530 
 
198.00 186.00 6% 0.0% 
2010 252,280 230 252,510 -2% 218.00 192.00 14% 3.6% 
2011 253,300 670 253,970 -1% 236.00 197.00 19% 0.9% 
2012 249,880 1,330 251,210 2% 261.00 203.00 29% 1.9% 
2013 249,760 1,950 251,710 3% 296.00 209.00 41% 3.1% 
2014 248,300 2,440 250,730 6% 315.00 216.00 46% 3.6% 
2015 250,340 2,850 253,190 7% 325.00 222.00 46% 3.6% 
2016 256,020 3,260 259,270 
 
323.00 
   2017 259,680 3,650 263,330 
 
334.00 
   2018 262,570 3,990 266,550 
 
343.00 
   2019 265,140 4,280 269,420 
 
353.00 
   2020 267,640 4,520 272,160   364.00       
 
Note: Prices rounded to nearest $ and demand figures rounded to nearest 10. 
  Source: Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science (2015a), Forecasts from Frontier 
Economics (2015), BREE (2015) for total demand   
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Figure 6-3 Relationship between real electricity price increases and reduced electricity consumption, 
FY 2011 to FY 2015 
Given that there appears to be a close relationship between real electricity price increases and 
reduced electricity demand a second analysis was undertaken in an attempt to determine 
Australia’s price elasticity of demand, the difference being that an incremental approach was 
adopted. Growth in electricity consumption is partly driven by population growth so demand was 
expressed on a per capita basis to remove this influence. It would have been ideal to concentrate 
only on household consumption but such information is not available; hence the analysis has the 
limitation of including commercial and industrial consumption but to the extent that they are also 
affected by population growth and increasing electricity prices the limitation is mitigated. 
Over the period FY 2008 to FY 2015 real retail electricity prices increased each year and 
electricity demand per person declined each year (Table 6.17). For each year, price elasticities of 
demand were negative as expected and did not exceed unity, exhibiting a comparatively inelastic 
rather than elastic outcome, as could have been expected. There are aberrations on a year on year 
basis so the most realistic outcome is the result over the seven year period of a -0.4 price 
elasticity of demand. This is in line with DSM literature, as discussed in Section 5.9, with short-
term price elasticity of demand in general ranging between -0.3 and -0.6. This analysis highlights 
the fact that subsidies resulting in higher retail electricity prices have resulted in reduced 
electricity demand and further contributed towards reducing GHG emissions.  
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                     Table 6-17 Estimate of Australian price elasticity of demand 
FY Real elec. price Demand Population Demand per person Price elas. of demand 
   (AU$/MWh) % inc (GWh) (million) (MWh pp) % decr.   
2008 181.00 
 
243,220 20.0 12.2 
  2009 192.00 6% 249,530 20.5 12.2 0% 0.0 
2010 205.00 7% 252,280 21.0 12.0 1% -0.2 
2011 215.00 5% 253,300 21.5 11.8 2% -0.4 
2012 231.00 8% 249,880 22.7 11.0 7% -0.9 
2013 254.00 10% 249,760 23.1 10.8 2% -0.2 
2014 263.00 3% 248,300 23.7 10.5 3% -0.9 
2015 263.00 0% 253,150 24.2 10.5 0% -3.8 
2008 to   46%       16% -0.4 
2015               
 
Note: Prices rounded to nearest $ and demand figures rounded to nearest 10. 
6.6 Emission reduction costs in Australia and world-wide 
 
GHG emission amortised reduction costs for household PV rose to a peak of over AU$200/ per t 
CO2e in FY 2010 and have since been declining to an expected AU$110 per t CO2e in FY 2020, 
mainly because of the phasing out of attractive FITs (Table 6.3). Large-scale renewable 
amortised energy emission reduction costs have instead steadily increased to an expected excess 
of AU$80/ per t CO2e by FY 2020 (Table 6.13). The Coalition government introduced a DAP 
scheme in 2015 to secure emission reductions through an auction process which to date has had 
an average cost of AU$14 per t CO2e. Unlike other Australian schemes the cost is not applied 
directly to electricity consumers. These figures provide some perspective of the variation in types 
of emission reduction schemes in Australia, both in cost and the fact that in some cases electricity 
consumers pay and in others tax payers are liable.  
If an ETS or CAT scheme is eventually introduced the outcome will instead be a cost to emitters, 
flowing through the economy, but at a market cost. Permits may be issued or auctioned which 
would have a price influence. 
McKinsey & Company (2008) estimated that Australian household PV abatement costs for 2020 
would be AU$65 per t CO2e. A year later, on a world-wide basis they estimated, for 2020, PV 
abatement costs at EU$35 (AU$50) per t CO2e (McKinsey & Company, 2009) followed by a 
reduction to EU$20 (AU$30) per t CO2e a year later (McKinsey & Company, 2010). Large-scale 
solar abatement costs were nearly double these figures possibly due to the impact of subsidies. 
Ackerman and Bueno (2011) reviewed the work of McKinsey, producing abatement costs above 
those of McKinsey’s postulating that this could be because McKinsey uses a broad “top-down” 
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approach compared with their more detailed “bottom-up” approach.  Ackerman and Bueno 
(2011) also raised the question of why negative cost abatement curves, determined by McKinsey 
& Company (2010) were not taken up. That is if there is no cost but instead a reward for taking 
action to reduce GHG emissions why is there not more of such action? In effect they were 
questioning part of McKinsey’s analysis. 
Bakhtyar et al (2014) analysed emission reduction costs on a world-wide basis utilising FITs in 
13 countries or country regions. The results are not strictly comparable to those in this thesis as 
only FITs are considered, and not other subsidies such as REC subsidies as in Australia’s case. 
Emissions were taken as average emissions per kWh of output rather than emissions at the 
margin thereby not reflecting the types of generation that would be replaced. In Australia’s case a 
FIT of US80c/kWh was used, supposedly for Victoria, with this FIT applying also to all other 
forms of renewable energy which is not the case, reflecting the broad approach taken. 
 Kesicki (2011) analysed UK FITs for different renewable energy fuel types with wide ranges of 
outcomes. FITs were highest for PV at US$730 to US$1,073 per t CO2e and potentially lowest 
for wind at US$20-878 per t CO2e. With the wide variation the only conclusions that could be 
reached are that FITs were lowest for wind and likely to be very high for PV, similar to the 
results in this thesis. 
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Chapter 7 Sensitivity analyses 
 
Summary 
This chapter discusses how changes in subsidy components, and other model variables such as 
PV prices and levels of retail tariffs, alter the uptake of small and large-scale renewable energy 
and hence the level of GHG emissions. In effect these changes in input variables are sensitivity 
analyses but in some cases the changes are to variables which policy-makers have some control 
over, such as FIT prices and grants, and hence become scenario analyses. The period covered is 
initially from FY 2000 to FY 2015 and then extended to FY 2000 to FY 2020 encompassing 
forecasts, which are likely to be of more interest to policy-makers. Household PV is first 
examined in the context of the relationship between payback periods and actual uptake noting 
that if subsidies had been lower such that payback periods were never less than five years, 
savings of between AU$1 and AU$2 billion would have occurred with minimal uptake 
difference. Without any FITs or STCs almost 50% uptake of actual uptake would still have been 
likely. The impact on retail prices of no subsidies is also shown.  
Large-scale renewable energy model results suggest that without subsidies little renewable 
energy growth would have occurred. Looking forward if LGC prices remain at their current 
AU$60/LGC to AU$70/LGC level, or increase further, then growth in large-scale renewable 
energy projects, particularly wind generation, will ensure the 20 % target will be easily achieved, 
with payback periods falling to between seven and eight years. The total cost of subsidies to 
electricity consumers is estimated to be AU$8.0 billion between FY 2000 and FY 2014, 
increasing to an expected AU$19.4 billion for the FY 2000 to FY 2020 period (Table 6.14). 
Analysis background 
The model has been created with linkages between key variables to enable sensitivity analyses to 
be undertaken.  It is important to recognise that not all input variables are independent of each 
other with some inputs being common to all types of renewable energy projects, such as changes 
in electricity prices. There are also market-related relationships such as that between LGC prices 
and wholesale electricity prices. It is the combination of the two that provides large-scale 
renewable energy projects with the necessary revenue for viability. If the electricity price is 
comparatively low the LGC price will increase to ensure sufficient projects are viable to generate 
the number of LGCs necessary to enable retailers to meet their liability obligations (and hence the 
overall LGC target). If this is not the case retailers will be required to pay the LGC shortfall 
penalty, of AU$92.86/LGC tax adjusted. To avoid doing this retailers will increase the price they 
are willing to pay for LGCs until they are eventually high enough to enable additional renewable 
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energy projects to become viable thereby and generating sufficient extra LGCs. In effect a typical 
economic supply and demand relationship will be operating. Although this is a self-fulfilling 
mechanism there is a timing issue in that renewable energy projects cannot instantaneously come 
into effect resulting in a time delay giving rise to LGC prices rising to higher than equilibrium 
levels until sufficient project-generated LGCs become available.  
The main focus of the sensitivity analyses has been on the impact of how changes in subsidies 
might affect household and large-scale renewable energy output, changes in emission reduction 
levels and changes in retail electricity prices.  
7.1 Sensitivity of household PV uptake to reduced subsidy levels 
 
As discussed in Section 5.6.2 FITs and the REC multiplier were higher than necessary to achieve 
the resultant levels of PV uptake. Policy makers had not anticipated the coincidental drop in the 
cost of solar panels, mostly from China, by over 50%, and the strong interest by households in 
seeking to take some control of their electricity costs. If the level of FITs had been less attractive 
and the STC multiplier lower, such that payback periods were never less than five years, the 
uptake would have been only marginally less but the level of subsidies would have been reduced 
by between AU$1.0 billion and AU$2.0 billion. This conclusion was achieved by first noting the 
maximum level of subsidy reduction that could have been achieved and then noting what 
realistically could have been achieved. 
In the years when payback periods were less than five years, being FY 2011 to FY 2015, subsidy 
savings of AU$2 billion potentially could have been achieved (Table 7.1).                        
Table 7-1 Household PV subsidy savings if no annual payback period is less than five years 
FY  
Annual 
p/back 
Net cap. 
cost  
Annual 
benefit  
Annual benefit 
at 5 yr P/Back Difference 
Five year 
difference 
Total number 
of installations 
Total 
savings 
  (years) (AU$) (AU$) (AU$) (AU$) (AU$)   (AU$m) 
2011 3.3 $3,900 $1,170 $780 $390 $1,940            350,900  $680 
2012 2.8 $3,520 $1,240 $700 $540 $2,690            331,200  $890 
2013 3.9 $4,370 $1,110 $870 $240 $1,200            198,900  $240 
2014 4.5 $4,850 $1,080 $970 $110 $520            173,100  $90 
2015 4.8 $4,810 $990 $960 $30 $150            164,400  $30 
Total               $1,930 
 
Note: Cost and benefit figures have been rounded to nearest AU10 m. 
                            Source: Sensitivity analysis of model output (Figure 6.1) 
123 
 
               Table 7-2 Practical changes in subsidy levels that could achieve substantial savings 
FY 
Year 
FIT 
benefit Act. FIT  Lower FIT  FIT diff.  
FIT cost 
redn 
STC 
multiple 
Reduced 
STC 
multiple 
Capital 
cost diff. 
No. of 
instal'ns 
STC 
savings  
Revised 
P/back 
  
 
(AU$m)  (AU$/MWh)  (AU$/MWh)  (AU$/MWh) 
 
(AU$M)     (AU$)   
 
(AU$m) (years) 
2011 $790 57.96 30.00 27.96 $380 4 4 
   
5.0 
2012 $740 43.09 25.00 18.09 $310 3 2 $720 
   
331,200  $240 4.5 
2013 $410 15.23 15.23 0.00 0.00 1.5 1 $410 
    
198,900  $80 4.3 
2014 $260 5.10 5.10 0.00 0.00 1 1 
   
4.4 
2015 $190 2.53 2.53 0.00 0.00 1 1 
   
4.8 
Tota
l         $690         $320   
 
Note: Cost and benefit figures have been rounded to nearest AU10 m. 
                                                              Source: Table 7.1 
In reality the AU$2 billion savings (Table 7.2) would not have been possible for a number of 
reasons including difficulties spreading savings effectively between years and unrealistic 
implications for some FITs. The approach taken has been to firstly reduce FITs in the highest FIT 
year of FY 2011 to a state average of AU30c/kWh being equivalent to a 5 year payback period, 
producing AU$380 m savings over the first five year for households that installed PV in FY 
2011. Savings would in reality be greater than this as most FITs had terms of more than five 
years. The FIT for FY 2012 was reduced to an average AU25c/kWh being marginally greater 
than average tariff levels which would remain attractive. No further FIT reductions were 
considered as the average FIT for new installations post FY 2012 had already been substantially 
reduced (Table 7.2). These reduced FITs would generate subsidy savings of AU$690 m. 
As mentioned in Section 5.6.2 large STC subsidies also occurred during these years, particularly 
in the form of STC multipliers. This was recognised at the time with the multiplier deadline 
brought forward a year to the end of 2013. If the multiplier had been reduced from 3 to 2 in FY 
2012 and to unity in FY 2013 there would have been additional subsidy savings of AU$320 m. 
These savings are recognised in higher capital costs paid by households because STCs are used 
by installers to discount capital costs. The combined effect of both lower FITs and reduced STC 
multipliers is to produce AU$1 billion in subsidy savings with payback periods continuing to 
remain below 5 years, being still attractive (Table 7.2). 
The substantial household PV uptake had become obvious by early 2010 providing time to react 
for FY 2011. Adjustment to STC multipliers would have been easier to achieve as they are part of 
a national scheme whereas FIT are state-based but might have been more successful if they had 
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been a nationwide scheme. This would have allowed a speedier reaction to linking FITs to market 
prices, as occurred in Germany, for example (GAU, 2000). 
In the extreme example of no FITs being provided and no STCs being available there is likely to 
still be some uptake of household PV over the period FY 2000 to FY 2020 because PV panel 
costs have fallen, retailers are likely to be willing to make some payment for electricity generated 
and there will continue to be material savings from solar output offsetting domestic consumption. 
Looking ahead the possibility of increasingly more attractive battery storage costs occurring 
when attractive FITs expire is likely to provide further PV support. 
The extreme example was modelled of setting FITs and STCs to zero, removing the carbon price 
over the two years FY 2013 and FY 2014 and also removing the large-scale renewable energy 
subsidy reflected in LGCs. The effect on retail electricity prices is shown in Table 7.3. 
                        Table 7-3 Retail electricity prices with and without subsidy components 
  
  
Actual and forecast retail 
prices 
Subsidy 
component 
Annual prices without 
subsidies  Price decrease 
FY (AU$/MWh) (AU$/MWh) (AU$/MWh)   
2001 132.00 0.04 132.00 0.0% 
2002 142.00 0.12 142.00 0.1% 
2003 151.00 0.27 151.00 0.2% 
2004 159.00 0.45 158.00 0.3% 
2005 163.00 0.55 163.00 0.3% 
2006 168.00 0.51 167.00 0.3% 
2007 174.00 0.71 173.00 0.4% 
2008 181.00 2.00 179.00 0.9% 
2009 198.00 2.00 196.00 1.0% 
2010 218.00 5.00 213.00 2.1% 
2011 236.00 11.00 224.00 4.7% 
2012 261.00 14.00 248.00 5.2% 
2013 296.00 48.00 248.00 16.1% 
2014 315.00 39.00 276.00 12.4% 
2015 325.00 11.00 315.00 3.2% 
2016 323.00 13.00 310.00 4.1% 
2017 334.00 14.00 319.00 4.2% 
2018 343.00 16.00 328.00 4.5% 
2019 353.00 17.00 335.00 4.9% 
2020 364.00 19.00 344.00 5.4% 
 
Note: Prices above AU$1 have been rounded to nearest dollar 
                    Source: AEMC (2013), Australian Government, Department of Industry, Innovation and 
Science. (2015), Forecasts from Frontier Economics (2015), AER (2015) 
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The price decreases reflect subsidy contributions paid by consumers in each financial year. In the 
extreme year of FY 2013 the subsidy impact, from all forms of subsidies, was to increase retail 
electricity prices by 16 percent higher. The impact going forward, being mainly due to the cost of 
LGCs, is an ongoing 5 percent increase to retail electricity prices. 
The expected household PV uptake at these no-subsidy price levels results in payback periods 
increasing to at least six years in every year (Table 7.4). The modelled relationship (Figure 6.1) 
was used to convert these higher payback periods to lower levels of uptake of household PV in 
each year. For the 20 year period to FY 2020 capacity is predicted to reduce from 6,190 MW to 
4,050 MW and output from 51,170 GWh to 28,300 GWh. The overall decrease is less than 50 
percent reflecting the likelihood that PV uptake is less influenced by subsidies from FY 2015 to 
FY 2020. That is even though uptake from FY 2015 is expected to decline by nearly 50 percent 
this partly reflects the increasing level of household PV saturation which is unlikely to be greatly 
impacted by changing economics. In effect without any subsidies there would still have been a 
substantial uptake of household PV despite capital costs, without subsidies, being higher on 
average by AU$1,000 per PV unit. Benefits would not have fallen substantially because there 
would still have been savings from reduced electricity consumption as well as export credits, in 
the order of AU8c/kWh that would still be provided by retailers. 
                       Table 7-4 Household PV output with and without subsidies 
  
Payback 
with 
subsidies 
PV 
model 
uptake 
Payback 
without 
subsidies 
PV model 
uptake, no 
subsidies 
PV 
uptake 
decrease 
Actual 
and 
forecast 
uptake 
Uptake, 
no 
subsidies 
PV 
output 
with 
subs. 
PV 
output 
no subs. 
FY (yrs) (MW) (yrs) (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) (GWh) (GWh) 
2006 47.4 10 49.8 5 5 2 0 2 0 
2007 43.5 20 45.0 10 10 6 0 10 0 
2008 32.5 30 35.3 15 15 20 8 40 10 
2009 16.1 160 31.2 20 140 60 0 110 10 
2010 5.4 570 26.4 50 520 230 0 400 10 
2011 3.3 750 15.4 180 580 600 25 1,170 40 
2012 2.8 800 9.6 340 460 900 440 2,320 610 
2013 3.9 730 7.4 450 280 860 580 3,420 1,350 
2014 4.5 650 6.5 530 120 660 540 4,260 2,040 
2015 4.8 610 6.5 530 80 570 490 4,990 2,660 
2016 5.1 600 6.6 530 70 560 490 5,700 3,290 
2017 5.5 530 6.7 470 60 530 470 6,380 3,890 
2018 5.6 460 6.9 400 60 460 400 6,970 4,400 
2019 5.8 400 7.1 330 70 400 330 7,480 4,820 
2020 5.9 330 7.3 280 50 330 280 7,910 5,180 
Total   6,650   4,130 38% 6,190 4,050 51,170 28,300 
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Total 
to 
2014   3,720   1,600 57% 3,340 1600 11,730 4,060 
 
Note: Non-single figure capacity and output figures have been rounded to nearest 10 
                         Source: Sensitivity analysis of model output (Figure 6.1) 
The no-subsidy outcome is for emission reductions to fall to nearly half of those under the 
subsidy scenario with subsidy savings of nearly AU$8 billion (Table 7.5). 
                               Table 7-5 Household PV output emissions with and without subsidies 
  Expected outcome with subsidies      Expected outcome - no subsidies 
FY Output 
Emission 
reductions 
Subsidy 
costs 
Output 
redn (%) Output 
Emission 
reductions 
Subsidy 
costs 
  (GWh) (th. t CO2 ) (AU$000)   (GWh) (th. t CO2) (AU$000) 
2001 0 0 $0 0% 0 0 $0 
2002 0 0 $0 0% 0 0 $0 
2003 0 0 $0 0% 0 0 $0 
2004 0 0 $0 0% 0 0 $0 
2005 0 0 $0 0% 0 0 $0 
2006 2 2 $1 74% 0 1 $0 
2007 10 10 $1 91% 0 1 $0 
2008 40 40 $10 97% 10 1 $0 
2009 110 100 $60 96% 10 4 $0 
2010 400 350 $710 74% 10 90 $0 
2011 1,170 1,020 $1,090 61% 40 400 $0 
2012 2,320 2,020 $1,200 52% 610 970 $0 
2013 3,420 2,970 $850 47% 1,340 1,590 $0 
2014 4,260 3,710 $700 42% 2,040 2,140 $0 
2015 4,990 4,340 $690 39% 2,660 2,650 $0 
2016 5,700 4,960 $680 37% 3,290 3,130 $0 
2017 6,380 5,550 $570 36% 3,890 3,580 $0 
2018 6,970 6,070 $470 35% 4,400 3,970 $0 
2019 7,480 6,510 $450 45% 4,820 3,600 $0 
2020 7,910 6,880 $420 65% 5,180 2,380 $0 
Total 51,170 44,530 $7,910 38% 28,300 24,500 $0 
 
Note: Non-single figure numbers have been rounded to nearest 10. 
                                           Source: Table 7.4 and Table 6.3 
7.2 Sensitivity of large-scale renewable energy output to reduced subsidy levels 
 
Two types of subsidies have had the greatest impact in stimulating large-scale renewable energy 
projects in Australia, being one-off grants and ongoing LGCs. Low cost finance, provided by the 
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Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) represents a further subsidy but this aspect has not 
been included in the analysis as the impact is not as great as the other two types of subsidies.  
An analysis has been undertaken of the likely outcome in Australia if no grants, from states or the 
Commonwealth, had been available and the LRET scheme, providing LGCs, had not existed. 
Variations to this scenario are possible but have not been examined because of the complexity of 
assumptions and because the no-subsidy scenario is the extreme case which has most value. 
Subsidy savings are compared with the higher level of emissions that would have occurred to 
assess the impact on renewable energy and emission targets not being reached. 
It was first noted that some large-scale renewable energy projects have occurred since the RET 
scheme was introduced without the assistance of subsidies. This was observed by noting the 
extent to which there has been growth in renewable output in excess of the growth in the creation 
of LGCs. 
In the case of wind energy there was small non-subsidised growth prior to 2001 but little non-
subsidised growth since then.  With large-scale solar it was observed that at least since the mid 
1990s there has been increasing growth in non-subsidised solar, exhibited in output growth 
exceeding the growth in LGCs. It has been assumed that this growth will continue and is the main 
component of non-subsidised renewable energy growth. Hydro energy output fell by over 
4,000,000 GWh between 2002 and 2009, reflecting the drought of 2008 and 2009, falling below 
the hydro energy base line but still producing LGCs (which was not able to be explained in 
communications between the author and the CER in March 2016). It has been assumed that 
output fluctuations will continue but not as a result of increased capacity expansion. With bagasse 
it was noted that output has continued to exceed expectations when comparing net out output 
with LGC creation in the period since FY 2012 by an average 400 GWh pa. Biomass output 
exceeded LGC determined output between FY 2011 and FY 2013 by 400 GWh pa but since then 
there has been a close alignment with LGC driven output. Hence no non-subsidised output has 
been assumed in future forecasts. In summary there has been some solar growth and bagasse 
growth that has arisen without subsidies. The analysis now focuses on the extent to which 
subsidised output would have continued without subsidies. 
Renewable energy projects fall into two categories, being large projects receiving state or 
Commonwealth grants and smaller projects where viability is dependent on the number and price 
of LGCs created. As in the case of most renewable projects the receipt of contracted forward 
prices is critical to the project’s ongoing viability. This is highlighted in the financial difficulties 
experienced by the two 30 MW northern NSW bagasse cogeneration projects, Condong and 
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Broadwater which began operation in 2008, and the more recent experience of Hydro Pacific’s 
wind turbine portfolio. In both cases the projects went “merchant” on LGC revenue, that is they 
were fully exposed to varying wholesale LGC prices which had remained depressed until early 
2015 resulting in the two bagasse projects being sold under duress in 2013 and Hydro Pacific 
reporting a AU$780 million financial loss in early 2015. This position however will have 
improved substantially with the dramatic increase in LGC prices since mid 2015. These examples 
show the importance of securing fixed forward prices, creating revenue certainty and greater 
interest by financiers in financing such projects. Falls in subsidy levels, such as those now being 
examined, would then not affect viability over the contract period. In this analysis it is assumed 
that such contract terms are not long enough to overcome the viability consequences of no 
subsidies.  
Viewing model results of large-scale renewable project viability suggests that the only projects 
that could in future be viable without subsidies, are those that are an adjunct to another activity 
such as bagasse cogeneration and biomass generation. Solar is often referred to as being close to 
viability without subsidies but in an Australian context this is more relevant to household PV. For 
large-scale solar the value of LGCs at the current (November 2015) price of AU$60/LGC, creates 
an output purchase price in the order of AU$120 to AU$130/MWh. Excluding the LGC price 
produces an output price of AU$60/MWh to AU$70/MWh which is not adequate for viability. 
Wind energy is in a similar position. It is difficult to analyse biomass because it covers a wide 
range of fuel types but rapid growth, since the availability of LGCs, suggests that most of the 
output is subsidy driven. 
There could be some output increases, not subsidy related, arising from more intensive use of 
capacity that existed in 2000. The reason for this is that there are no fixed costs related to extra 
output from existing plant so that such output could occur despite the fact that there are no 
subsidies for this purpose. To evaluate this impact the model was used to view capacity and 
output in each year from FY 2000 to FY 2020 for each type of renewable energy. Not 
surprisingly subsidised solar and wind output were found to increase only in line with additional 
capacity (as improved capacity utilisation is a reflection only of climatic conditions). Hydro 
energy output could have been used more efficiently but over the 20 year time period it was 
found that productivity varied considerably year by year, being a reflection of weather and 
hydrology patterns over time. Broadly over the 20 year period there was no real net hydro energy 
output change. Non-subsidy related renewable energy growth therefore focussed on non-
subsidised solar, which continued to show growth from the 1990s, and bagasse cogeneration. The 
diverse nature of biomass products meant detailed analysis was not possible. 
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Output of non-subsidised solar was determined as growth since FY 2002 less the FY 2002 
baseline output of 58 GWh pa. For bagasse the approach taken was to note the average number of 
hours per day cogeneration plants operated each year, being 6 hours per day in 2001 and 
deducting this figure from the average number of operating hours in each subsequent year. These 
figures excluded the 24/7 bagasse plants introduced during this (Pioneer, 70 MW in FY 2003, and 
Racecourse, 38 MW in FY 2012 and FY 2013) as their contributions distort productivity 
improvements. The outcome suggested that non-subsidised bagasse output was likely to gradually 
increase to a forecast 230 GWh improvement by FY 2020 (Table 7.6).  
Total subsidies saved over the 20 year period would have been AU$11.5 billion and GHG 
emissions would have been 164.3 m t CO2e higher, being 169.0 m t CO2e (Table 6.13) less 4.7 m 
t CO2e (Table 7.6). Renewable energy capacity would have increased only marginally (from non-
subsidised solar) above the FY2001 level of 8,400 MW, 96% of which would have been hydro.  
                   Table 7-6 Large-scale renewable energy output with and without subsidies    
      Expected outcome with subsidies Expected outcome - no subsidies 
FY 
Subsidy related 
output 
Subsidy related 
emission 
reductions 
Subsidy 
costs Output 
Emission 
reductions 
Subsidy 
costs 
  (GWh) (th. t CO2) (AU$000) (GWh) (th. t CO2) (AU$000) 
2001 1,500 1,110 $50 0 0 $0 
2002 1,940 1,420 $70 0 0 $0 
2003 3,280 2,440 $120 0 0 $0 
2004 3,340 2,490 $130 9 6 $0 
2005 3,710 2,690 $130 20 10 $0 
2006 4,010 3,130 $100 70 40 $0 
2007 4,770 3,590 $120 80 50 $0 
2008 5,950 4,490 $290 120 80 $0 
2009 5,580 4,200 $290 130 80 $0 
2010 8,170 5,950 $330 150 100 $0 
2011 9,380 6,640 $360 460 300 $0 
2012 9,970 7,220 $390 360 230 $0 
2013 13,010 9,160 $520 490 310 $0 
2014 15,510 11,230 $510 640 410 $0 
2015 17,670 13,030 $800 670 430 $0 
2016 19,620 14,600 $1,330 720 460 $0 
2017 21,550 16,360 $1,290 830 530 $0 
2018 23,800 18,120 $1,430 820 530 $0 
2019 25,820 19,740 $1,550 880 560 $0 
2020 27,840 21,370 $1,670 930 590 $0 
Total 226,410 168,980 $11,470 7,370 4,720 $0 
 
Note: Non-single figure numbers have been rounded to nearest 10. 
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                                                                       Source: Table 6.12 
Model payback periods were also used to determine the circumstances in which renewable 
projects could have been viable, without subsidies. The lowest payback periods, with subsidies, 
excluding those affected by substantial capital grants, is seven years occurring frequently 
between FY 2013 and FY 2020.  If LGCs instead had a zero value the lowest payback periods 
become those for large-scale solar at 10 years in FY 2013 and FY 2014; for other years payback 
periods do not fall below 13 years. Based on the response to payback periods for household PV, 
comments in ASMC (2014) and the views of financiers7, it is possible that some large-scale solar 
in FY 2013 and FY 2014 could have been viable without LGCs. In these years wholesale 
electricity prices, with a premium to reflect the profile of solar energy output, were higher than in 
any other years being the key viability factor. Under this scenario the only large-scale renewable 
energy projects that might have prevailed would have been 100 MW of solar in FY 2013 and 22 
MW of solar in FY 2014, a total 120 MW, having output of 310 GWh pa and emission reductions 
of 199 thousand tonnes pa. This is about 13 % of subsidy-related emission reductions and 
although material is an upper limit of possible outcomes. It should be stressed that this conclusion 
reflects modelling outcomes, dependent on a range of assumptions, some of which, as mentioned, 
relate only to FY 2013 and FY 2014 and hence may not be seen as indicative of the future, being 
the view developers might take. Modelling results here, and elsewhere in this thesis, therefore 
need to be treated with caution.  
The model was also used to understand outcomes with subsidies increasing rather than 
decreasing. With current grants and a continuation of recent AU$70/LGC prices, payback periods 
for wind and solar reduced from between 12 to 18 years prior to FY 2012, to approximately 10 
years at present and reducing further to between seven and eight years over the next five years, 
providing support to the growth currently taking place. Hydro energy output was not considered 
to be sensitive to LGC prices as decision-making involves many other factors, including 
environmental and regulatory issues. Bagasse and biomass were also not considered as the 
economics are impacted by a range of factors, as mentioned earlier. 
7.3 Sensitivity of total renewable energy output to reduced subsidy levels 
 
In the extreme case of no subsidies for any type for renewable energy, there would still be growth 
in household PV but little growth in large-scale renewable energy projects (Section 7.1). 
7 The author met with various financiers, including banks, during his 10 year role exploring renewable energy project viability 
between 2002 and 2012.  
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For household PV with subsidies limited to payback periods of no less than five years the 
outcome was a comparatively small reduction in household PV uptake with potential AU$2 
billion in subsidy savings, reducing to AU$1 billion when viewing changes that could have 
realistically occurred.  
The analysis now brings together information from earlier sections to show outcomes for total 
renewable energy without subsidies (Table 7.7).    
                                 Table 7-7 Total renewable energy output with and without subsidies 
          Expected outcome with subsidies Expected outcome without subsidies 
FY 
Subsidy related 
output 
Subsidy related 
emission 
reductions Subsidy costs Output 
Emission 
reductions Subsidy costs 
  (GWh) (th. t CO2) (AU $000) (GWh) (th. t CO2) (AU$000) 
2001 1,500 1,110 $50 0 0 $0 
2002 1,940 1,420 $70 0 0 $0 
2003 3,280 2,440 $120 0 0 $0 
2004 3,340 2,490 $130 9 6 $0 
2005 3,710 2,690 $130 20 10 $0 
2006 4,020 3,130 $100 70 40 $0 
2007 4,780 3,600 $130 80 50 $0 
2008 5,990 4,530 $300 130 80 $0 
2009 5,690 4,300 $350 140 80 $0 
2010 8,570 6,300 $1,040 160 190 $0 
2011 10,550 7,660 $1,450 510 700 $0 
2012 12,290 9,240 $1,590 960 1190 $0 
2013 16,430 12,140 $1,370 1,830 1,900 $0 
2014 19,770 14,940 $1,220 2,680 2,550 $0 
2015 22,660 17,370 $1,490 3,330 3,080 $0 
2016 25,320 19,560 $2,010 4,010 3,600 $0 
2017 27,940 21,920 $1,860 4,730 4,110 $0 
2018 30,770 24,190 $1,900 5,230 4,500 $0 
2019 33,300 26,250 $2,000 5,700 4,160 $0 
2020 35,750 28,250 $2,090 6,100 2,980 $0 
Total 277,580 213,510 $19,380 35,670  29,220  $0 
 
Note: Non-single figure numbers have been rounded to nearest 10. 
                                                           Source: Table 7.5 and Table 7.6  
The effect on the level of total renewable energy output, if there were no subsidies, would be to 
reduce output over the period FY 2000 to FY 2020 by 241,910 GWh (that is 277,580 less 35,670) 
with almost all large-scale renewable output not eventuating but 50% of household PV still 
occurring. Although AU$19.4 billion of subsidies would be saved the total level of emission 
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reductions would be substantially reduced (by 184.3 m t CO2e, from 213.5 m t CO2e to 29.2 m t 
CO2e).   
A further scenario is the situation if there were no household PV subsidies, just those for large-
scale renewable energy. Large-scale renewable energy output is expected to total 45,730 GWh in 
FY 2020 being 17 % of total expected generation, so that the target of 20% of total energy from 
renewable sources would not be met (Table 6.13).    
7.4 Effect on retail electricity prices without renewable energy subsidies 
    
Electricity consumers have been increasingly subsidising the cost of renewable energy since FY 
2001, with the carbon price in FY 2013 and FY 2014 having the most noticeable impact (Table 
7.3). Subsidies peaked at AU$8.0 billion in FY 2013 and are forecast to average AU$3 billion pa 
to FY 2020 (Table 7.8). 
                       Table 7-8 Cost of subsidies paid by electricity consumers 
  Actual and forecast retail prices Subsidy component 
Annual prices without 
subsidies  
FY (AU$/MWh) (AU$/MWh) (AU$/MWh) 
2001 132.00 0.04 132.00 
2002 142.00 0.12 142.00 
2003 151.00 0.27 151.00 
2004 159.00 0.45 158.00 
2005 163.00 0.55 163.00 
2006 168.00 0.51 167.00 
2007 174.00 0.71 173.00 
2008 181.00 2.00 179.00 
2009 198.00 2.00 196.00 
2010 218.00 5.00 213.00 
2011 236.00 11.00 224.00 
2012 261.00 14.00 248.00 
2013 296.00 48.00 248.00 
2014 315.00 39.00 276.00 
2015 325.00 11.00 315.00 
2016 323.00 13.00 310.00 
2017 334.00 14.00 319.00 
2018 343.00 16.00 328.00 
2019 353.00 17.00 335.00 
2020 364.00 19.00 344.00 
Total       
 
Note: Figures above AU$1 have been rounded to nearest dollar. 
Source: ROAM Consulting (2012), Frontier Economics (2015) for forecasts, Parliament of Australia (2009) 
for EITE assumptions.  
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There are variations in retail electricity price forecasts, mainly relating to network charges, which 
contribute nearly 50% of total retail prices. Frontier Economics (2015) retail electricity price 
forecasts have been used which are higher than those of Green Energy Markets (2014) whose 
forecasts contain energy and network costs decreasing in real terms between FY 2015 and FY 
2020, possibly being overly conservative. 
The position can also be viewed in the case of no renewable energy subsidies at any time. For the 
period FY 2001 to FY 2015 the subsidy component would have totalled AU$133/MWh, reducing 
the FY 2015 retail electricity price from AU$325/MWh to AU$192/MWh, a reduction of 41%. 
Similarly for the 20 years to FY 2020 the retail electricity price would have been 59% lower, at 
AU$151/MWh (Table 7.8). The larger reduction in FY 2020 reflects the extra five years of 
subsidies, principally relating to LGCs, included in the retail price. This highlights the extent to 
which electricity consumers subsidise renewable energy.  
This thesis has focused on subsidies stimulating renewable energy, being grants and electricity 
price subsidies. Although these are amounts actually received by renewable energy developers 
they are less than what they could have otherwise been. For example PV installers credit 
households with STCs at an estimated 20% discount to market prices. In addition retailers 
electricity prices contain regulated margins of approximately 17%, which is in effect a premium 
applied to STC and LGC retail components. Together these margins result in an average 18% 
premium applied to the subsidies received by renewable energy developers. This is a conservative 
calculation as it excludes the difference between the prices electricity retailers actually pay for 
STCs and LGCs and the prices negotiated with regulators, often being at the capped price. An 
18% premium is equivalent to the total level of subsidy payments (Table 7.7) increasing from 
AU$19.4 billion to AU$22.9 billion, being the amount actually paid by electricity consumers. It 
could be argued that the difference of AU$3.5 billion is justified in reflecting the activities of 
installers in creating and on-selling STCs and electricity retailers in undertaking similar activities 
including taking on price risk8. For these reasons no adjustments have been made to other figures 
in this thesis. 
Electricity consumers have also been paying a network cost premium for additional network 
capacity that may not have been necessary, as mentioned in Section 5.6.2. An evaluation of this 
network cost “premium” has been made by assessing the impact if network costs had increased at 
the same rate as other components of electricity prices. The outcome is that the largest “excess” 
8 These comments reflect the experiences of the author in undertaking price negotiations with the Queensland energy 
regulator. 
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network energy charges occurred post 2012 when network cost increases in excess of 20% pa 
were approved by regulators (Table 7.9). Although greater restraint in network costs increases 
has been signalled for the future the build-up of increases during the 2011 to 2013 period remain 
imbedded in the retail tariff structure. These “excess” network energy charges represent a further 
subsidy paid by electricity consumers to reduce GHG emissions, through the effect of reduced 
electricity consumption, as discussed in Section 6.5.  
Table 7-9 Reduction in network costs if increases had been at same rate as other retail electricity cost 
components 
  
Actual and 
forecast retail 
prices 
Network 
component 
Retail prices 
exc. network 
Increase 
in ret. 
prices 
exc. 
network 
Network 
comp. at ret. 
price ex. 
network inc. 
Retail prices 
at lower 
network 
comp. 
Network 
cost savings 
FY (AU$/MWh) (AU$/MWh) (AU$/MWh)   (AU$/MWh) (AU$/MWh) (AU$m) 
2001 132.00 64.00 68.00 
 
64.00 132.00 0 
2002 142.00 72.00 70.00 3% 66.00 136.00 910 
2003 151.00 81.00 70.00 0% 66.00 136.00 2,260 
2004 159.00 86.00 73.00 3% 68.00 141.00 2,650 
2005 163.00 87.00 76.00 5% 72.00 148.00 2,370 
2006 168.00 88.00 80.00 5% 75.00 155.00 1,990 
2007 174.00 89.00 85.00 6% 79.00 164.00 1,490 
2008 181.00 90.00 91.00 7% 85.00 176.00 800 
2009 198.00 100.00 98.00 8% 92.00 189.00 1,370 
2010 218.00 112.00 106.00 8% 99.00 205.00 2,150 
2011 236.00 118.00 118.00 11% 110.00 228.00 1,290 
2012 261.00 135.00 126.00 7% 119.00 245.00 2,780 
2013 296.00 160.00 136.00 8% 128.00 264.00 5,380 
2014 315.00 175.00 140.00 3% 132.00 272.00 7,220 
2015 325.00 200.00 125.00 -11% 118.00 243.00 13,690 
2016 323.00 204.00 119.00 -5% 112.00 231.00 15,460 
2017 334.00 208.00 126.00 5% 118.00 243.00 15,480 
2018 343.00 212.00 131.00 4% 123.00 254.00 15,570 
2019 353.00 216.00 136.00 4% 128.00 264.00 15,600 
2020 364.00 221.00 143.00 5% 134.00 277.00 15,400 
Total             123,850 
                             
  Note: Prices have been rounded to nearest dollar and savings to nearest AU10m. 
                                        Source: Table 7.8 
Without these “excess” network charges retail electricity prices would have been substantially 
lower,  in FY 2015 for example at AU$243/MWh rather than AU325/MWh, a reduction of 25%. 
Total cost savings over the period FY 2000 to FY 2020 are estimated to be AU$123.8 billion.  
Not all of these savings however would have been achievable because the importance of “keeping 
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the lights on” comes at a cost but the analysis does give some indication of the upper bound of 
what has been known as “gold plating”, as discussed in Section 5.6.2. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
Summary 
Chapter 8 summarises key differences between types of GHG emission reduction schemes and 
then brings together the key findings of the model analysis, including the impact of subsidies on 
stimulating household PV uptake and large-scale renewable energy development, and outcomes if 
there had been lower subsidy levels. The impact these subsidies has had, and will have in the 
future, on retail electricity prices is examined as well as the potential for households to benefit 
from battery storage. The likelihood of Australia meeting its renewable energy and emission 
reduction targets is discussed. The chapter concludes with research limitations and suggested 
areas for future research. 
 8.1 Comparison of GHG emission reduction schemes 
 
Emission reduction schemes differ in many respects including government cost and revenue 
implications and their effectiveness in achieving emission reduction targets. Carbon pricing 
(“Price”) schemes involve subjective judgement in setting emission reduction baselines but, as 
with Australia’s current DAP scheme, they have the benefit of allowing the auction process to set 
a carbon price, which might otherwise be set by regulation. Renewable energy (“Quantity”) 
schemes have renewable energy output or emission reduction target clarity and, in the case of 
Australia’s LRET scheme, involve a market price (LGC) mechanism designed to ensure the 
renewable target is met, although timing issues may result in targets being met over a longer time 
frame than initially envisaged.  
8.2 Desirable structure of emission reduction schemes 
 
Lessons learnt from this research are the need for an integrated approach, when more than one 
emission reduction scheme has been introduced, and the cost implications of setting scheme 
parameters unrelated to changing market conditions. In Australia’s case, with household PV a 
more cost-effective outcome would have been likely if FITs had a market price component and 
were not determined independently by each state. 
It is important to have households involved in schemes targeted to reduce emissions, but their 
demand-side involvement, through higher electricity prices, is not the most effective means of 
reducing emissions. Emission reductions are most effective if incentives or penalties are targeted 
at the generation source, rather than where demand occurs. In Australia subsidising renewable 
energy generation, both for household PV and large-scale renewable energy has been effective, 
although costly. Substantial emission reductions occurred during the two year carbon pricing 
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period, when gas-fuelled generation replaced coal-fired generation. This occurred at a high cost 
and begs the question of what lower carbon price might have achieved a similar emissions 
reduction outcome.  
8.3 Household PV summary and conclusions 
 
In Australia, household PV financial incentives have been very successful in stimulating PV 
activity and hence in reducing GHG emissions, being well in excess of forecasts. This has come 
at a substantial cost to electricity consumers, particularly in FY 2010 and FY 2011, when FITs 
were at their highest levels. Policy makers had not anticipated the coincidental high levels of 
incentives and the drop in the cost of solar panels, by over 50%, as well as the strong interest by 
households in seeking to take some control of their electricity costs. Modelling suggests that if 
the level of FITs had been less attractive such that payback periods fell to no lower than five 
years, the uptake would have been only marginally less but the level of subsidies would have 
been reduced by AU$1.0 billion, over the period FY 2008 to FY 2014. This could have been 
possible if FITs had included a market-related reduction, remained within a price range and/or 
contained an ongoing sliding scale. 
Household PV subsidy payments are forecast to cost AU$7.8 billion over the period 2000 to 
2020. Substantial emission reductions were achieved which will continue for the life time of the 
PV panels. Emission reduction costs are estimated to decline from over AU$200 per t CO2e in 
FY 2010 to a forecast AU$110 per t CO2e in FY 2020. These unit costs are higher than in most 
other parts of the world, but a true comparison requires comparable methods of calculating 
emission reduction benefits. The reducing unit cost reflects the expiry of attractive FITs on a state 
by state basis between 2016 and 2028. They are largely responsible for ongoing subsidies in 
excess of AU$600m pa continuing to 2016 then falling to AU$400m by FY 2020 and beyond.  
Australia’s targeted 5% reduction in GHG emissions over the period 2000 to 2020 requires the 
stationary electricity sector to not exceed 191 m t CO2e in 2020. In FY 2013 the level was 193.1 
m t CO2e, at which time household PV had reduced emissions by 3.0 m t CO2e. The extra PV 
reduction of 3.9 m t CO2e, forecast to result in a FY 2020  PV emissions reductions of 6.9 m t 
CO2e, highlights the important role PV will continue to have in assisting Australia to meet its 
GHG reduction commitments. On an accumulative basis, over the 14 year period from FY 2007 
to FY 2020, it is forecast that household PV will reduce GHG emissions by 44.5 m tonnes at a 
cost of AU$7.9 billion. This is equivalent to households paying in the order of an extra 2.2% on 
their electricity bills, averaged over the 14 year period from FY 2007 to FY 2020. 
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Modelling was used to evaluate the outcome if there had been no household PV subsidies. Retail 
electricity costs would have been substantially lower through no impost from the carbon price, 
STCs and FITs, but there would still have been a household PV uptake of 1600 MW, or 43% of 
the total uptake, over the period FY 2008 to FY 2014. This outcome reflects the continuing 
decline in solar panel costs, savings from reduced domestic consumption and the (comparatively 
small) FIT that retailers would still pay for electricity exports. 
Looking forward, even though export revenue has declined to an average AU6 to 8 cent per kWh, 
the comparatively low cost of solar panels, reduced by STC savings, combined with the savings 
from reduced electricity consumption suggests that the interest in household PV will remain 
strong, although uptake will increasingly reduce as household penetration continues to increase. 
Modelling suggests that by FY 2020 household PV will total 7,240 MW, of which 4800 MW, 
that is 66%, would have arisen without subsidies. 
8.4 Large-scale renewable energy summary and conclusions 
 
The viability of large-scale renewable energy projects in Australia is largely dependent on grants 
and LGC payments. LGC prices are set by demand and supply with demand being a reflection of 
the LRET target. Although agreement on a lower (33,000 GWh) target, inclusive of small-scale 
renewable energy, was reached between  the major political parties in May 2015, the certainty it 
provided resulted in a substantial increase in LGC prices which is very likely to ensure the 2020 
target of 20% of total energy being met from renewable energy sources will be met.  
In FY 2014 subsidy-related renewable energy reduced GHG emissions by 13.6 m t CO2e, being 
3.7 m t CO2e from household PV and 9.9 m t CO2e from large-scale renewable energy (Table 
6.14). By FY 2020 it is expected that the comparative contributions will be 6.9 m t CO2e and 21.4 
m t CO2e respectively, totalling 28.3 m t CO2e showing similar growth rates. 
Unit emission reduction costs gradually rose to AU$47/t CO2e in FY 2014 and are expected to 
increase to AU$80/t CO2e in FY 2020 as a result of the substantial increase in LGC prices and 
less effective emission reductions. It is possible that LGC prices may increase above this level in 
order for the 33,000 MWh LRET target to be met. This is most likely to occur in the lead-up to 
FY 2020 because projects, in taking time to reach completion, may not have enough time to take 
advantage of the higher LGC prices to be able to meet pre FY 2020 LRET targets. This will cause 
LGC prices to spike until such time as new projects come on stream. By FY 2020 LGC prices are 
unlikely to be at the cap of AU$92.86/MWh as sufficient new large-scale energy projects should 
have ensured LGC supply is adequate to meet demand. 
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 Wind energy subsidy costs are the lowest, followed by solar energy and then bagasse 
cogeneration. Hydro energy unit emission costs are also low but their contribution is 
comparatively small because these comments only relate to subsidised renewable output. Hydro 
energy, although the largest source of renewable energy at present, provides the lowest level of 
subsidised renewable energy. Forecasts suggest that wind energy output will overtake hydro 
energy generation as the largest renewable energy source in several years’ time. 
8.5 Consideration of Australia’s renewable energy and emission reduction 
targets 
   
Modelling suggests total electricity generation increasing from 224,000 GWh in FY 2001 to 
252,000 GWh in FY 2010 and forecast to reach 268,000 GWh in FY 2020 (Table 8.2). These 
figures represent an increase of 13% in the first 10 years and 6% in the second 10 years 
highlighting the impact of factors such as renewable energy displacing non-renewable energy and 
energy conservation in the second period.  
Renewable energy output increased from 17,500 GWh in FY 2001 to 37,000 GWh in FY 2010 
and forecast to reach 53,600 GWh in FY 2020 (Table 6.14), an overall increase of 36,100 GWh 
between FY 2001 and FY 2020. Of the 36,100 GWh increase, household PV is forecast to 
comprise 7,900 GWh and large-scale renewable energy 28,200 GWh.  
In FY 2014 subsidy-related renewable energy reduced GHG emissions by 13.6 m t CO2e, being 
3.7 m t CO2e from household PV and 9.9 m t CO2e from large-scale renewable energy. By FY 
2020 it is expected that the comparative contributions will be 6.9 and 21.4 m t CO2e respectively, 
totalling 28.3 m t CO2e, showing similar growth rates. However the associated subsidy costs are 
very different, with household PV emission reduction costs of AU$118/ t CO2e in 2014 
decreasing to an expected AU$110/ t CO2e by 2020 and large-scale renewable energy emission 
reduction costs of AU$47/ t CO2e in 2014 increasing to an expected AU$80/ t CO2e by 2020. 
Household PV emission reduction costs are higher but decreasing whereas large-scale renewable 
emission reduction costs are lower but increasing. The diverse trends reflect high FITs gradually 
terminating while LGC prices have instead been increasing. 
Australia has targets of at least 20% of electricity generation being from renewable energy 
sources and GHG emission reductions of 5% compared with 2000 levels by 2020. (Clean Energy 
Regulator, 2012a). The modelling undertaken in this thesis is designed to assist in determining 
whether these targets will be met and to provide guidance on whether these targets could have 
been achieved more cost effectively. 
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Target of 20 % electricity being supplied by renewable energy 
The LRET target of 33,000 GWh, being additional renewable energy from base year FY 2000, 
appears achievable according to the modelling results in this thesis (Table 8.2). The forecast can 
be considered conservative as no allowance has been made for the results of the DAP auctions. 
The result is supported by the fact that if the target does not appear achievable the LGC price 
would rise to its cap of AU92.86/MWh ensuring some seemingly unviable projects proceed. 
Hence target achievement looks very likely with the real question being, given delays in project 
implementation, whether the achievement will be in time to meet the 2020 target. Australian 
Government, Department of Environment, (2015b) concluded that if the revised large-scale 
generation target of 33,000 GWh was met then the renewable percentage would be 23.5%, being 
consistent with the conclusions reached in this thesis. 
        Table 8-1 Renewable energy share of total electricity generation with and without subsidies 
 
FY 
Renewable 
energy 
output 
Non-
renewable 
energy 
output 
Total 
energy 
output 
Renewable 
share 
Subsidy 
related 
renewable 
energy 
Non-
subsidised 
renewable 
energy 
output 
Non-
subsidised 
renewable 
share 
L/scale 
renew. 
output 
less base 
year 
  (GWh pa) (GWh pa) (GWh pa) (%)  (GWh pa) (GWh pa) (%) (GWh pa) 
2001 17,440 206,200 223,640 8% 1,500 15,940 7% 0 
2002 17,570 207,300 224,870 8% 1,940 15,630 7% 140 
2003 18,530  203,590 222,120 8% 3,280 15,260 7% 1,110 
2004 18,800 210,980 229,780 8% 3,340 15,470 7% 1,380 
2005 21,030 207,620 228,650 9% 3,710 17,320 8% 3,620 
2006 21,880 210,950 232,830 9% 4,020 17,870 8% 4,480 
2007 21,440 221,710 243,150 9% 4,780 16,670 7% 4,040 
2008 20,740 222,470 243,220 9% 5,990 14,760 6% 3,300 
2009 18,100 231,430 249,530 7% 5,690 12,410 5% 540 
2010 21,490 230,790 252,280 9% 8,570 12,910 5% 3,620 
2011 25,350 227,950 253,300 10% 10,550 14,800 6% 7,060 
2012 26,160 223,720 249,890 10% 12,290 13,880 6% 6,590 
2013 32,330 217,430 249,760 13% 16,430 15,900 6% 11,760 
2014 36,570 211,720 248,300 15% 19,770 16,800 7% 15,300 
2015 39,840 210,500 250,340 16% 22,660 17,180 7% 17,870 
2016 42,470 213,550 256,020 17% 25,320 17,140 7% 19,830 
2017 45,080 214,600 259,680 17% 27,940 17,140 7% 21,810 
2018 47,920 214,650 262,570 18% 30,770 17,140 7% 24,100 
2019 50,440 214,700 265,140 19% 33,300 17,140 6% 26,170 
2020 52,890 214,750 267,640 20% 35,750 17,140 6% 28,250 
 
Note: Figures have been rounded to nearest 10 GWh pa. 
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                                      Source: Table 7.5, Table 7.6, and AEMO (2015b) 
Target of 5% reduction in GHG emissions in 2020 compared with 2000 
Australia’s targeted 5% reduction in GHG emissions in FY 2020 requires total emissions to 
reduce from 565 m t CO2e in 2000 to 537 m t CO2e in 2020, including the electricity sector’s 
emissions reducing from 176 m t CO2e in 2000 to 167 m t CO2e in 2020. Latest forecasts 
(Australian Government, Department of Environment, 2015d) show electricity sector emissions 
reaching 187 m t CO2e by 2020, being 21 m t CO2e above implicit electricity sector targeted 
levels, but substantially below previous electricity sector forecasts due to the inclusion of 
expected DAP auction outcomes. It is the DAP auction outcomes that are also expected to enable 
Australia to achieve its overall emission reduction target. The DAP verification process, to be 
undertaken in 2016 will be very important in substantiating the accuracy of these figures. 
Modelling in this thesis suggests household PV will reduce GHG emissions by 6.9 m t CO2e in 
FY 2020 with large-scale renewable energy contributing 21.4 m t CO2e, a total of 28.3 m t CO2e. 
Modelling does not include DAP outcomes, which would increase these figures materially. As an 
indication the DAP is reported (www.CleanEnergyRegulator.gov.au) to have contracted 
abatement contracts of 93 m t CO2e during 2015, but these figures have yet to be verified. There 
is also the issue that abatement contract possibilities may diminish over time. 
Over the 20 years to FY 2020 the total cost of subsidies to achieve these emission reductions is 
expected to be nearly AU$20 billion. As almost all the subsidy payments are recovered in retail 
electricity prices, the subsidy cost is equivalent to households paying in the order of an extra 
2.2% on their electricity bills, averaged over the 14 year period from FY 2007 to FY 2020. 
Without subsidies, very little large-scale renewable energy growth would have occurred between 
FY 2000 and FY 2020 but almost 50% of household PV is likely to still have eventuated. 
Emission reductions would have totalled only 3.0 m t CO2e (2.4 m t CO2e from household PV 
and 0.6 t CO2e from large-scale renewable energy) compared with the forecast 23.9 m t CO2e, a 
reduction of 20.9 m t CO2e. Whether this outcome would materially affect Australia meeting its 
emission reduction target is largely dependent on emission reduction activities in other areas, 
reflecting the electricity sector being responsible for only 40 to 45% of total emissions, 
nevertheless a 20.9 m t CO2e emission reduction difference could be material. 
Differing comments have been made on the likelihood of Australia achieving its targeted level of 
emission reductions. According to Australian Government, Department of Environment (2015c) 
Australia is on track to achieve GHG emission reductions of at least 5% below 2000 levels by 
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2020. Inclusion of the DAP reductions, estimated to total 431 m t CO2e by 2020, will be a 
material contribution. Expectation of the target being met is however not a unanimous view with 
UNEP (2014) commenting that four parties including Australia “are likely to require further 
action and/or purchased offsets to meet their pledges, according to government and independent 
estimates of projected national emissions in 2020” (UNEP, 2014, p xix). Shahiduzzam et al 
(2015), in analysing components of emission reductions in Australia, commented “the 
unconditional reduction of emissions by 5% by 2020 from the 2000 level will really be quite a 
daunting task for Australia” (Shahiduzzam et al, 2015, p 100). 
8.6 Imposts and opportunities for households  
 
Households experience costs burdens arising from renewable energy but also have opportunities 
available to make financial gain and contribute towards environmental improvements. 
Retail price subsidy impact 
Retail electricity prices are substantially higher than they would otherwise have been without the 
inclusion of subsidies for renewable energy and the two years of a carbon price. If none of these 
subsidies had applied in FY 2015 the retail electricity price would have been AU$315.00/MWh 
rather than AU$325.00/MWh. With no subsidies at all during any of the 15 years from FY 2000 
to FY 2015 the retail electricity price in FY 2015 would have been AU$182.00/MWh rather than 
AU$325.00/MWh, a reduction of 44%. Similarly the retail electricity price for FY 2020 forecast 
to be AU$364.00/MWh would instead be AU$344.00/MWh without subsidies in FY 2020 and 
AU$127.00/MWh without any subsidies during the 20 year period, a decrease of 65%. This 
highlights the fact that although society may agree there is an emissions reduction need, penalties 
or incentives are necessary to ensure there is a price signal to react to and that there are few, if 
any, free riders (as few parties are exempt any of the subsidies). 
Energy conservation 
The role of households in helping Australia meet its emission reduction targets is becoming 
increasingly noticeable, reflected in the increasing belief in the reality of climate change, the 
uptake of energy efficient appliances, the substantial uptake of household PV and the electricity 
demand response to increasing retail electricity prices. Shahiduzzam et al (2015) observed the 
potential of energy efficiency in commenting that “energy efficiency played a dominant role in 
the measured 17% reduction in CO2e emissions aggregate intensity in Australia over the period 
1978-2010”. 
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Wholesale market opportunities may become available in the future that allow households to 
participate at the wholesale level as well as the retail level. For example the DAP scheme which 
took effect in early 2015 is mainly targeted at commercial enterprises but this may be expanded 
to enable households to participate. The carbon offset scheme allows approved parties and 
approved products to create carbon offsets for purchase by parties with emission reduction 
liabilities, such as those that have become part of the DAP auction. As mentioned in Australian 
Government, Department of Environment (2010) approved products include carbon reductions 
from tree planting and firing of land fill emissions, with many other opportunities that could be 
provided if schemes such as this were given more prominence. An indication of consumer 
preferences for policy instruments was canvassed in a survey of 245 executives by the Carbon 
Market Institute (2014) resulting in vehicle emission and energy standards being most preferred, 
followed by the RET target and a domestic carbon offset scheme ahead of another eight choices 
further supporting the views above.  
Battery storage 
The fast developing market advance of cheaper batteries will create incentives for Australian 
households to further reduce GHG emissions with another upsurge expected in household PV. 
For Australian households already with PV the payback period is comparatively high if their PV 
is the most common size of 1.5 kW to 3.0 kW, being at least 12 years. The payback period falls 
substantially for households with PV systems in excess of 4kW because PV exports increase at a 
proportionately faster rate with PV system size, and battery costs exhibit substantial economies of 
scale. Although the payback period is currently about 11 years it is expected to eventually fall to 
nearly five years. Based on the experience with household PV a five year payback period will 
result in a substantial uptake of battery storage systems. Unlike household PV this mini boom is 
not driven by subsidies, although subsidies were largely responsible for the initial household PV 
boom.  
At the household level there has been much research recently relating to the development of 
models to find the optimal mix of solar/wind and battery storage for given load profiles. Fast 
developing technologies and greater economies of scale in the future suggest that eventually such 
“integration” models may become available for use by households to assist them in cost 
effectively integrating their energy choices. 
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8.7 Limitations of research 
 
The 20 year database used in this thesis is from Australia published information gathered over the 
years FY 2000 to FY 2015 plus forecast information for the subsequent five years. Forecasts are 
based on assumptions which have been rapidly changing and need constant updating. Data for 
household PV analysis was available in more detail than for large-scale renewable energy and 
hence more reliable. Household FIT payments were built up from (1) state FITs, noting access to 
FITs in some states extended beyond announced expiry dates, and from (2) state PV installations. 
Although the outcomes were matched against various press releases of FIT payments, and found 
to be comparable, further analysis would be desirable.  
Recent data shows the rapid pace of developments in the areas of renewable energy and 
conservation: faster than most forecasters anticipated. In particular household PV has grown 
faster than forecast, total energy consumption has declined faster than anticipated, household 
average electricity household consumption is lower than expected and future retail electricity 
tariffs are likely to be lower than expected. These events do not impact on the key year of focus, 
being household PV over the period FY 2000 to FY 2014, or on the broad conclusions reached 
but the speed of change means that constant updating is required. Most importantly these changes 
will impact forecasts over the period FY 2020 to FY 2030, not examined in this thesis. 
A key development considered important enough to incorporate at a late stage, was the recent 
rapid rise in LGC prices, stimulating renewed interest in large-scale renewable energy projects. 
At the time of writing LGC prices were still increasing, making large-scale renewable energy 
projects more attractive and increasing the level of subsidies to be paid by a electricity 
consumers. 
From a modelling viewpoint the key data limitation relates to reconciling renewable energy 
growth data to the creation of LGCs, as shown in the REC Registry. There are a number of 
reasons for this, particularly the fact that LGC data is for calendar years and model data and 
BREE output data are for financial years. In addition renewable energy baselines for each 
renewable energy type, showed unexplainable variations which the CER could not explain and 
warrants further investigation. This required approximations of how numbers of LGCs were 
determined but not to the extent that they affected the broad conclusions reached. 
One development has unwittingly made household PV more attractive. Reduced electricity 
consumption has resulted in more electricity being exported rather than used to offset domestic 
consumption, increasing FIT returns in excess of retail tariff rate savings. This may help explain 
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why current growth in household PV has been stronger than most forecasters had expected, and is 
another area that could be further explored. 
8.8 Policy implications of thesis results 
 
The results of this thesis highlight a range of future policy issues.  
The undertakings by Australia in seeking to meet emission reduction targets and renewable energy 
targets need policies that transparently show how these targets are expected to be achieved 
including the expected relationship between these policies, including ensuring “double dipping” 
does not occur and how targets at different future points of time will be met. A concern, already 
experienced by households in regard to PV, is an assurance that ongoing incentives will remain in 
place for a minimum time period. The history of FITs suggests that policies are better determined 
nationally than on a state by state basis and that there is bipartisan support.  
There are consequent market implications of the growth in renewable energy that will be 
highlighted further as the growth in renewable energy continues. Network companies need to ensure 
there is adequate capacity to meet situations of high renewable energy output when the direction of 
electricity flows reverse and in times when there is volatility in wind generation when backup, 
typically gas-fired or hydro, generation is required. The extent to which new network capital 
expenditure is required will become a testing exercise for the associated regulator, the AER.  
Generator revenues will be impacted by their bidding behaviour. Renewable energy with very low 
operating costs, can provide low priced bids but to the extent to which such bids set the pool price, 
all generators pool price revenue will be reduced (Wilkie, 2015).  This is the classic marginal cost 
pricing dilemma which has resolution in bidders raising their bids, when the market allows, that is 
when there is little competition, to ensure additional revenue is secured in these times to provide 
adequate revenue (that is for capital replacement) over longer time periods, such as annually. This 
may test authorities such as the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission who have in the 
past (Burtt, 2009) investigated the bidding behaviour of generators to ensure there has been no 
abuse of market power.  
The structure of franchise tariffs is a key market efficiency issue because of the need to provide 
market participants with price signals that reflect underlying market costs. This particularly applies 
to demand side management and will be important in the future with the expected increase in 
electric motor vehicles. Flat franchise tariffs do not encourage load shifting to lower cost periods; 
nor do they provide the incentive for electric vehicle charging to occur outside the period of peak 
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demand (Young et al, 2015). The structure of franchise tariffs differs by state and ideally need to be 
the type of three part tariff as in NSW on a national level.   
There is also the network issue of ensuring network companies receive adequate revenue as a result 
of increasing number of PV households reducing electricity imported from the grid, and in extreme 
cases going “off grid” (Oliva and MacGill, 2013). Innovative tariffs and a realistic time period for 
adjustment will be required, possibly again involving the AER (as mentioned three paragraphs 
earlier).  
8.9 Suggested areas for future research 
 
There are some areas for future research in an Australian context, which would add value to this 
thesis, being mainly an expansion of research already undertaken. Firstly there are areas related to 
data trends and comparative economics associated with achieving improved efficiencies from 
household PV. Solar emission reduction benefits are sensitive to levels of household electricity 
consumption and to load shape. The extent to which household electricity consumption continues 
to decline will alter the economics through changing the offset and export balance. The continued 
roll out of half-hourly meters, with associated data availability, and more households having 
access to wholesale market prices, or surrogates such as three part pricing, will assist in 
determining the long-term value of PV. The economics of these developments should be better 
understood. 
Secondly there is value in monitoring the expiry of FITs by Australian state as it is possible, with 
declining battery costs, that there will be an upsurge both in battery purchases and (again) in 
household PV. Being prepared for this may help avoid another boom and bust outcome. 
Thirdly there is expected to be increased interest in Australia in customised methods to determine 
the optimal integration of wind generation, solar generation and electricity storage associated 
with individual demand profiles. This could occur at both the household and wholesale level. It is 
likely that standard software might eventually be available at the household level, coinciding with 
reduced battery storage costs, to allow households to better utilise renewable energy generation. 
Households may attempt to go “off-grid” but the eventual reality of the risk of renewable-energy 
related power shortages may prove to be a limiting factor. A better appreciation of these events 
will be important for market operators and network companies. 
 Fourthly, in response to the increased interest by Australian households to participate in 
conservation measures, there is value in determining means by which households can contribute 
to emissions reductions. This could occur at the macro level in the form of demand reduction 
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aggregation or at the micro level through greater use of more energy efficient appliances and 
through households being provided with the ability to respond to two or three part pricing. 
The structure of any FIT scheme in future needs careful consideration as this thesis suggests. The 
dilemma is that FIT schemes need to provide investors with enough certainty to invest while still 
giving policy makers some forward pricing discretion. A critical aspect is whether FIT changes 
are applied at the decision-making stage or on an ongoing basis, being particularly relevant for 
households with PV installed. If the latter is adopted households are forced to make investment 
decisions in an uncertain future financial climate which, as witnessed in NSW in Australia, could 
have a strong public backlash. 
On a broader scale there is a need for more research into the relationship between emission 
reduction schemes, their comparative timing and the comparative cots involved. The need for 
investment certainty needs to be balanced against the ongoing cost-effectiveness of subsidies, and 
whether they are paid for by electricity consumers or sourced from states or the Commonwealth 
Government. Included in the mix should be realisation that reduced GHG emissions are more 
cost-effectively achieved if incentives or penalties are applied at the source of generation rather 
than consumers of electricity. This is evidenced in electricity consumers’ comparatively low price 
elasticity of demand. 
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Appendix A: Model Explanation  
 
This Appendix provides additional detail relating to the model that has been developed. It is in 
three parts: firstly explaining the process used in determining annual payback periods for 
household PV; secondly explaining how the components of retail prices and total generation by 
fuel type, emission levels and pool prices were determined; and thirdly explaining how total 
output and subsidy-related output were determined for each large-scale renewable energy type. 
The financial year ended June 2013 was used as a specific example in some instances.  
Information from various publications was used to either provide the necessary data or provide 
closely related information to ensure approximations were as realistic as possible. Some of the 
information sources not shown in References, are listed at the end of this Appendix. 
A.1 Household PV model explanation 
PV at the household level was analysed, on an annual basis from 2005 to 2014 and then forecast 
to 2020, by noting the average size of new solar systems (which ranged from 2.5kW to 3.9 kW 
over time), the average cost of new solar panels, using $/MWh costs inclusive of installation 
costs, which was then discounted by the value of STCs. This information was used in the 
regression model to convert payback periods to forecast levels of household PV uptake and then 
compared with other household PV forecasts which were not dissimilar.  
STC prices used ranged from low AU$30s/MWh to AU$39/MWh reflecting the legislative 
AU$40/MWh cap. For modelling purpose a future AU$37/MWh price was used. Benefits were 
noted as the value of electricity exported to the grid, calculated from the weighted average FIT in 
Australia in the years concerned and the volume of exports, plus  reduced consumption benefits 
arising from solar output being used for domestic consumption. The weighted average FIT was 
determined on a state by state basis for each year. The volume of exports was developed by 
noting the average output of new PV systems, being 3.5 hours per day, then separated into output 
exported to the grid (2.5 hours per day) and output used to offset domestic consumption (1.0 
hours per day). These figures were derived from Frontier Economics (2001) and also cross 
checked data from other sources such as AEMO (2000). 
FIT revenue was noted as the payment made by retailers for electricity benefits they received 
from a reduction in their electricity purchases, in the order of AU6c/kWh to AU8c/kWh, plus the 
legislated FIT retailers received from network companies, being each state’s legislative 
obligation. 
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The cost and benefit figures were used to calculate annual payback periods. This method of 
financial evaluation is comparatively simple enabling households to easily determine the 
economics of their decision-making. The outcome was payback periods falling to a low of three 
to four years in 2010 and 2011, subsequently increasing to five to six years, supported by the 
continuation of relatively high electricity franchise tariffs.   
Payback periods were regressed against the actual uptake of household PV, which was used for 
sensitivity analysis as mentioned in Section 5.6. Household PV output was used to determine 
numbers of STCs, noting the deeming impact, and factored up to produce annual numbers of 
STCs. The numbers compared favourably with those reported in EGA(2014). PV output exported 
to the grid and used to offset domestic consumption was examined to determine the level of GHG 
emission reductions on a counter-factual basis as discussed in Section 6.1.  
A.2 Generation data and retail price build-up explanations 
 
A model replicating generation by fuel type was developed covering the 20 year period 2000 to 
2020. Input and output data were determined for each financial year with annual trends analysed 
as a reality cross check. FY 2013 was chosen as a sample year to explain key components in 
detail. Key components were: 
Marginal cost of energy (MCE) 
The marginal cost of energy associated with each of the four generation fuel types has three 
components being: 
Carbon price 
For FY 2013 there was a carbon price in place of AU$23/tonne of CO2e. The contribution of this 
price in the pool price is a reflection of the types of generation setting the pool price. For example 
if only gas-fired generation was setting the pool price the contribution would be AU$13.8/MWh 
because gas-fired generation has a carbon intensity factor of 0.6 tonnes of CO2e/MWh of output. 
For FY 2013 the mix of generation types setting the pool price is shown in the blue column 
headed “MP set” (Table A-1). The generation type mix was applied on a weighted average basis 
to the carbon intensity factor for each fuel type in the column headed “carbon int. fctr” giving rise 
to the AU$18.14/MWh carbon price component of the pool price. 
 
 
170 
 
Fuel price 
The fuel price was highest for gas-fired generation, at AU$35/MWh, calculated from a gas price 
of AU$3/GJ and a heat rate (GJ/MWh) of 10. Brown and black coaled-fired generation were the 
next most expensive, between AU$18 and AU$20/MWh. Renewable energy has a very low 
marginal cost of energy as the inputs are wind, solar and hydro, with bagasse being the only 
renewable generation with a small fuel cost. . 
Capital recovery cost 
Capital recovery reflects the extent to which each generator type is able to recover its fixed costs, 
reflected in the level of competition at that time. This cost component is in effect the balancing 
component used to produce the total cost able to be recovered by each generation type in setting 
the pool price. It represents the difference between known pool prices and known input costs. 
Calibration of cost components 
The model was calibrated against various cost and market data as a reality check and to ensure 
consistency. For example the pool price is known (from AEMO) to be AU$59.58/MWh for FY 
2013. Total output by generation type is provided by BREE (Bureau of Resource and Energy 
Economics). Knowledge of which generators set the pool price was obtained from ad hoc 
publications from organisations such as ROAM Consulting and by analysing AEMO pool price 
data by half-hour. As mentioned in Section 5.6.3, AEMO pool price data were analysed on a half-
hour basis for calendar year 2012 as part of the household PV determination of emissions 
reductions. Hence it was possible to approximate the mix of generation types that set the pool 
price in FY 2013. 
Retail electricity price 
The retail electricity price, built up from AEMC and BREE data, has components: 
Energy prices 
Energy prices used were an average of pool prices in the current year and the previous year (that 
is AU$30.62/MWh for FY 2012 and AU$59.58/MWh for FY 2013, giving a figure of 
AU$79.85/MWh that was used). The reason for this is that the energy component is calculated 
differently in each state by that state’s regulator, generally comprising a mix of the LRMC for 
new generation, and market contract prices. Market contract prices are usually at a margin above 
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the previous year’s pool price. Hence a mix of current and previous year energy prices was used 
as an approximation. This is not a critical component of the modelling. 
Peak adjustment factor 
A peak adjustment factor was applied to convert flat (time weighted) energy prices into profiled 
(load weighted) energy prices, being representative of the load profile of energy that retailers are 
required to purchase from AEMO. This reflects the fact that retailers are required to purchase 
more electricity in peak periods when pool prices are higher. A factor of 1.8 was used in earlier 
years declining to 1.4 for current and future years, reflecting action taken by consumers to reduce 
the peakiness of their loads, with household PV being largely responsible for this.   
Network costs 
Network costs were approximated from a range of sources, including tariff determinations by 
state regulators, and cross-checked with reported percentage breakdowns of retail price 
components as well as a trend series developed to track approved network costs each year. 
Network costs are also partly a balancing component between known retail prices and other 
substantiated cost component. FITs included in network charges were deducted for reporting 
separately as one of the renewable energy subsidies. Although approximations were required 
network costs are not a critical component of the analysis. Network costs were also expressed on 
a per MWh basis, using BREE total generation data.  
Renewable energy costs 
Renewable energy costs, exclusive of grants, comprise three components: STC costs; LGC costs; 
and FIT costs. STC and LGC costs were each calculated by multiplying the percentage liability 
obligation by STC and LGC prices. STC and LGC prices and FITs are covered in detail in 
Chapter 5. Unit costs were factored up to produce total Australian costs which were cross-
checked against published data. 
The remaining part of Table A.1 shows renewable and FIT figures expressed in different ways. 
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Table A-1 FY 2013 Screen shot of model components of retail electricity prices  
R 2012/13                 
Input 
Factors 
Carbon 
price pass thro %               
carbon cost 23.00 79% 18.14             
Other 
energy cost     41.44             
Total (pool 
price)     59.58             
  MCE           MP set Output Emissions 
Fuel Type ie fuel 
carbon int. 
fctr carbon cost 
Inc 
carbon Cap Rec. 
Total 
cost wtg (GWh pa) (000 tCo2) 
brown coal 20 1.3 30.8 50.8 13.0 63.8 18% 47,555 63,724 
black coal 18 0.9 21.6 39.6 10.0 49.6 22% 10,050 104,802 
gas 35 0.6 14.7 49.7 21.0 70.7 52% 57,463 36,776 
renewables 1 0.1 2.3 3.3 0.0 3.3 8% 32,566 3,257 
Total   0.84     115.3 wtd av. 59.58 147,634 208,558 
    wtd av. 
carbon cost 
in pool price   18.14   $/MWh 253.8   
gas price 
($/GJ) 3   
cost ex. 
Carbon   41.30   59.58     
heat rate 10         
Peak adj. 
fctr 1.80     
          107.24 
Profiled 
cost 79.85     
        2.12 
Includes 
FIT 
Network 
cost 160.00     
    
               
renewables 
% of ret. 
Price     4% 
renewabl
es $13.23 STC Ratio STC cost 
  
Carbon in 
retail price   32.66 $/MWh       21.36% $34 
  
Carbon % 
of retail 
price   11% carbon   
retailer 
margin 43.02   40 
            
Retail 
elec. 
Price  296.10     
. 
A.3 Explanation of how renewable energy model data was determined 
The information shown in Tables 6.8 to 6.11, particularly annual output and subsidy-related 
output, was determined by ensuring the data was as close as the model would allow to BREE 
(now Office of Chief Economist) output data and the CER’s Registry on creation of LGCs by 
renewable energy type. 
For each renewable energy type the level of capacity, in MW, was determined from EGA (2010) 
and cross-checked against other information including Energy Supply Association of Australia 
annual reports. On a year by year basis for each renewable energy type, the level of capacity was 
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converted to annual output by noting the average hours the renewable energy type was most 
likely to operate, factored up from average hours per day. The outcome was calibrated against 
actual (BREE) annual output. Specifically large-scale solar operated at between 5 and 9 hours per 
day, averaging 7 hours per day post 2016. Wind was found to operate between 6 and 9 hours a 
day, averaging 9 hours per day post 2016. Hydro was found to operate 4 to 6 hours per day, 
averaging 6 hours per day post 2016. Bagasse proved to be the most difficult to analyse because 
output reflected both good and bad sugar crush seasons and because output was seasonal. This 
was made easier when Pioneer (68 MW) came on stream in 2005 and MacKay Racecourse (38 
MW) came on stream at the end of 2012, both being run almost all year round. Hence bagasse 
was found to operate initially between 6 and 8 hours a day, although lower in the poor crush 
seasons of 2001 and 2002, increasing to 12 hours a day post 2011 which was retained post 2016. 
In each year, levels of additional capacity were determined, being input into determination of 
payback periods. Large-scale solar showed little new capacity until 2010 when subsidy-assisted 
Moree (56 MW), Kogan Creek Solar Boost (46 MW) and AGL’s Nyngan (147 MW) projects 
took effect. With wind, additional and often substantial capacity increases occurred regularly, 
year by year, with the outcome showing a close correlation with annual wind output, being the 
closest of any renewable energy type. Hydro energy was also easy to analyse as very little 
additional capacity occurred since the base level of 8,000 MW in 1997. In the case of bagasse, as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, capacity increases were on one-off bases, being subsidy 
driven, the first being Rocky Point (30 MW) in 2001.  
Subsidies associated with capital increases were allocated over the years when additional capital 
was expected to take effect. This process enabled payback periods to exhibit meaningful results, 
such as no payback period being negative, for each renewable energy type. 
Capital costs (AU$/MW) were noted from various sources including Renewable Power 
Generation Costs (2014) and press releases relating to individual projects, such as Ecogeneration 
(2009) stating, for example that Broadwater and Condong (total of 60 MW) cost AU$220 million, 
being AU$3.7/MW, in line with trend figures used. 
Payback periods were then determined by using capital costs mentioned above, discounted by any 
grants, and revenue from LGCs and load weighted pool price exports to the grid less any fuel 
costs. Fuel costs were only applied in the case of bagasse as there are no fuel costs associated 
with the other types of renewable energy. Load weighted pool prices were used to reflect revenue 
that would be paid under Power Purchase Agreements, being the revenue stream that most 
projects would seek to secure.  
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Biomass was treated differently from other renewable energy types as it consists of nine different 
energy types, with REC Registry data showing most output from land fill gas, followed by black 
liquor, wood waste and waste coal mine gas. The approach taken was to use BREE data for 
output and to assume growth post 2016 in line with past growth rates with LGC creation being 
output levels less CER baseline levels.   
A.4 Reconciliation of large-scale renewable energy output with REC Registry 
data 
The Clean Energy Regulator (CER) maintains a Renewable Energy REC Registry which 
requires, by legislation, that creators of STCs and LGCs register these environmental certificates. 
The creators can then on-sell these certificates to parties such as electricity retailers, who have a 
legal obligation to purchase these certificates each calendar year.  
The model that has been developed serves various purposes including determining output levels 
and numbers of LGC and STC levels, which are reconciled against public data including LGCs 
shown in the REC Registry, for each fuel type. The importance of this reconciliation is to ensure 
renewable subsidy levels (which LGCs and STCs represent) are accurately modelled for 
forecasting subsidy levels and forecasting the growth in renewable energy. It is the increase in 
numbers of STCs and LGCs, since 2020 that help determine whether Australia is able to meets its 
renewable energy targets. 
The REC Registry contains STCs and LGCs by validity type, of which there are seven, six of 
which cover LGCs, and fuel type, of which there are 20. Fuel types have been aggregated into six 
categories: household PV, large scale PV, hydro, wind, bagasse and biomass. 
The number of LGCs produced has been recreated in a model by noting total output, reconciled 
against BREE data, in the six categories mentioned from which baseline levels converted from 
calendar years to financial years, have been deducted. 
The CER defines LGC baselines as the average of renewable energy output over the three years 
1994, 1995 and 1996. However investigation of the REC Registry shows that in fact this is only 
an approximation (Table A-2) so actual baseline levels shown in the CER website (under Register 
of accredited power stations) have instead been used. 
In broad terms it could have been expected that output levels less baseline levels determine the 
number of LGCs. This was not always the case, particularly in fuel types where there were many 
producers whose output varied above and below their baselines, such as with sugar cogeneration 
(cogen) mills. Where baselines were above output levels, increased output may not have 
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produced LGCs if output did not reach this level. Furthermore in some years the output of some 
plants may go over baseline levels and for other plants drop below baseline levels. These 
comments are made to highlight the difficulties in reconciling (BREE) output above baselines 
with (REC Registry) actual LGCs created, being a particular issue with bagasse cogen and hydro 
energy. Reconciliation was made easier through discussions with the CER who advised that they 
did not consider LGCs “invalid due to audit” and “pending audit” to be creditable LGCs at this 
stage (CER, 2016). The fact that for bagasse and hydro, good years generally apply to the fuel 
type as a whole helps reduce this effect.  
Baseline and output analysis by renewable energy fuel type 
Hydro energy 
The hydro energy baseline shown in the REC Registry averages 15,630 GWh pa which compares 
with BREE’s 16,200 GWh pa average hydro output over 1994, 1995 and 1996 in effect providing 
LGCs above the three year output averages. The number of LGCs shown in the REC Registry, 
when compared with BREE output numbers, on a common financial year basis, requires the REC 
baseline figure to be on average 1,600 GWh pa lower than the 15,630 GWh pa baseline figure. 
The figures have been examined in as much detail as is available, including individual hydro 
power station baselines but LGCs are only available in aggregate for all hydro power stations. 
Only parties that are participants, that is inputting data into the REC Registry, can view 
individual power station LGC figures. Similarly BREE data is only available for hydro power 
stations in aggregate. Discussions with the CER personnel have not assisted in trying to resolve 
why baselines used are effectively lower than indicated, being necessary to generate these higher 
than anticipated LGC numbers. This apparent hydro baseline reduction was also noted by 
MacGill et al (2006).  
To ensure a meaningful relationship could be established between hydro output levels and LGCs 
created, baselines were reduced by an average 1,600 GWh pa with variations summing to zero on 
an annual basis.  
Wind energy 
Modelling of renewable energy growth and associated LGC data were found to be very close for 
wind energy, assisted by there being a very small baseline and hence not complicated by 
variations in baseline levels.  
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Solar Energy 
Solar energy was split into three sections: household PV generating STCs, large scale solar 
generating LGCs and non-subsidised, possibly commercial, solar operating prior to 2000 which 
because of the timing, did not generate either STCs or LGCs. BREE data is the basis for non-
subsidised solar energy. 
The total solar output position, as determined by BREE, was taken as the starting point. 
Household PV, as determined by the detailed model, was deducted from these figures on an 
annual basis to provide non-household PV, consisting of large-scale LGC stimulated solar and 
non-subsidised solar. 
Large-scale solar output was determined from the number of solar LGCs, that is excluding small-
scale solar STC, shown in the REC Registry which will be an accurate indicator as there is no 
solar baseline. Non-subsidised solar therefore became the residual figure. 
For forecasting purposes it was assumed the historic growth in non-subsidised solar would 
continue, resulting in non-subsidised solar decreasing from 100% of all solar output in 2000 to 
below 10 percent from FY 2012 onwards. Consistency with BREE output data was maintained.  
Bagasse 
For bagasse BREE data was matched against output from sugar cane co-gen plants. 
The REC Registry shows that the LGC baseline increased only marginally, from 468,000 LGCs 
in 2002 to 510,000 LGCs in 2003, rising to 513,000 where it has remained since FY 2008. 
Output was very low in the drought years of 2000 and 2001 but has since risen substantially from 
291,000 MWh in FY 2002, the first full year, to 1,676,000 MWh in FY 2015. The increase in 
LGCs has however not matched output growth increasing from 278,000 LGCs in FY2002 to 
822,000 LGCs in 2015, an increase of 544,000 LGCs compared with output increase of nearly 
1,400,000 MWh. Part of the reason is because increased output has occurred with some mills that 
had yet to reach baseline levels and therefore did not produce LGCs in line with increased output. 
Biomass 
It was not possible to model inputs and outputs for biomass, being from a wide range of fuels but 
biomass needed to be included as it is a material figure contained in BREE data. However it was 
possible to apply a similar concept to that used for other renewable fuels, that is average output 
over the three base years of 1994, 1995 and 1996 was determined and deducted from output post 
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2000 to determine growth volumes that would generate LGCs. A continuation of average annual 
growth of 5 percent pa was used to develop forecasts over the period FY2015 to FY 2020. The 
same emission reduction effects were assumed to apply as for bagassse generation.  
Variations in renewable energy baselines 
Variations in renewable energy baselines were found to occur between those determined from the 
average output for years 1994, 1995 and 1996, as required by legislation, and actual baselines 
notified by the CER. This is likely to be mainly due to the average output figures provided by 
Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science. (2015a) being on a financial year 
basis and the CER figures being on a calendar year basis, but converted to financial year figures. 
For modelling purposes, to ensure LGCs created lined up with those in the REC Registry, 
baselines used more closely aligned with the CER figures (Table A-2). 
                  Table 2-2 Comparison of financial year renewable energy baselines 
Fuel type 
Average 1994, 1995, 
1996 output 
Shown in REC 
Registry (2002) 
Used in Modelling 
(FY 2002) 
  (GWh) (GWh (GWh) 
Large-scale solar     19 0 0 
Wind 4 5 6 
Hydro                 16,206 15,673 15,130 
Bagasse                   104 467 308 
Biomass                 670 574 560 
Total                      17,003 16,719 16,004 
 
Source: Australian Government, Department of Industry and Science. (2015a), REC Registry in Clean 
Energy Regulator website (www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au), 
A.5 Sources of information used to provide model data not elsewhere specified 
 
The following data reference sources were used in the model being in addition to data reference 
sources mentioned in the main document. 
ABARES. (2011). “Energy in Australia”  (www.abares.gov.au) for 2011 renewable energy data  
 
AER. (2011, 2012) “State of the Energy Market” for 2011 and 2012 retail prices and generator 
bidding behaviour; pool prices by state 
 
CER. (2016), Email to author from CER on eligible LGCs and Accredited power station 
baselines, 17 March 2016 
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Clean Energy Council. (2011), Clean Energy Australia report 2011, Clean Energy Council 
assisted by SunWiz Consulting See www.cleanenergycouncil.org.au  for installed capacity by 
renewable type and state, 2001 to 2011 and newly proposed renewable energy projects 
 
Clean Energy Council. (2012), Clean Energy Australia report 2012, Clean Energy Council 
assisted by SunWiz Consulting  See  www.cleanenergycouncil.org.au  for installed capacity by 
renewable type and state, 2002 to 2012 and newly proposed renewable energy projects 
 
EGA. (2010), Electricity Gas Australia 2010, Energy Supply Association of Australia See 
www.esaa.com.au for generation by fuel type, by state and emission factors (by subscription) 
 
EGA. (2014), Electricity Gas Australia 2014, Energy Supply Association of Australia See 
www.esaa.com.au for generation by fuel type, by state and emission factors  
 
Frontier Economics. (2012), Possible Future Retail Electricity Price Movements – A Report for 
the AEMC, Dec 2012  See www.frontier-economics.com for LRMC residual for MRET scheme, 
by network area 
 
Riesz, J. (2011), Carbon Pricing and Electricity. What will a carbon price mean for Electricity in 
Australia? QUT presentation, 29 July 2011 
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